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The thesis is an attempt to critique the operation of the UN collective security system, 
in particular in relation to territorial disputes. In the introduction, the author argues that 
territorial disputes are an important, common but dangerous type of international 
disputes which can be, and have been controversially intervened by the UNCSS. 
Accordingly, the author has found out that the interaction between territorial disputes 
and the UNCSS is worthy to be studied. In the First main chapter, the author has 
reviewed the past literatures on either the UNCSS or territorial disputes, and evaluated 
the traditional route of legal research. Accordingly, the author argues that his research 
perspective of jointly studying territorial disputes and the UNCSS by combining legal 
and political theories is rather original, as the existing literatures tend to focus on general 
studies from their own research fields. Meanwhile, the author also argues that the 
realistic philosophy and the qualitative library-based literary methods are rather suitable 
for the current research topic, as they can deviate from the set paradigm without 
becoming impracticable. In the second main chapter, the author has addressed the 
inherent nature and the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. Accordingly, the 
author argues that the land-territory disputes among member states of the United 
Nations can be defined as the working objects of study of this thesis. Moreover, the 
author also argues that the characters of territorial disputes are unfavorable for their 
settlement, and the peaceful measures are overly affected by the will of the direct parties, 
thus the intervention of the UNCSS is necessary. In the third main chapter, the author 
has described the authoritative institutions, operating mechanism and predetermined 
purposes of the UNCSS in handling territorial disputes. Moreover, the author has also 
analyzed the relationships between the UNCSS and the peaceful measures, the right of 
self-defence and definite regional organizations in regard to territorial disputes. 
Accordingly, the author argues that the UNCSS is responsible for returning the relevant 
situation to peace, and it has to primarily trust in its own changing structure and ability. 
In the fourth main chapter, the author has examined the practice of the four sets of 
forcible or non-forcible measures of the UNCSS in dealing with territorial disputes. 
9 
 
Accordingly, the author argues that none of these measures is perfect, but their 
effectiveness is generally determined by their coerciveness, or mandatory power. In the 
fifth main chapter, the author has proposed his thoughts and plan for the reform of the 
UNCSS in the field of territorial disputes. Accordingly, the author argues that the 
shortages of the UNCSS related to territorial disputes are both explainable and 
amendable, so that the future of the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes is 
worthy to be anticipated. In the conclusion, the author summarized the entire thesis 
through listing all his research findings, following the set research questions.  
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The United Nations Collective Security System (hereinafter ‘the UNCSS’) and 
territorial disputes are two seemingly distinct topics within the system of modern 
international law: 
The former refers to the forcible mechanism under the name of the United Nations, in 
which the member states act collectively to guarantee their harmonious internal order, 
and therefrom further maintaining international peace and security. Theoretically 
speaking, this mechanism not only enjoys the exclusive command of the UNSC and 
other organs of the United Nations, but also has the right to recruit the combined 
strength of all the member states to enforce an extensive range of sanctions (especially 
the centralized use of force). Unfortunately, due to the repeated failure of its past 
operating attempts, this mechanism is still being thoroughly criticized by those leading 
international legal scholars (for the details of this mechanism, see 4.1 below).1 
The latter refers to the disagreement among multiple states over the sovereign 
ownership or control of a particular piece of territory. Practically speaking, according 
to its various different definitions, this dispute not only can involve plenty of core actors 
in the modern international relations, but also can cover most of the geographical spaces 
in which the human civilizations and activities are existing. Nevertheless, due to the 
rapid change of its background international situations, this dispute has been largely 
banished from the present Western world (for the details of this concept, see 3.1 below).2  
At the beginning of this thesis, therefore, it is necessary to explain the interrelated 
importance of the UNCSS and territorial disputes from the perspective of modern 
international law, so as to show the practical significance and internal connection of this 
research topic. Naturally, this introductory chapter will also set out the basic structure 
                                                        
1 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 339; Gary Wilson, The United Nati
ons and Collective Security (Routledge 2014) 5-8. 
2 See e.g. Alan Day & Judith Bell (eds), Border and Territorial Disputes (2nd edn, Cartermill I
nternational 1987) ch 1. 
17 
 
of the thesis. 
1.1 The importance of territorial disputes in the context of international law 
International law, or the law of nations, as it is traditionally called, refers to ‘the name 
for the body of customary and conventional rules which are considered legally binding 
by civilized states in their relation with each other.’3  In other words, the modern 
international law, which originates from the era of the Peace of Westphalia, exists and 
continues to develop on the basis of sovereign states and their need to regulate their 
mutual relationships.4 In addition, it is clear that recent theories of international law 
have recognized other international political entities, such as inter-governmental 
organizations5 or even individuals,6 as the subjects of international law. However, at 
the moment, sovereign states are still the main focus and core subject of international 
law.7 
Correspondingly, the element of territory also holds the primary position among the 
four basic pre-conditions listed in the Montevideo Convention that must be met for a 
state to be said to exist.8 If an international political entity does not have a defined 
territory, then it cannot have a permanent population. If it does not have a permanent 
population, it also cannot form a stable human society, and accordingly there is no need 
to organize a government. If it does not have a government, and is therefore merely a 
group of scattered individuals, it can hardly enter into relations with other states.9 
Meanwhile, according to Morgenthau, territory and the various natural elements 
attached to it, provide the basic tangible prerequisites for the stable national strength 
                                                        
3 Robert Y. Jennings & Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (9th edn, Longman 
1992) 4.  
4 Matthew Craven, ‘Statehood, Self-Determination, and Recognition’, in Malcolm Evans (ed), In
ternational Law (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 203 at 208-17. 
5 See e.g. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opin
ion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174. 
6 E.g. International criminal law, see Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 
143-50. 
7 See Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005), 71-72. 
8 See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention) (signed 26 Dec
ember 1933) 165 LNTS 19, art 1. 
9 See e.g. Jan Klabbers, International Law (CUP 2013) 70-71. 
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and further development of sovereign states.10 Territory is therefore one of the core 
national interests which must be safeguarded by states for the purpose of ensuring their 
competitive ability in international society. 
Owing to this double-tiered relationship between territories and states and states and 
international law, the abnormal change of the sovereignty ownership of territories is 
definitely capable of creating serious international disputes. Thereby, this issue could 
actually further test the effectiveness of international law in the relevant practice: 
For example, although many common states tend to adopt a forbearing stance in their 
diplomatic activities due to their relative weakness,11 but sovereignty and territorial 
integrity are still uncompromisably necessary for keeping their basic national strength.12 
Similarly, even though the superpowers rarely have to face international disputes which 
directly relate to their own territories,13 but territories remain the original basis on 
which all the superpowers compete with each other. Meanwhile, territories are an 
accurate indicator of the rise and fall of the national strength of those superpowers as 
well.14 Besides, even in regions where processes of integration have served to weaken 
the significance of sovereignty, the status of territories is also highly praised by local 
states. Accordingly, territorial disputes may still have a potentially negative impact on 
the peace, international co-operation and rule of law over there.15 
                                                        
10 Hans J. Morgenthau (author), Kenneth W. Thompson & David Clinton (revised), Politics am
ong Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power (7th edn, McGraw-Hill 2005) ch 9. 
11 See e.g. Andrew F. Cooper & Timothy M. Shaw (eds), The Diplomacies of Small States: Be
tween Vulnerability and Resilience (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) pt 1. 
12 Hans J. Morgenthau (author), Kenneth W. Thompson & David Clinton (revised), Politics am
ong Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power (7th edn, McGraw-Hill 2005) 318-20. 
13 CIA, ‘Transnational Issues > Disputes > International by country, All CIA World Factbooks 
18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008’ (NationMaster.com) <http://www.nationmaster.com/gra
ph/gov_tra_iss_dis_int-government-transnational-issues-disputes-international> accessed 7 January 2
014. 
14 E.g. A series of new-born territorial disputes within the borders of the former socialist repub
lics in Eastern Europe, after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. See CIA, ‘Transnational Issues > 
Disputes > International by country, All CIA World Factbooks 18 December 2003 to 18 Decem
ber 2008’ (NationMaster.com) <http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/gov_tra_iss_dis_int-government-
transnational-issues-disputes-international> accessed 7 January 2014. 
15 E.g. The issue of Gibraltar within the frontier of the EU. See Keith Azopardi, Sovereignty a
nd the Stateless Nation: Gibraltar in the Modern Legal Context (Hart Publishing 2009); Nigel 
White, Democracy Goes to War: British Military Deployments under International Law (OUP 2
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Under the above circumstances, territorial disputes among the sovereign states have 
certainly formed one of the main international disputes that are both most regularly seen 
and most likely to directly threaten international peace and security (with regard to the 
working definition of territorial disputes in the context of this thesis, see chapter 3 
below).16 Consequently, this type of dispute has become a crucial long-term issue 
within the framework of modern international legal system:  
Actually, among those international armed conflicts which both brought about 
casualties and occurred between 1816 and 2001, approximately half contained some 
elements of territorial dispute.17 Besides, those conflicts caused by territorial disputes 
are also the most bloody and long-lasting conflicts among all types of international 
armed conflicts.18 In addition, among all the total interstate wars which took place 
between 1648 and 1989, more than three quarters contained territorial disputes.19 As a 
direct result of this prevalence of territorial disputes, and the risk they pose, just during 
the period from 1946 to 2002, the ICJ had already judged 16 cases related to land or 
maritime delimitations. Fortunately, many of which have established authoritative 
precedents for the future application of international law in territorial disputes.20 
In summary, as sovereign states are still the core focus of modern international law and 
states have a core interest in their territory, there is no doubt that territorial disputes 
should be seriously concerned by the international legal academia. In addition, while 
the modern international legal system has pledged to defend ‘international peace and 
security’, territorial disputes have been threatening its duty for centuries, and they have 
                                                        
009) 174. 
16 For an in-depth explanation of the complex definition of modern territorial disputes, see Paul
 Huth, Standing your ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflicts (University of Mi
chigan Press 1998) 4-5 & 19-26; with regard to the dangerousness of territorial disputes, see al
so John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle Revisited (CUP 2009) 135-36. 
17 John A. Vasquez, What do we know about War (Roman & Littlefield 2012) ch 1 table 1.3. 
18 Hein E. Goemans & Kenneth A. Schultz, ‘The Politics of Territorial Disputes: A Geospatial 
Approach Applied to Africa’ (Draft) (2016) 71 (1) International Organizations 31 at 31.  
19 Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1991 (CUP 
1991) 307-10; John A. Vasquez, What do we know about War (Roman & Littlefield 2012) ch 
1 table 1.3. 
20 Nie Hongyi, ‘A Review of the Function and Dilemma of International Law in Settling Territ
orial Disputes’ (2009) 2009 (2) Heilongjiang Chronicles 137 at 139. 
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even enhanced the related experience of the ICJ. Thus, this issue is a worthy subject-
matter for academic study, just like it is a regular object-matter for judicial institutions.21 
1.2 The importance of the UNCSS in the context of territorial disputes 
Since the end of the WWII, the prohibition of the use of force in international relations 
has become a worldwide norm of international law. 22  Therefore, the processes of 
settling contemporary international disputes, including territorial disputes, have 
gradually shifted to peaceful methods.23 These peaceful forms of dispute settlement, 
however, are not perfect, nor can they guarantee their effectiveness in any particular 
international dispute. 24  Meanwhile, comparing to common international disputes, 
territorial disputes are relatively complex, and compromise is harder to achieve since 
they involve the core interest of states,25 which means that they are less likely to be 
gently resolved (these arguments will be discussed further in chapter 3).26 Under the 
pressure of such a dilemma and due to the following reasons, as a substitute method for 
the traditional use of force by states, the UNCSS is indeed quite meaningful to territorial 
disputes settlement:27 
Firstly, the UNCSS is a key method for legally handling contemporary 
international disputes by the use of force. 
The peaceful settlement of international disputes is both the basic requirement of 
contemporary international law and a common expectation of the international 
                                                        
21 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operatio
n among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res 2625 (XXV)
 (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625, see especially the first two principles of the seve
n principles listed by this declaration. 
22 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 2 (4). 
23 Nie Hongyi, ‘A Review of the Function and Dilemma of International Law in Settling Territ
orial Disputes’ (2009) 2009 (2) Heilongjiang Chronicles 137 at 138. 
24 See e.g. J.G.Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (5th edn, CUP 2011) 21-25, 37-40; Adv
isory Opinion on Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12. 
25 Yang Mian, ‘The Peaceful Approaches and Methods of Settling Territorial and Boundary Dis
putes’ (2009) 31 (1) Socialism Studies 109 at 109-10; regarding the general characters of territ
orial disputes, see below. 
26 Nie Hongyi, ‘A Review of the Function and Dilemma of International Law in Settling Territ
orial Disputes’ (2009) 2009 (2) Heilongjiang Chronicles 137 at 140. 
27 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 1121-22, 1146-47, ch22s3. 
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community.28 However, once an international dispute cannot be settled by peaceful 
methods, the related parties are likely to be forced to consider the option of resorting to 
coercive measures, or even their armed forces. In this situation, and especially in the 
latter case, the UNCSS is the appropriate route to the legal use of force. In contrast, 
although the right of self-defence is also a legitimate reason for the use of armed forces, 
this is only a provisional method which is expected to be supervised of the UNSC, 
before the situation is eventually transferred back to the UNCSS.29 In addition, being 
the only universal collective security system in the contemporary international 
community, the UNCSS is backed by a global inter-governmental organization that 
includes almost all states on Earth. Needless to say, there is no other measure or 
institution for the settlement of international disputes which involve the use of force can 
compare to this character.30 Furthermore, a few past cases have shown that states can 
greatly benefit from conducting their relevant practice via the platform of the UNCSS:  
In terms of those small or weak states, the UNCSS could help them to offset their 
disparities in national strength, this has been proved by the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 
(it is noteworthy that the original design of the UNCSS institutionalised the dominance 
of the P5 over smaller or weaker states. Thus, the superpowers always keep a 
conservative attitude towards the expansion of the authority of this mechanism, see 
below31).32 To larger states or the global powers, the UNCSS could be used by them as 
an excuse to avoid the negative legal consequences of unilateral actions, this has been 
proved by the invasion of Iraq in 2003.33 
                                                        
28 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 2 (3) (4). 
29 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 51; Christine Gr
ay, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 124-25. 
30 See e.g. The United Nations, ‘Member States of the United Nations’ <http://www.un.org/en/m
embers/> accessed 12 January 2013. 
31 In regard to a typical expression of the common attitude of small states on the power/refor
m of the authoritative institutions of the UNCSS，see e.g. Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Si
ngapore and Switzerland Draft Resolution on Improving the Working Methods of the Security 
Council (17 March 2006) UN Doc. A/60/L.49. 
32 E.g. The Liberation of Kuwait during the Gulf War, see William Thomas Allison, The Gulf 
War, 1990-91 (Palgrave 2012) chs 7-8. 
33 E.g. The legal justification of the UK for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, see United Kingdom
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Memorandum (17 March 2003) 52 ICLQ 812. 
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Secondly, the UNCSS has plenty of opportunities to be widely applied in territorial 
disputes. 
As past cases have shown, once a dispute has been intensified to the point at which it 
cannot be peacefully settled and has been determined by the UNSC to be a threat to 
international peace and security, then the UNCSS might be activated (e.g. the Gulf War, 
on the inherent limitations of peaceful measures, see 3.2 below).34 Likewise, if the 
parties to a territorial dispute cannot settle the dispute themselves, they may refer the 
case to the UNCSS for winning the mutual confrontation.35 Thirdly, under the shadow 
of superpower politics, if any ally of a superpower is in disadvantageous position in a 
territorial disputes, that superpower may also intervene as a third party by quoting the 
UNCSS (e.g. the US intervention in the Korean War). Thereby, the superpowers may 
‘legally’ change the result of the relevant territorial disputes through non-peaceful 
methods, or they may at least force the other side not to act too aggressively.36 
Thirdly, the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes has initiated some 
controversies. 
As aforementioned, territorial disputes are a particular type of international disputes in 
which the direct parties can hardly express their consent or make any significant 
concession.37 Therefore, right from when the UNCSS was first established as a legal 
                                                        
34 E.g. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait before the Gulf War. See Brian Frederking, The United St
ates and the Security Council: Collective Security since the Cold War (Routledge 2007) 78-82. 
35 E.g. The request for external assistance sent by the government of South Korea to the UNS
C on the outbreak of the Korean War, and the request for external assistance sent by the inter
nationally recognized authority of Cambodia to the UNSC on the issue of the occupation of C
ambodia by Vietnam & the deployment of the subsequent United Nations peacekeeping operatio
ns, see e.g. David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making
 of the Modern World (OUP 2009); Benny Widyono, ‘United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC)’, in Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy & Paul D. Willi
ams (eds), The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (OUP 2015) 395 
at 395-407. 
36 E.g. The military reinforcement offered by the USA towards the government of the Republic
 of Korea under the name of the ‘UN Forces’ during the Korean War, see UNSC Res 82 (25 
June 1950) UN Doc S/RES/82; UNSC Res 83 (27 June 1950) UN Doc S/RES/83; UNSC Res 
84 (7 July 1950) UN Doc S/RES/84; David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law 
(7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 806-808. 
37 Yang Mian, ‘The Peaceful Approaches and Methods of Settling Territorial and Boundary Dis
putes’ (2009) 31 (1) Socialism Studies 109 at 109-10; Nie Hongyi, ‘A Review of the Function 
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alternative to the unilateral resort to force by states, there have been controversies 
related to its application in territorial disputes.38 Even the Gulf War, which is usually 
seen as a successful model of the application of the UNCSS, also raises questions.39 
More seriously, in some cases such as the Korean War, the application of the UNCSS 
in territorial disputes has further increased the tensions between the related parties, and 
led to intensified conflict or war.40 For their own reasons, however, scholarship on 
international law, especially in the Western academia, 41  lacks comprehensive and 
detailed research on the application of the UNCSS in the settlement of territorial 
disputes (see literature review). Hence, the related actions of the international 
community cannot be legally and properly regulated, and the maintenance of the 
international peace and security may be negatively affected as well. 
In summary, being the major method of legally using armed forces after the WWII, the 
UNCSS is a qualified coercive supplementary method to the peaceful measures in the 
field of settling territorial disputes. Additionally, concerning the related past practice, 
there is no lack of chance for the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes, and 
they have caused definite controversies. Therefore, it is clearly necessary to conduct 
research on this issue within the system of contemporary international law. 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
Given the limitations in time and words inherent in this thesis it will not be possible to 
examine all the controversial issues related to the application of the UNCSS in territorial 
disputes. The thesis will, however, creatively and profoundly reflect the unique features 
of the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes. Additionally, according to Strong, 
                                                        
and Dilemma of International Law in Settling Territorial Disputes’ (2009) 2009 (2) Heilongjiang
 Chronicles 137 at 140. 
38 E.g. The Korean War, David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (7th edn, Sw
eet & Maxwell 2010) 806-808. 
39 Thomas Frank, ‘What Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq’ (2003) 97 AJIL 607; E.
 Rostow, ‘Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense’ (1991) 85 AJIL 506. 
40 See David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (7thedn, Sweet & Maxwell 201
0) 806-808. 
41 Basically due to the political advantages and cultural commonalities, see Malcolm Shaw, Inte
rnational Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 13-42. 
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a dissertation in law should contain at least four elements, namely ‘Claim-Law-
Evaluation-Outcome (CLEO)’ in respect to the research topic of this thesis. This means 
that the author should answer at least four research questions related to the application 
of the UNCSS in territorial disputes, namely ‘necessity (Claim), rules (Law), 
performance and prospect (Evaluation and Outcome)’.42 For these purposes, the author 
would like to set the basic structure of the main body of this thesis as follows: 
Firstly, the author will review the research basis of the thesis. 
This chapter will entail a review of the existing international legal literature on the 
UNCSS and territorial disputes, alongside related academic materials from the field of 
international relations. This review will serve to demonstrate the originality of the 
detailed content of the subsequent chapters. This will be followed by the systematic 
illustration of the methodology that the author wishes to apply, so as to show the 
distinctiveness of the abstract methods adopted in the subsequent chapters. 
Next, the author will discuss the background of the application of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes settlement. 
This chapter will entail a discussion of the working concept of territorial disputes, and 
the characters of the issue of territorial disputes from the perspective of modern 
international law. This process will help to define the parameters for the selection of the 
case studies in the thesis and to illustrate the main challenges that the UNCSS might 
face in this field. Then the thesis will discuss the various peaceful measures for settling 
territorial disputes, summarizing their inherent disadvantages, so as to highlight the 
need to apply the UNCSS in territorial disputes. In short, this part mainly answers such 
an afore-mentioned research question in relation to ‘necessity’-why the settlement of 
territorial disputes should be resorted to the UNCSS? 
Next, the author will explain the framework of the application of the UNCSS in 
                                                        
42 S. I. Strong, How to Write Law Essays & Exams (4th edn, OUP 2014) 4-6 & 119-128. 
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territorial disputes settlement. 
This chapter will specify the authoritative institutions, operating mechanisms and 
predetermined purposes that might be activated/pursued by the UNCSS in the face of 
territorial disputes. Accordingly, it will collate the process of the UNCSS when this 
mechanism is participating in the resolution of such disputes, together with its aims. 
Afterward, this chapter will try to specify the mutual relationship between the UNCSS 
and other surrounding measures, mechanisms or organizations in the face of territorial 
disputes. Accordingly, it will clarify the partners of the UNCSS when this mechanism 
is participating in the resolution of such disputes, together with their interactions. In 
short, this part mainly answers such an afore-mentioned research question-what are the 
general ‘rules’ governing the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes settlement? 
Next, the author will analyse the practice of application of the UNCSS in territorial 
disputes settlement. 
This chapter will analyse the different measures under the framework of the UNCSS by 
using representative cases, so as to explore the practical performance of this 
international security mechanism in territorial disputes. Afterwards, the thesis will try 
to analyse the fatal drawbacks of the various measures under the framework of the 
UNCSS while they are being applied in territorial disputes, so as to inform the 
subsequent chapter of the thesis. In short, this part mainly answers such an afore-
mentioned research question-how is the specific ‘performance’ of the application of the 
UNCSS in territorial disputes settlement? 
Finally, the author will provide the reform plan of the thesis.  
This chapter will focus on enforceable self-reform of the UNCSS, generalizing the 
guiding thoughts and thus offering the practicable suggestions. Meanwhile, this thesis 
will also assess the potential effect of these reforms by studying a selected recent case 
of territorial disputes. Afterwards, following the set order of the research questions, as 
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listed in the present section, the author will summarise his research findings and 
thereupon conclude the entire doctorate project. In short, this part mainly answers such 
an afore-mentioned research question in relation to ‘prospect’-what can be improved 




Chapter 2-The research basis of the thesis 
As territorial disputes have always threatened the peace, security and stability of the 
international community, this issue is certainly an important one for international legal 
scholars. Similarly, as the mechanism allowing the use of force within the only universal 
inter-governmental organization of the modern international community, the theoretical 
status of the UNCSS is also unquestionable. Moreover, since it was founded in 1945, 
this mechanism is also a relatively longstanding one.43 It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
there has been a lot of research into territorial disputes or the UNCSS within both the 
scholarship on international law and that on international relations. 44  In order to 
identify gaps in this research, and thus justify the originality of this thesis, this chapter 
systematically assesses the current literature, so as to situate the thesis within the 
scholarship. 
Besides, it should be seen that different scholars would certainly interpret territorial 
disputes and the UNCSS in different ways. Therefore, two articles/monographs that 
both put ‘territorial disputes’ or ‘the UNCSS’ into their titles might not have the same 
detailed content (for example, while they are studying territorial disputes, some scholars 
may choose not to incorporate boundary disputes, see below). For original research and 
convenient writing, the author will soon state his personal opinions on the various 
details of the two key words of his research topic. Nevertheless, for impartially 
reflecting the related research progress, the author will not ignore any representative 
material by claiming his disagreement in opinions, provided the material has clearly 
specified that ‘territorial (disputes)’ or ‘(United Nations) collective security’ is its key 
                                                        
43 With regard to the basic status of the United Nations and the UNCSS, see Antonio Cassese,
 International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 317-20 & 339-40. 
44 International law and international relations can be seen as like the two sides of one coin, t
he former primarily studies the issue of how to maintain the normal order of international affai
rs, and the latter primarily studies the issue of how to explain the contradictions emerging with
in international affairs: the former treats the latter as its parallel subject, whilst the latter treats 
the former as its subordinate subject, but in any case, these two subjects are supplementary to 
each other, and it is very hard to forcibly divide or separate them, see e.g. Michael Byers, ‘Int
ernational Law’, in Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Inter




2.1 The literature review of the thesis 
2.1.1 Legal and international relations scholarship on territorial disputes  
1. Prior to the establishment of the United Nations. 
Legal scholarship on territorial disputes has an early start. In the first magnum opus of 
the 20th century, Oppenheim already discussed several traditional norms of international 
law related to territorial disputes in a general manner.45  Indeed, notwithstanding some 
fundamental differences between traditional international law and contemporary 
international law, some of Oppenheim’s views are still not outdated (e.g. Oppenheim’s 
list of various methods of acquiring territories). 46  Additionally, in the subsequent 
development of this masterpiece, Lauterpacht, Jennings and other editors further 
perfected the theories Oppenheim by re-editing his old-fashioned contents and adding 
more modern perspectives in the relevant fields (e.g. the abandonment of the second 
volume of Oppenheim’s International Law by Lauterpacht, and the differentiation of 
territorial disputes and boundary disputes emphasized by Jennings/Watts).47  
Simultaneously, certain other international legal scholars who were active in early 20th 
century also discussed territories, and gradually developed new thoughts on these issues 
which have come to form the basis for contemporary international law. For example, 
Kelson and Brierley criticised the use of force by states in international disputes and 
several traditional methods of acquiring territories, including conquest and forced 
cession48 . In the relevant academic research before the birth of the UN, however, 
                                                        
45 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, A treatise (2nd edn, Longmans & Green 1912) Pt2ch1. 
46 See Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, A treatise (2nd edn, Longmans & Green 1912) Pt2
ch1Sxi. 
47 See Hersch Lauterpacht (ed), Oppenheim’s International Law (7th & 8th edns, Longmans & 
Green 1948, 1952 & 1958) (Note: the 8 th edn formally abandoned Volume 2); Robert Y. Jenni
ngs & Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (9th edn, Longman 1992) 668-69. 
48 Hans Kelson, General Theory of Law and State (Anders Wedberg tr, Harvard University Pre
ss 1945) 207-18; James Leslie Brierly (author), Andrew Clapham (ed), Brierly's Law of Nation
s: An Introduction to the Role of International Law in International Relations (7th edn, OUP 2
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scholars still mainly focused on general issues, such as the legal meaning of territories 
or the various ways of acquiring territories. Furthermore, they did not completely get 
rid of the negative impact of traditional international law as well (for example, Brierley 
was critical of the issue of conquest, but he was quite pessimistic about the ability to 
regulate illegal conquest within international law, so he never clearly denied the legality 
of conquest).49 Under the threat of war, states usually preferred to use their forces 
directly for the purpose of settling territorial disputes, and thus there only was very 
limited space for the application and development of international law.50 
2. After the establishment of the United Nations. 
Into the second half of the 20th century, war as an instrument of national policy was 
abolished,51 and the unilateral resort to force by states in their international relations 
was prohibited.52 Accordingly, the methods of settling international disputes started to 
turn to peaceful means, and the use of force started to be controlled.53 Thus, there was 
more opportunity to develop international legal theories regarding territorial disputes.  
In the same year as the end of WWII, Hill published the first representative monograph 
of the new era, which studied the territorial demand of states simultaneously from the 
perspectives of international law and international relations. Although this book is still 
strongly influenced by Western-Centrism (given that at the time of writing the colonial 
empires had not yet collapsed, and the developing states which became the primary 
participants in the subsequent territorial disputes had not yet appeared in large numbers), 
it nonetheless exhaustively listed a variety of pacific means of settling territorial 
                                                        
012) ch 5. 
49 See James Leslie Brierly (author), Humphrey Waldock (ed), The Law of Nations: An Introdu
ction to the Role of International Law in International Relations (6th edn, Clarendon Press 196
3) 317-19. 
50 Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1991 (CUP 
1991)217-23. 
51 See Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation of 
War as an Instrument of National Policy (Pact of Paris) (adopted 27 August 1928, entry into f
orce 24 July 1929) 94 LNTS 57, art 1. 
52 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 2 (4). 
53 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 254. 
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disputes which were recognized in international relations at that time.54 Additionally, 
Hill also emphasized the various non-legal claims which might lead to territorial 
demands (e.g. strategic claims, economic claims and ethnic claims). In comparison with 
the legal claims which had been repeatedly highlighted by traditional international law 
then, such as cession, it should be recognized that these non-legal claims were closer to 
the original basis used by states to support their territorial demands.55 
Subsequently, the advance of de-colonization disrupted the status quo in Asia, Africa 
and Latin-America, since the appearance of newly independent states in large numbers 
forced the relevant regions to face complex problems of re-distributing territories.56 
These challenges were exacerbated as the governments and officials of these states 
usually both lacked experience and were motivated by extreme nationalism and weak 
national strength. As a result, the number of territorial disputes was growing rapidly in 
these regions.57 This change in the international situation was a further motivation for 
scholarly interest in and research on the issue of territorial disputes, so that a series of 
instructional monographs were published. 
For example, in his book The Acquisition of Territories in International Law published 
in 1963, Jennings developed Hill’s attempts to distinguish legal and non-legal claims 
and to list various ways of acquiring territories. Additionally, he also clearly stated the 
illegality of forcibly settling territorial disputes by unilateral resort to force (including 
conquest). Moreover, Jennings further discussed certain principles of international law 
related to territorial disputes through case studies (i.e. Estoppel).58 Furthermore, he 
briefly evaluated the principle of self-determination with reference to the development 
                                                        
54 Norman L. Hill, Claims to Territories in International Law and Relations (OUP 1945, reprin
ted by Greenwood Press in 1976) 198-231. 
55 Norman L. Hill, Claims to Territories in International Law and Relations (OUP 1945, reprin
ted by Greenwood Press in 1976) chs 3-9, especially chs 4-8. 
56 John Kent & John W. Young, International Relations since 1945: A global History (2nd edn, 
OUP 2013) chs 3 & 8. 
57 See Alan Day & Judith Bell (eds), Border and Territorial Disputes (2nd edn, Cartermill Inter
national 1987). 
58 Here, Sir R. Jennings used the famous case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear. In addit
ion to his monographs, see also the judgment of this case: Case concerning the Temple of Pre
ah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Merits) [1962] ICJ Rep 6. 
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of the movement of de-colonization at that time.59 At last, Jennings even emphasized 
the differences between boundary disputes and common territorial disputes,60 later 
including these thoughts in the latest edition of Oppenheim’s International Law which 
was co-edited by him.  
Similar to Jennings, the research of many other international legal scholars during the 
early years of the Cold War was also deeply affected by de-colonization. For instance, 
Cukwurah and Shaw published their famous monographs about territorial disputes in 
the late 1960s and 1970s respectively. Although the focal points of their research are 
not the same, they do both reflect the important influence of decolonization in the 
territorial disputes of their era. On one hand, Cukwurah noted that ‘Where two states 
lay claim to conflicting boundary lines, an area of controvertible jurisdiction is bound 
to arise’.61 On the other hand, Shaw noted the geographical distribution of territorial 
disputes, as he found out that post-colonial countries in Africa were seriously affected 
by this issue.62 
3. Recent publications. 
After the 1980s, the Western world started to hold an advantageous position in 
international relations, and the comprehensive integration of the developed states in 
Europe and America started to be strengthened. Thanks to the change of situation, the 
traditional territorial disputes directly related to the Western world had significantly 
decreased.63 Accordingly, the research into territorial disputes began to change in focus, 
and the achievement of the international relations academia had started to surpass their 
                                                        
59 Robert Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester University Pr
ess 1963) chs 2, 3 & 4, 78-79. 
60 Robert Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester University Pr
ess 1963) 12-13. 
61 A. Oye Cukwurah, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law (Manchester U
niversity Press 1967) 6. 
62 Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (Clarendon Press 198
6). 
63 John Kent & John W. Young, International Relations since 1945: A global History (2nd edn, 




Firstly, some international relations scholars began to codify or introduce the existing 
and past territorial disputes as a whole, but without in-depth discussion, such as Border 
and Territorial Disputes written by Day and Bell. It is no doubt beneficial for their 
common audiences to recognize and understand the issue of territorial disputes in 
general, and even in the early 21st century there were still scholars, such as Calvert, who 
focused on these questions. 64  On the contrary, some other international relations 
scholars, including a few international legal scholars, such as Shaw, started to conduct 
specific case studies on the existing or new-born territorial disputes. They mainly 
concerned separate cases which occurred between developing/former socialist states, 
but without considering the issue of territorial disputes as one. Such case studies are 
more meticulous and in-depth, and also more adaptable to the specific situation of 
different single case, so that it might provide more accurate information about related 
practice.65  
Secondly, in terms of the relevant research of the Western legal academia, because of 
the above changes, the focus of research had shifted to the study of new types of 
territorial disputes, such as maritime delimitation (e.g. the discussion of definite 
disputes over the EEZ by Smith and Thomas). 66  Even when discussing territorial 
dispute in the traditional sense, their stance and viewpoints tended to be much more 
broad and moderate than the corresponding stance or viewpoints of scholars from the 
developing states (A good example here is the discussion on the issue of Gibraltar, the 
Western scholars have frequently addressed the possible functions of third-party 
                                                        
64 See e.g. Alan Day & Judith Bell (eds), Border and Territorial Disputes (2nd edn, Cartermill 
International 1987); David Downing, An Atlas of Territorial and Border Disputes (New English 
Library 1980); Peter Calvert, Border and Territorial Disputes of the World (4th edn, John Harpe
r Publisher 2004). 
65 See e.g. Fravel M. Taylor, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in Chin
a's Territorial Disputes (Princeton University Press 2008); H. U. Rahman, The Making of the G
ulf War: Origins of Kuwait's Long-standing Territorial Dispute with Iraq (Ithaca Press 1997); 
Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (Clarendon Press 1986). 
66 See e.g. Robert W. Smith & Bradford L. Thomas, Island Disputes and the Law of the Sea: 
An Examination of Sovereignty and Delimitation Disputes (IBRU 1998). 
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international entities. Furthermore, the related parties/scholars even used to refer to the 
possibility of letting the parties share the sovereignty of the disputed territories. In 
contrast, this kind of viewpoint simply does not exist in the mainstream research of the 
East Asian states on their territorial disputes).67 Meanwhile, several international legal 
scholars, such as Sharma, had not abandoned their research regarding territorial disputes 
as a whole. However, since territorial disputes of the Western world were gradually 
being settled and marginalized, their relevant monographs were still largely successors 
of the elder scholars, such as Jennings, but rarely provided ground-breaking 
innovations.68 
Under these circumstances, the present Western scholarship certainly cannot by itself 
represent the full scope of the contemporary study of territorial disputes. Nevertheless, 
if the work of the international legal/relations scholars who do not come from the 
Western world can be impartially assessed, then the research on territorial disputes after 
the end of the Cold War still has some positive characters as follows: 
Firstly, research from the emerging developing states is booming. For example, two 
Chinese scholars, Li Fan and Xie Licheng, have published two international relations 
monographs which have comprehensively reviewed the recent territorial disputes 
within the regions of East Asia and West Asia. Being published in the early years of the 
2010s, these books represent the first work of its kind in the academic history of China.69 
Concerning the causes of this trend, on one hand this is because these states are facing 
many more territorial disputes (especially newly arisen territorial disputes, e.g. the 
territorial disputes among the member states of the former Communist Bloc70) than the 
                                                        
67 See e.g. Keith Azopardi, Sovereignty and the Stateless Nation: Gibraltar in the Modern Leg
al Context (Hart Publishing 2009); Feng Xuezhi, The International legal analysis on the Disput
es regarding China’s Maritime Rights and Interests (China University of Political Science and 
Law Press 2013). 
68 Surya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law (Brill 1997); Malcol
m Shaw, Title to Territory (Ashgate Publishing 2005). 
69 Li Fan, A Study on the Post-WWII territorial disputes and international relations of the Maj
or States of East Asia (Jiangsu People’s Publishing House 2013); Xie Licheng, A Study on the 
Contemporary Boundary and Territorial Disputes Among the Middle East Countries (China Soci
al Science Press 2015). 
70 For example, after the collapse of the USSR, approximately 70% of the borders of Russia h
ad not been delimited, since during the Cold War both sides of most of the above borders wer
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developed states at present. On the other hand, this research interest also reflects the 
fact that as these states have become stronger, they have become more inclined to 
attempt to settle their territorial demands by themselves.71  
Secondly, the geographic scope of relevant research has started to be extended. For 
example, some Western international relations/legal Scholars, including Hayton, Roy 
and Talmon, have all published on the disputes over the sovereign ownership of the 
islands/reefs of the South China Sea in the past five years.72 With mankind’s increasing 
demand for natural resources, and their improving scientific and exploration abilities, 
those natural spaces beyond the borders of land territories, such as oceans, have become 
new breeding grounds for territorial disputes. Thus, the recent research has become to 
cover fields that were rarely considered in traditional international law, such as maritime 
disputes.73  
Thirdly, special attention is increasingly being paid to the new methods of settling 
territorial disputes. For example, a Chinese international legal scholar, Guo Rongxing, 
has listed various forms of ‘buffer zone’ as ways of relieving territorial disputes. 
Likewise, a Western international relations scholar, Pinfari, has imagined the act of 
adding a ‘time deadline’ for the process of settling territorial disputes.74 Given that 
international law only has limited enforcement abilities,75 the means currently available 
to settle territorial disputes under its framework certainly face the same dilemma in 
                                                        
e under the military control of the Soviet army, there were few disputes related to them. See 
Lin Jun, The Draft History of the Diplomacy of Russia (World Affairs Press 2002) 45.  
71 Guo Rongxing, Territorial Disputes and Conflict Management: The art of avoiding war (Rou
tledge 2011); Jin-Hyun Paik, Seok-Woo Lee & Kevin Y. L. Tan, Asian Approaches to Internati
onal Law and the Legacy of Colonialism: The Law of the Sea, Territorial Disputes and Interna
tional Dispute Settlement (Routledge 2012).  
72 Bill Hayton, South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (Yale University Press 2014);
 Nalanda Roy, The South China Sea Disputes: Past, Present and Future (Lexington Books 201
6); Stefan Talmon & Jia Bingbing, The South China Sea Arbitration: A Chinese Perspective (H
art Publishing 2014). 
73 A. Oye Cukwurah, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law (Manchester U
niversity Press 1967) 69-78; Ralf Emmers, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in Eas
t Asia (Routledge 2012); Robert F. A. Goedhart, The never-ending dispute delimitation of air s
pace and outer space (Frontieres 1996). 
74 Guo Rongxing, Territorial Disputes and Conflict Management: the Art of Avoiding War (Rou
tledge 2014) ch 3; Marco Pinfari, Peace Negotiations and Time: Deadline Diplomacy in Territo
rial Disputes (Routledge 2012) chs 4-5. 
75 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 5-6. 
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practice.76 Thus, the relevant scholars has been prompted to seek new methods of 
settling territorial disputes, and the author has been motivated to write this thesis. The 
rationale for this effort, is so that when the existing means cannot handle specific 
territorial disputes, and thus international peace and security have been threatened, it 
may provide supplementary measures for the settlement of the relevant situations.77  
2.1.2 Legal and international relations scholarship on the UNCSS 
1. Early 20th century. 
Comparing to the above-stated literature related to territorial disputes, the literature 
specifically on the UNCSS is relatively new. This is not surprising, as the UNCSS has 
only been in existence since the end of the Second World War. However, facing the 
establishment of the United Nations and its collective security system in 1945, the 
reaction of the jurists was not slow at all. 
For example, shortly after the conclusion of the UN Charter, Kelsen had already 
discussed the new-born UNCSS in the first monograph of the Western academia which 
aimed at analysing the legal framework of the United Nations.78 Then in the initial 
years of the Cold War, together with other legal scholars, including Bowett, Kelsen 
published a few more monographs about the UNCSS, highlighting some of the core 
issues that would constantly hinder the UNCSS until today (e.g. the ‘United Nations 
Forces’).79  
                                                        
76 J.G.Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (5th edn, CUP 2011) ch1s5, ch2s4. 
77 It should be acknowledged that currently there is no widely-recognized revolutionary innovati
on on this issue, and although several new measures have been proposed they do not currently 
extend the scope of the existing methods. Nonetheless, the appearance of new ideals can undou
btedly provide new vitality to the process of settling territorial disputes, and it also offers a ne
w cornerstone for the development of the various corresponding theoretical systems. See e.g. M
arco Pinfari, Peace Negotiations and Time: Deadline Diplomacy in Territorial Disputes (Routled
ge 2012); Jaroslav Tir, Redrawing the Map to Promote Peace: Territorial Dispute Management 
via Territorial Changes (Lexington Books 2006); Paul Diehl & Gary Goertz, Territorial Change
s and International Conflict (Routledge 2002). 
78 See e.g. Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundament
al Problems, with Supplement (Frederick A. Praeger 1950) chs 5, 10 & 18. 
79 See Hans Kelsen, Collective Security under International Law (U.S.G.P.O. 1957) 113-20；D. 
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Unfortunately, just as the outbreak of the WWII destroyed the fantasies of the traditional 
great powers and their associated scholarship about the collective security system of the 
League of Nations, the outbreak of the Cold War froze the UNCSS as well.80 Given 
this disjunction between theory and practice, the Western scholarship began to adopt a 
more conservative attitude towards the UNCSS in the mid-late period of the Cold War.  
On the one hand, several scholars of international law, such as Naidu, continued to 
explore the existing UNCSS but now with clearly stated concern about its prospects.81 
On the other hand, many scholars began to explore substitute measures. For instance, 
in the late 1960s, Higgins overviewed the initial practice of the UN Peacekeeping 
Operations, which had been created as a replacement for the ‘UN Forces’ for the first 
time in history.82 These scholars were comparatively successful in developing and 
expanding on the inherent contents of the UNCSS, yet the substance of their research 
had clearly departed from the original operating mechanism and extent of competence 
of the UNCSS. Thus, they indirectly reflected the compromise and helplessness of the 
international community when faced with the negative reality of UNCSS. 
Alongside the above two schools, there were also a small number of scholars of 
international law who had lost all confidence in the various efforts of the UN to control 
the use of force by states. This group of ‘realists’ not only abandoned research on the 
existing UNCSS, but also cast doubt on the essential principle regarding the prohibition 
of the use of force under the system of contemporary international law. For instance, 
the relatively radical scholar, Franck, even directly questioned ‘Who Killed Article 2 
(4)?’ in the peak years of the Cold War.83 
Ironically, to a certain extent, the dilemma of the legal scholars had helped the 
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emergence of the harvest of the international relations scholars. From the 1950s to the 
1990s, the Western international relations scholarship had continually criticized or 
queried the UNCSS. For example, in his famous book Politics among Nations, 
Morgenthau, as a representative figure of the school of realism, frankly stated that the 
UNCSS was entirely unable to limit the self-willed acts of the P5. Additionally, in his 
work Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, Nye, as the leading expert of 
the opposite school of liberalism, believed that the UNCSS could ‘only rarely……be a 
basis for a new world order’, as it was trapped by the veto power, available resources 
and intra-state conflicts.84 In fact, even Claude, who was a ‘pragmatic liberalism’ 
scholar who wished to find a third pathway between classic realism and liberalism, 
possessed a negative attitude towards the UNCSS as well. For instance, he claimed that 
the UNCSS was not as good as the concept of ‘balance of power’ under the outdated 
Vienna System, in which the national strength of those European great powers would 
cancel each other out (so as to maintain absolute peace with relative balance).85 
2. Recent publications. 
Approaching the end of the 20th century, the collapse of the USSR slightly rejuvenated 
the UNSC. 86  Moreover, the disappearance of the global antagonism between the 
Eastern and Western Blocs also paved a way for various states to adjust their own 
international relations.87 Since the end of the Cold War, therefore, the study of the 
UNCSS in the field of contemporary international law had slowly started to be 
positively changed, 88  as was manifested in the following two complementary 
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On the one hand, represented by the short-term conversion of Franck himself,89 the 
more positive predictions about the prospect of the UNCSS gradually began to increase. 
In the new era, the UNSC had already proved the feasibility of the principle of 
unanimity in a series of cases, such as the Gulf War and the September 11 attacks.90 
Meanwhile, the evolution of the process of economic globalization and the expansion 
of the common interests of the great powers provided new reasons for the former 
hegemonic states to choose international co-operation when they were involved in 
international disputes.91 These developments, naturally, provided some foundation for 
the increasing confidence of scholars of international law with regard to the UNCSS.92  
On the other hand, as represented by the research on the collective security functions of 
regional organizations conducted by Abass, those extended topics under the framework 
of the UNCSS were obviously attracting more attention.93 The silence of the UNCSS 
during its early years of life had impelled the emergence of various surrounding issues, 
whilst the awakening of the UNCSS in the recent years had stimulated the widespread 
of these issues.94 Taking the research interest of Abass as an example, almost all the 
collective security functions of those regional organizations which took the UNCSS as 
their prototype had developed and expanded in the past 20 or more years. 95 
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Undoubtedly, this situation was caused by the vacuum left by the collapse of the bipolar 
system and the inherent need of seeking external security assistance of those small/weak 
states. Those related legal scholars, however, surely would be willing to spend more 
time and resources in such a vivifying field.  
This apparent optimism, however, cannot fully reflect the opportunities and challenges 
facing the study of the UNCSS within the system of contemporary international law. 
The continuous existence of several ‘outlaw states’, such as the USA, has already made 
the research on some of the relevant issues sensitive and lacking in practical meanings.96 
In practice, those negative cases directed by these privileged subjects of international 
law, including the Kosovo War and the Iraq War, are also testing the fragile expectations 
of the entire international community on the contemporary UNCSS.97 
Accordingly, throughout the legal or political literature on the UNCSS since the late 
1990s, there actually is an emerging body of work which has frankly acknowledged the 
inherent problems of the UNCSS from the perspective of international relations. For 
example, Koskenniemi has even critically questioned this mechanism from the classic 
realistic position. Nevertheless, there is still a lack of studies which aim at assessing the 
application of the UNCSS in specific areas.98 In addition, as the pupils of Morgenthau 
and Claude, those ‘Neo-realists’ like Waltz and Mearsheimer are still insisting on 
regarding the international security situation under the framework of the UNCSS as the 
product of the ‘balance of power’.99 More regretfully, certain international relations 
scholars who used to devote themselves to the assessment of the UNCSS, such as 
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Thakur and Weiss, have started to change their research interests. Weiss, for example, 
used to explore ‘collective security in a changing world’, but in his new monograph 
which aims at comprehensively evaluating ‘what is wrong with the United Nations’ he 
rarely refers to the UNCSS.100 Fortunately, another motivation for the writing of this 
thesis, is to provide new material for changing the negative situation above. 
3. New comprehensive monographs. 
It is also worth mentioning that in the first five years of the 2010s, scholars such as 
Orakhelashvili, Tsagourias, White and Wilson had published quite a few monographs 
on international law which generally introduced or evaluated the UNCSS.101 Previously, 
the study of collective security from the time of the Kosovo War to the time of the Iraqi 
War was accompanied by a tendency of marginalization, and in 2003 Franck even 
painfully asked ‘who killed article 2 (4) again?”.102 The appearance of these academic 
materials, however, has indicated another renaissance of their research topic in the 
Western international legal scholarship. 
In the initial place, the book written by Orakhelashvili in 2011 under the name 
‘Collective Security’ is still largely a monograph which focuses on the legal nature of 
the various collective security systems. In particular, this book has assessed the various 
legal issues surrounding the process of application of the various collective security 
systems in the context of modern international law. Firstly, it has discussed the 
background issues of the extent of authority/allocation of targets of the relevant 
institutions. Secondly, it has discussed the determination of the threats to peace and the 
corresponding applicable reaction before the activation of the various collective security 
systems. Thirdly, it has discussed the status and functions of the peacekeeping/self-
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defence operations during the process of applying the various collective security 
systems. Fourthly, it has also discussed the judicial remedies for the related illegal 
acts/decisions after the application of the various collective security systems. 103 
Furthermore, Orakhelashvili has listed, analysed and evaluated nearly all the ‘regional 
collective security institutions’ of the contemporary international community within a 
significant portion of his book. With such an effort, he has systematically explained the 
mutual relationship and complex hierarchy among those universal and regional 
collective security systems. Compared to a lot of earlier work that has tended to focus 
only on the United Nations and its UNCSS, this approach has undoubtedly expanded 
the subjective visual field and the objective research range of the contemporary study 
of collective security.104 
In addition, the book written by White and Tsagourias in 2013 under the name 
‘Collective Security: Theory, Law and Practice’ is a monograph which acknowledges 
that political elements and legal elements may simultaneously affect the various 
collective security systems. As ‘political’ means international relations here, the authors 
share the viewpoint of Koskenniemi, who also constantly emphasizes the political 
elements contained by both international law and those various collective security 
systems under its framework. 105  In particular, from the perspectives of concepts, 
component, tools, legal management and accountability, this book has successively 
assessed the complex features of contemporary collective security system (with the 
UNCSS as their core mechanism). In addition, building on Orakhelashvili, this book 
has also incorporated new sub-topics, such as the ancient origin of the UNCSS, and the 
private military companies and the post-conflict reconstruction guided by the 
UNCSS.106 It should be clarified, however, that although White and Tsagourias have 
acknowledged the considerable influence of political elements upon those various 
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collective security systems, they still praise the monitoring and restraining functions of 
international law. Being two middle-aged international legal scholars, their viewpoints 
still have not divorced from the inherent stance of their own academia.107 
Lastly, the book written by Wilson in 2014 under the name ‘The United Nations and 
Collective Security’ is a monograph which only focuses on the UNCSS, a relatively rare 
approach in recent years. In particular, this book begins with an introduction of the 
concepts of the United Nations and its UNCSS. Then, based on the logical order of the 
increase of coerciveness, this book has successively assessed diplomatic responses, 
non-military sanctions, peacekeeping and military enforcement actions under the 
framework of the UNCSS. Finally, this book ends with an overview of the regional 
arrangements of collective security.108 In addition, although this book is more ‘student-
friendly’ then the monograph of White and Tsagourias which has comparatively 
profound wording and multifarious content, Wilson has also pointed out the equal 
importance of the political perspective. Thus, his argument can still be directly traced 
back to the viewpoint of Koskenniemi.109 In spite of all these matters, Wilson has also 
defined the UNCSS as an imperfect international security mechanism which has 
creativity and flexibility, but which is enslaved by its political selectivity. Compared to 
those older international law scholars who possess a relatively more negative attitude 
towards this mechanism, such an opinion is certainly fairer and more impartial. 
Nevertheless, it has also revealed the compromise made by younger international legal 
scholars over their evaluation criterion in front of reality.110 
Of course, it should be noted that in essence, the above monographs and articles still 
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fundamentally aim at generally introducing or evaluating various collective security 
systems on the basis of the classic theories of international law. In other words, the 
structure, purposes and conclusions of the works of the relevant international legal 
scholars are still following the consistent rules of their own academic milieu. Even if 
we take Koskenniemi, the expert who has taken the lead in highlighting the influence 
of political elements as an example, his initial motivation is still to clarify ‘the place of 
law in collective security’ with the assistance of the relevant political factors. Moreover, 
his conclusion shows that at least to the realistic politicians, law is an irrelevant concept 
in front of collective security arrangement, which is not an optimistic finding to their 
colleagues from the legal field. Thus, it can be said that these recent bodies of 
scholarship are a combination of breakthrough and limitations. Meanwhile, their 
manner of writing, which is similar to the approach of higher educational textbooks, has 
indubitably left plenty of room for the in-depth research offered in this thesis. 
2.1.3 The problems of the existing literature on the UNCSS and territorial disputes 
As described above, although the international legal research on UNCSS and territorial 
disputes is extensive, it is certainly not comprehensive or perfect. Therefore, in order to 
delineate the space for the original work of this thesis, this section needs to outline the 
weaknesses in current knowledge, and they are generally evident in five main areas as 
follows. 
1. With regard to territorial disputes, the research outcome of the international 
relations academia on territorial disputes is richer than the corresponding 
research of the international legal academia. 
Huth has directly stated that international relations scholars have not paid sufficient 
attention to the issue of territorial disputes, meaning that their research in this field is 
limited and unsystematic.111 Nonetheless, it can be argued that the progress of their 
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study is still comparatively ahead of the corresponding study that has been undertaken 
in the field of international law. 
On the one hand, from the viewpoint of the international relations scholars, international 
law is only one of the perspectives for researching international relations, and it is just 
a negative method for promoting/maintaining peace.112 Additionally, international law 
is not only fighting for the aims of abandoning war and limiting use of force to the 
largest possible extent, but also influenced by the national will of states.113 Under the 
dual-effect of self-limitation and exterior limiting powers, the breadth of research 
undertaken in this area of international law is far narrower than that in the international 
relations scholarship. Moreover, generally speaking, the theories of international 
relations mainly come from the original interests of states and they are more realistic, 
in contrast, the theories of international law are more ideal.114  
Accordingly, international relations’ scholarship on the issue of territorial disputes is 
able to discuss several issues that are ‘sensitive’ to the jurists (e.g. the direct connection 
between territorial disputes and war), which gives greater depth to the field.115 In 
contrast, when considering territorial disputes, the international legal scholarship is 
relatively much more ‘conservative’ and thereby it has to face more serious dilemmas 
(e.g. the realistic international relations scholars insist that ‘sovereignty is not 
negotiable’, but the relevant international legal scholars do not have such a firm stance 
on this matter116). Consequently, the quantity and quality of the related research has 
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certainly be affected. For example, in terms of the three ‘positive characters’ of the 
recent study on territorial disputes since the end of the Cold War, nearly all the afore-
mentioned monographs have come from the international relations scholars (e.g. the 
monographs of Hayton and Roy on the disputes over the South China Sea). In an 
opposite manner, international legal scholars usually simply repeating the various 
measures for legally acquiring territories. 
On the other hand, as mentioned above, the traditional territorial disputes directly 
related to the Western great powers are decreasing, and the concept of sovereignty 
within the Western world is weakening. As a result, the European and American 
international legal scholars’ interest in the issue of territorial disputes is declining. 
Especially since the start of the 21st century, it has become fairly rare to see work from 
Western scholars which specifically discusses this issue from the perspective of 
international law.117 On the contrary, the relevant research of the international relations 
academia which has a wider sphere of vision of research and less self-limitation is less 
limited by external factors. For example, since 2010, several scholars of international 
relations, such as Wiegand and Gibler, have published monographs that discuss 
territorial disputes and the related issues (e.g. the settlement of long-lasting territorial 
disputes). Accordingly, they have enriched and improved the theoretical system of 
international relations in this field.118 
In fact, the advantages of the international relations academia in terms of their horizons 
and perspectives have already spread into the existing literature on the UNCSS. As 
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mentioned above, quite a few international legal scholars from the Western world have 
lost their confidence in the capacity of the UNCSS. Nevertheless, due to their own 
academic stance, they still have chosen to seek new ways to effect minor repairs of this 
mechanism within its existing framework (e.g. the creation of the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations). In comparison with them, international relations scholars are 
far less restricted when they are criticizing the idea and design of the UNCSS. Besides, 
the facilitating impact of the so-called ‘political elements’ on the contemporary study 
of the UNCSS has even been clearly affirmed by the latest practitioners from the 
international legal academia (see the above monographs/articles of Koskenniemi and 
other scholars). 
2. With regard to the UNCSS, there is almost no monographs or articles on the 
application of this mechanism in territorial disputes. 
From the above sections, it can be seen that the existing literature on territorial disputes 
and the UNCSS is not rare. However, for two main reasons, there is hardly any legal 
research that directly assesses the specific topic of the application of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes. 
Firstly, one of the purposes and principles of international law is to promote the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes through international judicial interference. In other 
words, it needs to maintain ‘the legal order of the international community’.119 Affected 
by this, international legal scholars usually prefer to discuss the various pacific means 
of settling international disputes, and rarely assess the coercive methods of international 
dispute resolution.120 Thereby, they may avoid to disobey the inherent requirement of 
modern international law.121  
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On the contrary, since they have relatively wider research horizons and different 
research perspectives, international relations scholars could completely put away those 
rigorous doctrines which limit those legal scholars. Being a subject with the purpose of 
explaining ‘the political, economic or cultural interaction in the international 
community’, the international relations scholars do not have to praise the various 
measures for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. On the same basis, they 
do not have to specifically discuss the (undesirable) UNCSS when they are talking about 
the various forcible measures for settling international disputes as well. Also, during the 
process of explaining a particular type of international dispute which is part of the 
various ‘international interactions’, they do not have to deliberately study the question 
of how to solve this issue with a definite type of measure.122 
Secondly, the UNCSS receives relatively low evaluations in practice. After over half a 
century of operation, the UNCSS is still disappointing a large amount of international 
legal/international relations scholars and is evaluated by them as having ‘failed’.123 In 
contrast, although the various peaceful measures for the settlement of modern 
international disputes could not guarantee the complete elimination of those disputes, 
but they are effectively contributing their own power to this work all the time. 
Accordingly, these measures could obtain some more positive and objective feedbacks 
from the international legal academia. 124  Under these circumstances, the relevant 
international legal scholars certainly would prefer to emphasize the functions and status 
of those peaceful measures. In contrast, being a group of people who assume an 
ambiguous attitude towards the UNCSS, the international relations scholars are even 
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less keen to actively assess the performance of this mechanism in the settlement of 
dangerous international disputes. 
More regrettably, even in the limited international legal/international relations literature 
regarding the relationship between the UNCSS and territorial disputes, there are also 
some problems: 
Firstly, the literature mainly focuses on the various peaceful measures for the settlement 
of modern international disputes, whilst it rarely discusses the UNCSS. For instance, in 
The international regulation of Frontier Disputes edited by Luard, the authors 
thoroughly discussed the general process of the peaceful settlement of frontier disputes, 
yet they just expressed their positive hope for the prospect of the application of the 
UNCSS in frontier disputes.125  
Secondly, the literature normally does not specifically review the application of the 
UNCSS in territorial disputes, but usually just briefly touches upon this issue while it is 
discussing the entire UNCSS as a package. Alternatively, the literature may also refer 
to a few isolated cases related to the UNCSS, while it is assessing some other 
international legal issues. For example, when discussing the dilemma of the UNCSS in 
terms of the great powers’ ignorance and deliberate damage, Simpson frequently 
mentioned the dispute over the sovereignty of the Kosovo region. However, it is clear 
that Simpson did not originally intend to assess the Kosovo War by regarding it as a 
territorial dispute, plus he also did not wish to evaluate the application of the UNCSS 
in territorial disputes (with regard to the working definition of territorial disputes in the 
context of this thesis, see the next chapter).126  
Thirdly, the literature rarely discusses those relevant cases in which the situations are 
complex or involve certain existing superpowers. Besides, these materials are lacking 
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in prospective study.127 It is therefore reasonable to claim that to the contemporary 
international legal and international relations scholarship, the precise topic of the 
application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes is virtually a vacuum. 
3. With regard to the academic discipline of the thesis, too many materials cannot 
break away from the set routine of their own disciplines for evaluating territorial 
disputes/the UNCSS. 
From the discussion above, it can be seen that each of the disciplines that are related to 
territorial disputes and the UNCSS has its own particular literature. However, when the 
readers put their eyes on the drafting process of these materials, they might find out that 
the corresponding experts have overly dwelled on their original field of study and basic 
academia stance. 
In terms of territorial disputes, many international legal scholars, such as Cukwurah and 
Sharma, start their research with a case study on a particular region. Then, they place 
their emphasis on the traditionally legal measures for acquiring territories, and end with 
an analysis of those peaceful measures for settling territorial disputes. 128  On the 
contrary, many international relations scholars, such as Huth and Gibler, start their 
research with the categorization of all the cases from various regions. Then, they place 
their emphasis on the exploration of the various subjective and objective factors that 
might initiate territorial disputes, and end with a calculation of the effectiveness of the 
various forcible/non-forcible routes for handling territorial disputes.129 
In terms of the UNCSS, meanwhile, many international legal scholars, such as 
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129 See e.g. Paul Huth, Standing your ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflicts 
(University of Michigan Press 1998); Douglas M. Gibler, The Territorial Peace: Borders, State 
Development, and International Conflict (CUP 2012). 
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Orakhelashvili and Wilson, start their research with the interpretation of legal statutes. 
Then, they place their emphasis on seeking the management and adjustment of the 
theoretical schemes (although they might equally consider the relevant ‘political 
elements’) in the operating process of the UNCSS, and end with the acknowledgement 
of the natural or derived weaknesses of this mechanism. With regard to the specific 
methods, these scholars would continuously engage with the existing theoretical 
viewpoints, and they may equally consider the relevant ‘political elements’.130 On the 
contrary, many international relations scholars, such as Morgenthau and Claude, start 
their research by criticizing the essential idea of collective security. Then, they place 
their emphasis on advocating the disruption and damage imposed upon the operating 
process of the UNCSS by the practical obstacles (e.g. superpower politics), and end by 
rejecting the status quo or future of the UNCSS. With regard to the specific methods, 
these scholars would continuously engage with the existing practical mechanisms and 
experiences, and they may inevitably treat the relevant ‘legal elements’ poorly.131 
It can therefore be seen that the roadmaps followed by the various research disciplines 
are very different to each other. This situation is certainly not helpful in terms of 
developing an accurate reflection of the issues explored in this thesis, or the proper use 
of the close relationship between international law and international relations. Tracking 
the origin of such a problem, the inherent difference between the two disciplines in 
terms of their specific research methodologies can be blamed (see next section). 
Moreover, the cause of this situation can also be attributed to the fundamental difference 
between the international legal scholarship and the international relations scholarship 
in terms of the schools of thought that they belong to. 
Firstly, the classical school of thought of the international legal academia is more 
                                                        
130 See e.g. Alexander Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (OUP 2011); Gary Wilson, The Unite
d Nations and Collective Security (Routledge 2014). 
131 See e.g. Hans J. Morgenthau (author), Kenneth W. Thompson & David Clinton (revised), P
olitics among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power (7th edn, McGraw-Hill 2005); Nejat 
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inclined to (though not relying on) the doctrine of idealism. International law is a subject 
that aims to explore the topic of how to maintain the ‘legal order’ of the international 
community. Most of its practitioners firmly believe in the assumption that modern 
international affairs can be bound by morality and regulations, and they also emphasise 
the self-control of states which relies on natural senses and lacks in superior 
supervision.132 As a result, those international legal scholars are normally good at 
listing the conceptual breakthroughs and hidden procedural troubles of the UNCSS 
when it is being applied in territorial or other disputes (e.g. the establishment of a 
universal mechanism to collectively use armed forces, and the veto power). However, 
they seldom say much about the actual, especially non-legal limitations of this 
mechanism (e.g. the origin of the birth of the veto power of the P5). Besides, it is 
noteworthy that as the predecessor of the UNCSS, the collective security system of the 
League of Nations was the masterpiece of Wilson, the famous supporter of idealism and 
the then president of the USA.133 
Secondly, the classical school of thought of international relations is more inclined to 
the doctrine of realism. International relations is a subject which seeks to explain the 
‘political interaction’ in the international community. Most of its practitioners firmly 
believe in the influence of power and interests upon modern international affairs, and 
they also highly doubt the self-control ability of states which relies on natural senses 
and lacks in superior supervision. 134  As a result, international relations scholars 
normally highlight the actual limitations of the UNCSS when it is being applied in 
various international disputes, including territorial disputes. However, they do not focus 
so much on setting out the conceptual breakthroughs and procedural hidden troubles of 
this mechanism. Besides, it is noteworthy that as a representative liberal scholar, Nye 
was constantly anxious about the effect of the veto powers of the P5 on the future of the 
UNCSS, even in the context of the overwhelmingly optimistic atmosphere after the Gulf 
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4. With regard to the purpose of the thesis, there is almost no literature which can 
provide complete set of reform plan for the application of the UNCSS in a 
particular field, including territorial disputes. 
This problem is the other issue that is caused by the inherent divergence between the 
legal scholars and the international relations scholars in respect to their set routines of 
evaluating related matters. As the logic terminal point of the process of relevant research, 
the reforming plan of the application of the UNCSS in various international disputes is 
also an important sub-topic in which the progress of research does not go well. 
On the one hand, it should be seen that Muller, a scholar of international relations, has 
already compiled a comprehensive review of successive plans to reform the entirety of 
the United Nations system, including the UNCSS. However, his edited volume and the 
works of his colleagues from the international relations academia maintain a 
consistently negative attitude towards the whole concept of ‘collective security’. Thus, 
this group of experts could hardly pay extra attention to the specific amendment of the 
UNCSS in some specific areas.136  
On the other hand, the international legal scholars are also restricted by the afore-
mentioned conclusion of their corresponding research projects, which is either pacific 
or negative. Generally, the reform plans drafted by these scholars are either rather 
palliative, or just indirectly helpful to the UNCSS in that they mainly argue for the other 
issues of the reform of the United Nations. For example, the creation of the United 
Nations peacekeeping operation was actualized by putting the UN Charter aside, even 
though the peacekeeping forces was set to be a substitute for the never-implemented 
‘United Nations Forces’ (see below). In another case, during the early years of the 21st 
                                                        
135 Joseph Nye Jr, Kurt Biedenkopf & Motoo Shiina, Global Competition After the Cold War: 
A Reassessment of Trilateralism (The Trilateral Commission 1991) 47-48. 
136 Joachim Muller (ed), Reforming the United Nations: A Chronology (Brill 2016), note the fa
ct that this book is the seventh volume of a series of works that have been successively publis
hed since 2001. 
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century, international legal scholars used to be enthusiastic about the reform of the 
UNSC. Through considering the abolishment of the veto power, certain scholars, such 
as Niemetz and Nadin, had even touched upon the Achilles heel of the UNCSS. 
However, the direct purpose of their effort was merely to promote the efficiency of the 
regular ‘decision-making procedure’ of the UNCSS.137 
All this said, some comprehensive books recently published in the 2010s, such as the 
three monographs written by Orakhelashvili, Tsagourias and White, and Wilson, have 
brought about a few good news. For instance, they have fully examined the hidden 
procedural troubles of the UNCSS, alongside the substantial limitation of the idea of 
‘collective security’ under the influence of political factors. None of these scholars, 
however, has thoroughly gone beyond their follow-up introduction and evaluation of 
the new changes of the UNCSS or other collective security systems. Hence, none of 
them has independently raised their own complete set of reforms for the 
accomplishment of any particular task (e.g. the settlement of territorial disputes) of the 
UNCSS. Unquestionably, such an arrangement could barely make the most use of the 
total length of more than 1000 pages of these books. Nevertheless, to be fair, it is also 
undeniable that the appreciation of the numerous troubles of the UNCSS by these three 
monographs has informed the reform plan that is about to be offered by this thesis. 
5. With regard to the scope of the thesis, there is also a lack of unanimous 
agreement on the concept of territorial disputes and the target of the UNCSS. 
In comparison with the four issues described above, the problem discussed here is not 
necessarily linked to the research level or limitations of the scholarship on the 
application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes. Nonetheless, in order to select the 
appropriate content for the following chapters of this thesis, a clear concept of territorial 
disputes and a clear target of the UNCSS is surely very important. Unfortunately, 
                                                        
137 See e.g. Martin Daniel Niemetz, Reforming UN Decision-Making Procedure: Promoting A D
eliberative System for Global Peace and Security (Routledge 2015) ch 4; Peter Nadin, UN Sec
urity Council Reform (Routledge 2016) chs 4-5. 
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however, there appears to be no consensus in the literature on these issues: 
In terms of territorial disputes, typically, legal and political scholars from the traditional 
Western powers, such as Shaw, usually tend to endorse the increase in the subjects of 
territorial disputes, yet oppose the expansion of the objects of territorial disputes.138 On 
the other hand, legal and political scholars from the newly emerging non-Western 
powers, such as Sharma, usually tend to oppose the increase in the subjects of territorial 
disputes, yet endorse the expansion of the objects of territorial disputes.139 Furthermore, 
legal and political scholars from most of the ordinary states, such as Cukwurah, usually 
tend to be the pupils of the scholars from the traditional Western powers, and support 
the stance of their teachers.140 
In terms of the UNCSS, those international legal scholars, such as Shaw, tend to 
recognize the unsuccessful records of the UNCSS. However, they still expect that this 
mechanism can in theory perform an active role that can be appraised as ‘dynamic (and) 
executive’ in the process of handling severe international disputes.141 On the other hand, 
those international relations scholars, such as Morgenthau, tend to recognize the noble 
original intentions of the UNCSS. However, they still doubt the capacity of this 
mechanism to perform an active role that can be appraised as ‘dynamic (and) executive’ 
in the process of handling severe international disputes.142 
                                                        
138 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014)143-80 & 352-77; Krista E. Wiegand,
 Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement  
(University of Georgia Press, 2011) chs 4-8; Paul Huth, Standing your ground: Territorial Disp
utes and International Conflicts (University of Michigan Press 1998) 19-32; Wolfgang G. Vitzth
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139 See e.g. Surya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law (Brill 199
7) ch 4; Ralf Emmers, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia (Routledge 2
012) chs 4 & 6; Regarding the mainstream viewpoint of the Chinese scholars, see the above-m
entioned books or articles written by Li Fan, Xie Licheng and Nie Hongyi. 
140 Chdid Anselm Odinkalu & Soni Ajala, ‘Anthony Oye Cukwurah, pioneer in law of internati
onal boundaries (1934-2013)’ (Vanguard, 27 August 2013) <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/0
8/anthony-oye-cukwurah-pioneer-in-law-of-international-boundaries-1934-2013/> accessed 1 March 
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141 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 897-98. 
142 Hans J. Morgenthau (author), Kenneth W. Thompson & David Clinton (revised), Politics am
ong Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power (7th edn, McGraw-Hill 2005) 437-38. 
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Concerning the origin of such a distinctive situation, there is no doubt that the inherent 
difference between the schools of thought of the two groups of scholars have played an 
important role here. Nonetheless, the divergence of opinions of various scholars can 
actually be attributed to more relevant factors- 
Firstly, after the end of the WWII, the notion of ‘territory’ has been widely expanded. 
The development of the aviation equipment and the maturation of the marine 
technology have let the large-scale exploration of those geographical areas other than 
land territories become less difficult. In addition, the accumulation of the treaties related 
to the law of sea/airspace has endowed the various parties of the relevant disputes with 
the legal ground of their mutual territorial claims and negotiations.143 Moreover, since 
non-state political entities and even individuals have started to be accepted as new 
subjects of international law, the number of the participants of modern international 
disputes has gone far beyond the imagination of the elder generations.144 In short, the 
background for defining territorial disputes are sharply shifting. 
Therefore, the viewpoints of the various scholars on the concept of territorial disputes 
normally have no better object to count on but the relatively stable national background 
of different states. In respect of the Western scholars, their opinions are often based on 
the relatively fast speed of the development of their academic theories and the relatively 
fewer practical demands of their motherlands. In respect of the non-Western scholars, 
their opinions are often based on the relatively slow speed of the development of their 
academic theories and the relatively more practical demands of their motherlands. 
Secondly, since 1945, the practical basis of the UNCSS, as designed by the UN Charter, 
has gradually collapsed. As afore-stated, the founders of the United Nations believed 
that its universal collective security system should be the only legal and non-temporary 
measure for the suppression of severe international disputes through actively using 
                                                        
143 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 391-97, 419-28 & 455-66. 
144 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 21-29 & 183-89; Stephen C. Neff, J
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armed forces. For securing the success of this mechanism, the P5 would together act as 
the ‘international policemen’ with the task of maintaining international peace and 
security.145 Affected by the outbreak of the Cold War, however, the ability of the 
UNCSS to intervene in international affairs of the UNCSS had rapidly decreased. The 
decades of stalemate between the Eastern and Western Blocs destroyed the once friendly 
relationship among the P5, whilst the abuse of the veto power led to the authoritative 
institutions of the UNCSS being frequently incapacitated.146 Additionally, with the 
establishment of the two military-political alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the 
‘United Nations Forces’ and the Military Staff Committee which were supposed to 
manage the use of force became useless ornaments. As the result, even when the 
UNCSS got a chance to lead, it still had to appeal to those extra substitutive measures 
for help (e.g. the United Nations peacekeeping operations, see below).147 In short, the 
background for setting the target of the UNCSS has also shifted a lot. 
Therefore, the viewpoints of the various scholars on the target of the UNCSS normally 
have no better object to count on but the relatively stable doctrines of various schools. 
In respect of the international legal scholars, their opinions tend to respect the law and 
believe in the acquired order of the international community. 148  In respect of the 
international relations scholars, their opinions tend to neglect the law and believe in the 
acquired disorder of the international community.149  
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Besides, regarding the disagreement between the legal and political scholars on the 
target of the UNCSS, the particularly dangerous attitude possessed by those extreme 
realists represented by Carr should be separately noted. Unlike common scholars, Carr 
possessed a strong aversion to any international security mechanisms that might contain 
elements of idealism, and he derided all attempts at establishing a ‘Wilsonian’ form of 
collective security system as ‘Utopianism’.150 Several decades later, the zero-sum logic 
of Carr was further carried forward by a few other international relations scholars during 
the early years of the 21st century. For example, when talking about those factors that 
could restrain ‘wars among superpowers’, Mearsheimer never even mentioning the 
UNCSS in his monograph which covered the period from the Napoleonic War to the 
Kosovo War.151 Undoubtedly, this school of thought would not care for any ‘achievable 
targets’ of the UNCSS. 
6. Summary. 
In summary, both territorial disputes and the UNCSS are long-term objects of research 
of the relevant scholars, but the recent study of the political scholars on the former issue 
is slightly ahead of that of their legal colleagues. However, reviewing the massive 
existing literature, there have been few genuinely integrated studies of territorial 
disputes and the UNCSS, and holistic plans to reform the application of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes are also hard to find. Moreover, if current researchers wish to fill or 
further explore the above-stated gap, then they must also consider the concept of 
territorial disputes and the target(s) of the UNCSS.  
Furthermore, it should be highlighted that the core purpose of the literature review of 
this chapter is to situate the original work in this thesis. Hence, specific emphasis has 
been placed on identifying ‘what has not been said’ by the relevant scholars in the two 
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research fields of territorial disputes and the UNCSS, rather than evaluating ‘what has 
been said’ by the relevant scholars. The necessary engagement of the viewpoints of the 
author and the relevant scholars on definite issues will be written in the corresponding 
sub-sections of the main body of this thesis. Concerning the general introductory nature 
of the present section, there is no need to have more extra discussion in this part. 
2.2 The methodology of the thesis 
International law is a discipline of social science, and the two dominant research 
methodologies in social science are quantitative research and qualitative research.152 
Similarly, there are numerous schools of thought, but the relevant scholars always have 
to face realism and idealism, the two philosophical approaches that are essential to their 
studies153. Accordingly, it is clear that the author needs to find its methodology which 
fits the research topic from the above four categories, and this approach should show 
some originality. 
2.2.1 General philosophy 
According to Goldsmith and Posner, international legal scholars are usually abided by 
the psychological assumption that ‘states follow international law for non-instrumental 
reasons……because it reflects morally valid procedure, or consent, or internal value 
set’. However, they have also stated that while this perspective does not deny the fact 
that states may pursue their own national interests, it has overly emphasized the natural 
ability of common morality and international legal regulations to bind the behaviour of 
states. 154  In other words, the traditional works of international law put too much 
confidence in ‘good public order and moral’, which means that they are more likely to 
analysis international law by using comparatively idealistic critique. Unfortunately, the 
success of this approach has rather strict pre-conditions, it depends on the mightiness 
                                                        
152 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (5th edn, OUP 2015) ch 2. 
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of international law, and the restraining effect exerted by social morality upon private 
desire. 
Therefore, at least to the present research topic, which involves both the core interests 
of states and the coercive enforcement of law, the continuous use of the traditional 
philosophy is inappropriate. This philosophy cannot offer an original perspective for 
this thesis, and such an approach would risk embedding an incorrect portrayal of the 
actual behaviour of states and the actual background of the thesis.155 In contrast, as the 
opposing philosophy to traditional international legal approach, the nature of realism 
can rightly match this thesis: 
Firstly, realists are known for their frequent criticisms of the inherent shortfalls of the 
UNCSS, and even underestimating the entire modern international legal system. 
Nonetheless, even Morgenthau, one of the most famous realists, has recognized that the 
thought of ‘collective security’ is theoretically rather ‘perfect’ in his book. 156 
Objectively speaking, the stance of this approach which tends to deal with a matter on 
its own merits is very suitable to be used to study those practical topics which may 
contain both successful cases and unsuccessful cases in the same plane. 
Secondly, realists place emphasis on ‘national interests’ and ‘national powers’, and 
these words largely contradict the preferred values of the modern international legal 
system. However, the former term has fairly reflected the direct motivation of the 
various parties of territorial disputes or other various international disputes (see below). 
In addition, the latter term has also helped the formation of the hierarchy of the 
participating states of the UNCSS.157 Objectively speaking, this approach, which tends 
to talk straightforwardly and honestly, is very suitable to be used to study those complex 
topics in which the initial design and the later management are different with each other. 
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Thirdly, realists usually prefer ‘primarily to explain, rather than prescribe, international 
behaviour’. However, in comparison with the traditional legal scholars or those 
idealistic political scholars, the realistic scholars still put more emphasis on the 
‘instrumental’ reasons for the detailed policy-making of states.158 Objectively speaking, 
this approach, which tends to refrain from making presumptuous assumptions, is very 
suitable to be used to study those controversial topics in which lies a gap between 
expectation and effect. 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the advantages of the realist approach are 
a good fit with the topic of this thesis. Adopting a general philosophy of realism will 
enable a critical analysis of the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes and the 
relevant legal statutes with better comprehensiveness, impartiality and creativity. In fact, 
when introducing the political and other interdisciplinary elements in their discussion, 
this approach has been partly implemented by several international legal scholars, such 
as Koskenniemi and Wilson.159 
2.2.2 Specific methods 
As aforementioned, mainstream research methods in contemporary social science 
studies can be divided into quantitative research methods and qualitative research 
methods. Given the detailed substance of these methods, along with a few other reasons 
below, this thesis will apply the ‘qualitative literary based study’ method which relies 
on the related literature, legal statutes and case reports:160 
Firstly, it is not easy to collect first-hand resources for the substance of this thesis. The 
UNCSS and territorial disputes are two issues which have very strong practicality. Thus, 
the most appropriate and original method should be the collection of first-hand 
resources on the spot, then empirically analysing them. Unfortunately, the UNCSS is a 
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forcible type of international security mechanism, and territorial disputes are all over 
the world. Accordingly, it is also unrealistic to try to investigate the application of the 
UNCSS in territorial disputes from within the affected areas. This thesis has therefore 
been left with making use of the second choice of the libraries which have large 
collections of academic materials, although these may include first-hand records 
collected by previous scholars. 
Secondly, the conclusion of this thesis cannot be reached via mathematical calculation. 
Historically speaking, the verification of research conclusion through calculation is a 
research method of natural science, and was adopted disciplines of social science 
later.161 To be fair, the preciseness of mathematical calculation has to be acknowledged, 
yet there is a reason for the absence of this method in traditional work on international 
law. On the one hand, the status and value of law is not a question that can be calculated, 
as memorably stated by Berman, ‘law has to be believed in, or it will not work’.162 On 
the other hand, the application and function of law is also not a question that can be 
calculated, whether the offenders would bend to law or the victims would resort to law 
is a subjective matter that is full of uncertainty. For example, the P5 has never passively 
obeyed the rules of international law in history, but the Philippines still sued China. 
Therefore, the author is not obligated to try this tactic. 
Thirdly, the topic of this thesis is a question of isness. Just as above-stated, the integrated 
study of the UNCSS and territorial disputes is still a gap in the research field of the 
modern international legal academia, and the drafters of the UN Charter used to 
positively fancy the role of the UNCSS. However, the situation in the 2010s is no longer 
as same as the situation in the 1950s when Kelsen had just published his first monograph 
that thoroughly introduced the UNCSS. The UNCSS has already been applied in 
territorial disputes, and it has already aroused a few controversies. Therefore, as the 
                                                        
161 E.g. In his monograph related to territories disputes, Huth has quantified the various causes 
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background conditions of the study of the questions of isness is comparatively ripe, the 
author hardly leave too much space for proposing hypothesis and establishing matched 
models. 
In summary, this thesis will be a doctoral project that is written by applying the general 
philosophy of realism and the specific method of ‘qualitative literary based study’. The 
realist framework will enable the author to assess his research topic with apt approach, 
and to pay particular attention to interdisciplinary elements of the international legal 
studies. Meanwhile, the qualitative literary method will ensure that the author will not 
overly deviate from the classic research paradigm of legal studies.  
Besides, it should be noted that according to the findings of the literature review, there 
lacks special literature which jointly studies territorial disputes and the UNCSS. 
Therefore, it is true that the general articles and books on the entire pack of territorial 
disputes and the UNCSS, written by authoritative scholars, need to be critically used 
for reference. However, the over reliance on the method of criticizing the broad 
viewpoints expressed by these general materials, cannot accurately improve the present 
practical study on the application of a particular mechanism in a specific field. In 
contrast, the rather realistic route which put more emphasize on directly demonstrating 
the drawbacks of the related mechanism, the limitations of the related thoughts and the 
results of the related practice with the help of the related literature, is equally worthy to 




Chapter 3-The background of the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes 
settlement 
3.1 The nature of territorial disputes 
Just as the textbooks of international law would primarily discuss the nature of 
international law, it is also appropriate to start a study on territorial disputes by assessing 
their nature. 163  Specifically speaking, here the author should at least answer two 
preparatory issues that are parts of the nature of territorial disputes, namely their concept 
and unique characters: 
Pertaining to the concept, Paul Huth, a leading scholar in this field, has pointed out that 
‘an essential first step is to develop a clear and valid definition of the concept of a 
territorial dispute between states…a well-grounded definition is critical...to both theory 
building and empirical testing’.164 Obviously, according to his teaching, the basis of the 
study of territorial disputes is to define the concept of territorial disputes, and the 
concept of territorial disputes will systematically affect, or even decide, the progress of 
any relevant research. 
Pertaining to the unique characters, as a particular type of international dispute that 
could easily trigger international armed conflicts,165 territorial disputes surely have 
their individual features which separate them from others. According to Huth again, it 
is the comprehensive effect of a series of unique characters of territorial disputes that 
has turned them into a special type of international disputes which can more easily 
initiate a war. Otherwise, this issue cannot become a vital object of concern of the 
various measures for the settlement of international disputes, including the UNCSS.166 
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However, given the importance of the characters of territorial disputes in practice, the 
past relevant scholars still tend to either ignore or conflate these elements in their 
research. For example, even Huth himself used to excessively emphasize the various 
values of the objects of territorial disputes, whilst he ignored the abundant characters of 
territorial disputes in other aspects.167 
Therefore, before further explore the settlement of territorial disputes, this thesis should 
clarify their concept and characters. With the help of the substance of the present section, 
the author may understand the range of choice of his case studies, and the UNCSS may 
also know its head-to-head opponent whilst it is being applied in actual practice. 
3.1.1 The concept of territorial disputes 
1. The range of the subjects of territorial disputes. 
As its name has suggested, in the context of the modern international legal theories, 
only those legitimate subjects of international law can become the subjects, or parties 
of the various international disputes. In accordance with the authoritative Oppenheim’s 
International Law, the ‘subjects of international law’ not only have covered a large 
geographical area in present days, but are also continuously expanding: 
In the firstly place, the literal meaning of ‘international law’ has already clearly 
explained the simple substance of the subjects of international law during the early years 
of this term-the common sovereign states. In addition, both Oppenheim and the early 
international treaties claimed that only those European or American states from the 
‘civilized world’ were exclusively qualified to recognize other sovereign states.168 
Afterwards, with gradual improvement of legal theories after the WWII, the traditional 
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international organizations represented by the United Nations gained wide acceptance 
as new subjects of international law. At the same time, the outdated idea of ‘civilized 
world’ was also abandoned by the international community.169 Finally, thanks to the 
birth of human rights law and other new departments of international law, together with 
de-colonization movement and other new types of international affairs, recently the 
concept of ‘subjects of international law’ has been further expanded. These include a lot 
of diversified political entities, such as sui generis territorial entities (e.g. national 
liberation movement170), non-governmental organizations and individuals.171 
However, regarding the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes, not all the 
various subjects of international law are qualified to become the objects. This is owing 
to three reasons as follows: 
One, some of the subjects of international law do not have their own, solid territories. 
Undoubtedly, the objects that the numerous parties of territorial disputes fight over, are 
tangible territories. If there is no solid piece of territories under a subject of international 
law, then such a given political entity should not participate in the related territorial 
disputes. Consequently, newly emerged subjects of international law which do not have 
previously-formed or well-defined territorial claims, such as national liberation 
movement and IGOs, are not suitable to be incorporated into the substance of this 
thesis172. 
Besides, it should be noted that the UN Charter has stipulated a separate type of subject 
of international law, namely the non-self-governing territories, which also possess the 
four essential elements of those common sovereign states, and comparatively stable 
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boundaries. 173  Nevertheless, limited by their nature as areas administrated by 
designated sovereign states, non-self-governmental territories cannot independently 
retain key national powers, including the right to manage their defence and diplomatic 
affairs. Therefore, the other subjects of international law which cast their eye on non-
self-governmental territories could only compete with the corresponding administrating 
powers174. 
Two, some of the subjects of international law not only do not have their own, solid 
territories, but also do not even need any piece of territories. Carrying forward the logic 
of the last paragraphs, there is no doubt that the disputed territories must be quite 
meaningful to the parties of the relevant territorial disputes (see above and below). If 
the existence, development and diplomatic communication of a subject of international 
law does not rely on any solid piece of territory, then this political entity clearly does 
not need to participate in the related territorial disputes as a party. Consequently, those 
subjects of international law that are more active in the field of private law, such as 
individuals, transnational corporations and NGOs, should be excluded from the 
substance of this thesis.175 
Three, some of the subjects of international law are not governed by the UNCSS, and 
here the author refers to the political entities that are similar to sovereign states but have 
not been widely recognized (hereinafter the ‘semi-states’). Undoubtedly, semi-states are 
a regular type of subject of international law which possesses all the four key elements 
of ‘territory, population, government and capacity to enter into diplomatic relations’. 
Thus, those semi-states have the ability and the motivation to act as parties of a 
particular territorial disputes. 176  Regrettably, in comparison with those common 
sovereign states, the territorial claims of those semi-states are usually regarded by the 
entire international community as a domestic problem of the related common sovereign 
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states. Therefore, their claims really cannot acquire sufficient support under modern 
international law. For example, all the 176 states with official diplomatic relations with 
China have adopted the ‘One China’ policy. However, the endorsement of this policy 
means that those states have recognized that the question of Taiwan is not a classic 
territorial dispute, but the ‘reunification’ of the separated old China. Accordingly, it is 
difficult for these states to broach the question of Taiwan by invoking international 
law.177  
More importantly, from the specific perspective of assessing the territorial disputes 
applied by the author, semi-states are not able to share the protection offered by the 
UNCSS with other common sovereign states. Tracking the origin of this phenomenon, 
the emergence of such a dilemma actually involves the fundamental nature of the 
UNCSS and the criteria for judging what is ‘not widely recognized’. 
On the one hand, unlike the idea of ‘collective self-defense’ which can easily be 
obfuscated with its inter-connected concept (see next chapter below), the idea of 
‘collective security’ upon which the UNCSS is based, effectuates the slogan of ‘all for 
one, one for all’. It combines the power of all the relevant member states to prevent 
internal challenges, but not against external threats.178 Although the UN Charter allows 
the UNCSS to sanction or protect non-member states of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of ‘international peace and security’, the UNCSS has only exercised this 
right once and that can be dated back to the Korean War.179 A famous example in this 
respect is the case of Kosovo, the final arrangement settling this dispute was the 
complete separation of this region, as an entire piece of territory, from Serbia. 
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Nevertheless, the core document which led to the intervention of the UNCSS in the 
process of independence of Kosovo, resolution 1244 of the UNSC, had emphasized that 
it was only willing to settle ‘the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo’. In the 
meantime, this resolution had also clearly stated ‘the commitment of all member states 
to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’.180 
On the other hand, unlike the four essential elements of the common sovereign states, 
‘not widely recognized’ is an ambiguous term. Can Kosovo, a country widely 
recognized by European and American states, but not by others, be treated as a ‘not 
widely recognized’ semi-state? Can Palestine, a country widely recognized by others, 
but not by European and American states, be treated as a ‘not widely recognized’ semi-
state? Until now, the Eastern and Western Blocs not only have endlessly quarreled over 
this topic, but also have frequently misinterpreted the relevant legal regulations for 
covering their political stances. 181 Consequently, according to Shaw, only the 193 
member states of the United Nations are the common sovereign states of the 
international community, whilst the identity of other ‘sui generis territorial entities’ as 
‘sovereign states’ is still questionable.182 A famous case in this respect is China’s 
United Nations membership. From 1949 to 1971, the seat of China was occupied by 
Taiwan as the Republic of China, and Taiwan had long-term control over the largest 
island/reef within the area of the South China Sea, the Itu Aba Island. Nevertheless, 
although the South China Sea Arbitration in 2016 had repeatedly cited the official 
documents of the former Republic of China, but the court never gave Taiwan the status 
of a state party of this case.183 
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In short, although there are variety of subjects of international law, but after screening 
the key words ‘UNCSS’ and ‘territorial disputes’, the real subjects of territorial disputes 
in the context of this thesis can only refer to those member states of the United Nations. 
Besides, it is noteworthy that there is another special type of political entity within the 
system of the United Nations, which is the ‘observers’ of the UNGA. In essence, the 
nature of observers and the member states of the United Nations are almost identical, 
the only difference is the former cannot participate in the voting procedure while 
attending UN meetings. Thus, this thesis should not ignore their territorial disputes.184 
Fortunately, concerning the fact that most of the former observers of the UNGA have 
become member states of the United Nations, and considering the stable status of the 
territories of the Holy See, the author only needs to notice one special observer-
Palestine.185 
2. The classification of the objects of territorial disputes. 
Unlike the subjects, the objects of territorial disputes are a rather changeless concept 
which only refer to substantial territories themselves, or the geographical spaces 
covered by the sovereignty of states. 186  However, several examples, such as the 
Scarborough Shoal dispute between China and Philippines, demonstrate that pertaining 
to the application of selected norms of international law, the objects of territorial 
disputes can be divided into different types.187 Meanwhile, Diehl has also pointed out 
that the classification of territorial disputes could help practitioners to select key cases 
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worthy of intensive study.188 Therefore, it is necessary to specifically classify territorial 
disputes at the beginning of the main body of this thesis. 
In terms of the basis of classification, previous international legal scholars relied on the 
legal or political characters of territories, but today they prefer to divide territories into 
land territories, territorial sea and territorial airspace.189 According to Sharma, law and 
politics are interdependent in the field of territorial disputes, thus the above-mentioned 
theoretical way of classifying territories could render the various territorial disputes 
indistinguishable.190 Other than that, any geographical area beyond the administrative 
and controlling ability of human beings (e.g., the earth’s core or outer space191) has no 
practical meaning. 192  Consequently, it is clearer to classify territorial disputes by 
referring to the geographical nature of actual territories. On this basis, the author will 
also analyse the research value of three types of disputed territories in order-land-
territory disputes, maritime disputes and airspace disputes. 
Firstly, land-territory disputes. 
Despite the Antarctic where the territorial claims have been suspended,193 there no 
longer exists any ‘terra nullius’.194 Thus, most of the present land-territory disputes 
examined by the international legal academia are land-territory disputes among 
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different states. Just like the primary status of land territories among all types of 
territories, as confirmed by the Oppenheim’s International Law, 195 the land-territory 
disputes have a primary status in territorial disputes as well. In particular, their 
importance stems from two aspects: 
First, the proportion of the land territories in the entire area of all types of national 
territories. The scope of the land territories covered by states’ sovereignty includes all 
the continents, islands and the subsoil within their borders.196 Needless to say, the entire 
area of these land territories are much larger than the entire area of the corresponding 
territorial sea.197 Additionally, Akehurst and Malanczuk also argue that the internal 
water which used to be treated as part of the sea in the traditional legal sense198 is now 
part of the land territories.199 Moreover, owing to its natural characteristics, airspace is 
not the same as land territories or the sea in territorial disputes (see below). Thus, in 
spite of several archipelago states which only have relatively small land territories (e.g. 
Nauru), land territories unquestionably account for an overwhelming proportion of the 
territories of the majority of states. 
Second, the proportion of the land-territory disputes in the entire pack of territorial 
disputes. In correspondence with the proportion of the land territories in the total area 
of territories, land-territory disputes also account for a very high proportion among all 
the various cases of territorial disputes.200 More importantly, as land territories are the 
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foundation for setting the baselines for maritime/airspace delimitation, 201  even in 
complex territorial disputes which involve other areas, land territories usually hold a 
core status as well. For example, although the East China Sea dispute between China 
and Japan is a competition for the economic resources within the relevant continental 
shelves and EEZs, but its focus is the inconspicuous Diaoyu/Senkaku Island, which 
belongs to the land territories.202  
In short, relying on its advantageous status in terms of the total relative proportion, at 
least until today, the land-territory disputes are still the most important type of territorial 
dispute. Actually, most of the traditional rules pertaining to territories within the 
international legal system are all developed in view of land territories and the relevant 
disputes, and this fact has also proved the importance of land territories from a lateral 
perspective.203 
Besides, it is noteworthy that some scholars have claimed that common territorial 
disputes and boundary disputes should be clearly separated. 204 However, although 
common territorial disputes usually involve a change of the sovereignty ownership of 
large pieces of territories, whilst boundary disputes usually involve small sections of 
border lines, they are not completely opposite issues.205 Moving border lines could 
certainly lead to the change of ownership of territories, and the change of ownership of 
territories could definitely cause a shift in border lines, these acts are essentially 
interdependent. 206  For example, Sharma once stated that in order to decide the 
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ownership of the region of the Temple of Preah Vihear, the ICJ had applied certain rules 
of international law which were usually applied to delimit national borders.207 In this 
thesis, therefore, the author will not be entangled in the differences between common 
territorial disputes and boundary disputes. 
Secondly, maritime disputes. 
From the perspective of international law, the unique feather of maritime disputes rest 
with the fact that they should be divided into the territorial sea of states and other sea 
areas in which states may enjoy sovereign rights. Each will now be explained. 
First, the territorial sea of states.  
Similar to land territories, states enjoy full sovereignty over their territorial sea, seabed 
and subsoil.208 Early in the era of Grotius, various European states had already begun 
to debate the rights of littoral states on the sea,209 which directly led to the birth of the 
concept of territorial sea.210 Later with the gradual expansion of the scope of territorial 
sea, along with scientific and military developments, the territorial sea claimed by 
different states overlapped and clashed, 211  so that the territorial sea disputes had 
become a major part of territorial disputes. 
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For instance, before the conclusion of the UNCLOS, Greece and Turkey respectively 
announced that the width of their territorial sea was 6 nm. Although this allowed Greece 
to control nearly half of the Aegean Sea, Turkey did not intensely respond. After 
UNCLOS I, however, Greece gradually claimed that the width of its territorial sea was 
12 nm, establishing this claim through formal legislation after the conclusion of the 
UNCLOS. With this policy the sovereignty of Greece could cover almost all of the 
Aegean Sea, and Turkey argued against this claim as it threatened her original interests. 
Thereby, a serious dispute over territorial sea was initiated.212  
Fortunately, despite the related troubles, the UNCLOS does provide a series of 
principles, rules and measures for the delimitation of territorial sea and the settlement 
of disputes. Meanwhile, it has created the ITLOS to assist the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes within the law of the sea as well.213 With the help of this complete 
legal system, currently most of the major states’ territorial sea has been delimited, and 
the remaining controversies are concentrating on just two perspectives which do not 
need the rules governing territorial sea214- 
The first is the disputed islands surrounded by the relevant maritime areas. The key 
point of this perspective is not the territorial sea around the disputed islands, but the 
small pieces of land territories, which are the disputed islands themselves, encircled by 
the territorial sea. Back into the detailed practice, the Scarborough Shoal dispute 
between China and Philippines is a typical case in this field.215 The second is the 
continental shelf disputes which have been heard on many occasions by the ITLOS. The 
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key point of this perspective is not a fight for the sovereignty of territories, but a fight 
for the economic resources covered by ‘sovereign rights’ (see next paragraphs below). 
Back into the detailed practice, the maritime delimitation and territorial questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain is a typical case in this field.216 Accordingly, it can be said 
that the status quo of those disputes over territorial sea are comparatively optimistic, 
and a large part of this issue which actually involves sovereignty controversies can 
indeed be absorbed into land-territory disputes.  
Second, the other sea areas in which states may enjoy ‘sovereign rights’.  
The UNCLOS not only established the present system of territorial sea, but it also 
established or created the present systems of continental shelf and EEZ.217 By this 
means, it not only widely expanded the behaviour space of states on the high seas, but 
also left certain hidden troubles to the emergence of the relevant international disputes. 
As territorial sea disputes are progressively subsiding, a significant amount of the 
existing maritime disputes in the present international community pertain to the 
EEZ/continental shelves, and their focus are the natural resources within the relevant 
maritime regions. For instance, the North Sea Continental Shelf Case settled before the 
conclusion of the UNCLOS is basically a typical case in this field.218  
However, although states may enjoy ‘sovereign rights’ in their EEZ/continental shelf 
regions, this is not tantamount to the complete national sovereignty which applies to 
common territorial seas. Strictly speaking, ‘sovereign rights’ are economic privileges of 
exploring, exploiting and conserving natural resources of the sea, the extent of which 
are far narrower than the political concept of national sovereignty.219 More to the point, 
‘sovereign rights’ can also be divided into multiple specific duties, which cannot affect 
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the legal rights or freedom of other nearby states in the corresponding maritime 
regions. 220  Hence, as the scientific technology develops, it is predictable that the 
EEZ/continental shelf will become more important, but there is also no need to confuse 
the EEZ/continental shelf under the ‘sovereign rights’ with territorial seas under 
national sovereignty. 
Thirdly, airspace disputes. 
Unlike land territories or maritime regions, airspace is formed by airflow that has no 
mass or smell. Accordingly, no method can actualise the stable control of its content 
(which is air) in practice, so that the sovereignty over airspace called by international 
law virtually only has theoretical meaning.221 Meanwhile, the nature of airspace means 
it has no clear frontier, thereby the scope of airspace under the sovereignty of a definite 
state can only be delimited by its land territories and territorial sea. 222 Consequently, 
airspace disputes only have minimum independent research value which derives from 
the relevant land-territory disputes or maritime disputes. For instance, the airspace 
dispute in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey is a typical case.223 
Greece and Turkey share historically disputed islands, territorial sea and continental 
shelves. According to the UNCLOS stipulation that the width of the territorial sea can 
be extended to 12 nm, Greece claims that its territorial airspace frontier is 10 nm from 
its coastline.224 However, because Greece controls most of the islands in the Aegean 
Sea, and the Greek islands in the east part of this region are very close to the Turkish 
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territories, Turkey continuously objects the claim of Greece. Based on the old rules 
concerning the width of territorial sea and the relevant international conventions, such 
as the Chicago Convention, Turkey claims that the largest extent of the Greek territorial 
airspace should be 6 nm from the Greek coastline225. This disagreement has precipitated 
provocation and military confrontation, in which the incident of the collision of military 
aircrafts in 2006 even caused several casualties of their military personnel. However, so 
far the negotiation between Greece and Turkey over the sea area of the Aegean Sea still 
has not made any breakthrough, thus the settlement of the airspace dispute in this region 
is even more out of the question.226  
Fourthly, special situation. 
Despite the above-mentioned standard territorial disputes, it is worthy to mention that 
there are well-known examples containing clear elements of territorial disputes, but are 
discussed as a separate category. Classic examples of this type include the Korean War, 
the Gulf War and the more recent Crimea Crisis. Undoubtedly, the key words of the 
above disputes are ‘annexation’ and ‘invasion’, and in comparison with scholars of 
territorial law, scholars from the disciplines like the law of war, or the law of 
international organizations are more interested in these cases.227 However, based on the 
following two reasons, the author will still discuss these disputes in this thesis: 
On the one hand, all direct parties of these cases were formal members of the United 
Nations (although more accurately, North Korea and South Korea joined the United 
Nations after their initial clash228). Moreover, the objects of fighting were pieces of land 
territories. In other words, these theoretical features certainly fit the range of research 
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of the thesis established in this section. On the other hand, regardless of whether it is an 
act of ‘invasion’ or an act of ‘annexation’, the nature of these terms is a specific measure 
used by attackers to illegally acquire territories from victims. In other words, these 
practical actions could separate the ‘good’ and ‘evil’ parties, but they cannot change the 
theoretical nature of the actual case. 
Therefore, there are some differences between the territorial expansion of the member 
states of the United Nations through armed actions and those common territorial 
disputes under the control of modern international law. Nevertheless, the former is still 
qualified to become an object of study of this thesis. Taking the length of a doctorate 
thesis into account, the subsequent chapters will not separately emphasize the 
particularity of this type of cases again. 
3. Summary. 
In summary, the ‘territorial disputes’ discussed in this thesis will mainly refer to the 
disagreement among member states of the United Nations over the sovereignty 
ownership of land territories. Besides, the author will not exclude a few manifestations 
of territorial disputes, such as invasion or annexation (hereinafter may call them 
‘standard’ territorial disputes). In addition, this thesis will only mention Palestine, and 
territorial sea disputes which derive from land-territory disputes, when absolutely 
necessary. Furthermore, while the legal academia has not reached an agreement upon 
the definition of ‘territorial disputes’, this thesis will not extensively cover the maritime 
areas where states may enjoy ‘sovereign rights’, the airspace and other subjects of 
international law. Lastly, since this thesis does not wish to deliberately incorporate the 
territorial issues of the non-member states of the United Nations, the relevant parties 
certainly cannot use excuses like ‘internal affairs’ or ‘sovereignty’ to reject the 
intervention of the UNCSS. But say, Tsagourias and White have already stated that 
according to the original idea of the UN Charter on this matter, the ‘enforcement 
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measures’ of the UNCSS are always higher than ‘domestic matters’.229 
3.1.2 The characters of territorial disputes 
As afore-mentioned, the characters of territorial disputes can partly explain the fact that 
this dispute could easily initiate wars, and attract the attention of various measures for 
settling international disputes, including the UNCSS. Unfortunately, and perhaps 
surprisingly, the corresponding research is slim. On one hand, the viewpoints of certain 
authoritative scholars, such as Huth, are more or less one-sided (see above). On the 
other hand, for example, some other scholars from developing states have even 
attributed the causes of these characters to ‘the remaining questions of history’.230 
Consequently, this thesis certainly need to summarize the unique characters of territorial 
disputes to fill the gap in the literature and to assist the writing of the next chapters. 
Bearing this aim and the inherent crucial status of states, territories and other relevant 
elements in mind (see introduction above), the author believes that the special characters 
of territorial disputes are as follows: 
1. The uniqueness of the subjects of territorial disputes.  
The normal subjects of territorial disputes are sovereign states, which in the context of 
this thesis are member states of the United Nations. In comparison to sovereign states, 
neither the international organizations and transnational corporations, nor the 
individuals have or need solid territories, so that territorial disputes are not a problem 
for them.231 In fact, even if the author is willing to take other subjects of international 
law which actually need solid territories into account, he still can hardly find any 
appropriate past practical record for his research: 
                                                        
229 Nicholas Tsagourias & Nigel D. White, Collective Security: Theory, Law and Practice (CUP
 2013) 285. 
230 E.g. Yang Mian, ‘The Peaceful Approaches and Methods of Settling Territorial and Boundar
y Disputes’ (2009) 31 (1) Socialism Studies 109 at 109-10. 
231 With regard to the potential subjects of common international disputes, see J.G. Merrills, Int
ernational Dispute Settlement (5th edn, CUP 2011) 1. 
80 
 
First, after gaining independence, those non-self-governing territories and national 
liberation movements will defend their territorial claims, but before then, the direct 
parties of the relevant disputes should still be the old dominating power. For instance, 
the sovereignty issue of the Falkland Islands is a territorial dispute between Argentina 
and the UK, not a territorial dispute between Argentina and the local government of the 
Falkland Islands.232  
Second, due to their limited status and strength (for example, as the richest semi-state, 
the GDP of Taiwan is equal to 5% of the mainland China’s GDP233), it is common to 
find cases in which semi-states act as if they are not involved in any territorial dispute. 
For instance, from 2013 to 2016, Taiwan was practically reticent about the South China 
Sea Arbitration between China and Philippines, only once announcing that it would ‘not 
accept the result of the arbitration’ after receiving the tribunal’s final decision.234 
2. The invaluableness of the objects of territorial disputes.  
As above-stated, territories (here specifically refers to land territories) are not only the 
sole object of territorial disputes, but also the primary pre-condition for a political entity 
to be qualified as state.235 After all, without territories there is no state, whilst without 
states there is no emergence of any international dispute, or even international law. 
Therefore, the inherent value of territories is surely exceptionally important, and thus 
territories surely have noticeable prominence in the eyes of the entire international 
community. Besides, as the physical space upon which the various subjects of 
international law co-exist, develop and compete with each other, the acquired value 
attached to territories should not be underestimated as well:236 
                                                        
232 Marcelo Kohen & Facundo Rodriguez, The Malvinas/Falklands Between History and Law 
(CreateSpace Independent Publishing 2017) 233-50. 
233 The Economist, Pocket World in Figures 2018 (Profile Books 2018) 24. 
234 Neyla Zennia, ‘Taiwan rejects ruling on South China Sea with Taiping Island defined as “r
ocks” ’ (TOC, 14 July 2016) <https://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2016/07/14/taiwan-rejects-ruling-o
n-south-china-sea-with-taiping-island-defined-as-rocks/> accessed 1 April 2018. 
235 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (7th edn, OUP 2014) 352. 
236 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 81; Paul Diehl, ‘Territorial Dispute
s’, in Lester R. Kurtz, Jennifer E. Turpin (eds), Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict 
81 
 
For instance, in order to explain the arguments used by states to support their territorial 
claims, many scholars have summarized the non-legal claims proposed by various states 
against the disputed territories.237 The most exhaustive list provided by Strausz-Hupe 
and Possony, inter alia, contains as many as 12 items, including linguistic, religion, 
culture, military, economy, history, administration, ideology, geography, race, sociology 
and psychology.238 Since no state would carelessly seek excuses for its potentially 
dangerous desire, this list has indeed proved that territories may possess abundant and 
significant value which cannot be easily renounced by any state in as many as 12 aspects. 
Needless to say, such a figure surely has highlighted the ‘abundant value’ of this 
particular object, namely land territories. 
More attractively, even if the thesis put the above number, or quantity aside, the quality 
of the value of other objects and that of territories are also incomparable. For example, 
in the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 case, Italy and Albania chose to 
appeal to the ICJ for the ownership of merely several tons of Gold (around 1 million 
British pounds then)239. In contrast, nearly 30 years ago, to purchase the tiny Virgin 
Islands from Demark in 1917, the USA had already spent over 25 million dollars.240 
Back into the relevant practice, the high-value nature of territories makes states pay 
much more attention to territories than other objects of international disputes, thus 
increasing the sensitiveness and hence the possibility of territorial disputes241. In fact, 
Mancini and Gibler have pointed out that ‘how willing a state is to compromise over a 
disputed territory seems to depend on the value attributed to it…valueless lands hold 
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little potential for conflict’.242 In other words, according to the related authoritative 
scholars, the direct cause of territorial disputes may even have nothing to do with the 
status of territories as a core interest of states. Conversely, the abundance of the 
comprehensive value of territories is sufficient to arouse the interest of the relevant 
parties, and thus determine the policies applied by those states upon them. On this basis, 
the change of national policies and stances could certainly determine the possibility of 
dispute, or even armed conflict.243 
3. The difficultness of the process of settling territorial disputes.  
After discussing the subjects and objects of territorial disputes, this thesis certainly 
should turn to the actual settlement of territorial disputes. Pertaining to the process, 
certain Chinese scholars have described it as complex and lengthy,244 whilst this author 
believes a more accurate word is difficulty, plus it is closely linked to the above two 
characters of states and territories:  
On the one hand, the uniqueness of the subject of territorial disputes means that 
sovereign states are usually the only participants of territorial disputes. However, as the 
most essential and complete subject of international law, states normally have stronger 
comprehensive strength and coordinated will (compared to other subjects) for enduring 
mutual competition and confrontation.245 On the other hand, the invaluableness of the 
object of territorial disputes also means that it is impossible for states to easily make 
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concessions in respect of the relevant disputes. One thing leads to another, it is certainly 
even more difficult for states to passively obey any common solution that is moderate 
or simple.246  
Under such an unsatisfactory circumstance, despite the apparently increased possibility 
of territorial disputes, the difficulty of the settlement of territorial disputes would 
inevitably be increased as well. Return to the related cases, this trend is naturally 
reflected by the length of the process and the complexity of the measures that have been 
mentioned by other scholars: 
For example, pertaining to the international commercial dispute between two of the 
largest mobile phone manufacturers (Apple and Samsung), the British court spent only 
one month.247  In contrast, from the delivery of the initial judgment to the recent 
Cambodian application for the interpretation of the judgment, the Temple Preah Vihear 
case between Cambodia and Thailand has been ongoing for 50 years and is still not 
settled.248 For another instance, even those international trade disputes between states 
are generally settled by negotiations, and they rarely need to be submitted to the 
WTO.249 In contrast, ever since the end of the colonial rule of the UK, India and 
Pakistan has been fighting over Kashmir for 70 years without a settlement of this 
territorial dispute.250  
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However, speaking from the opposite perspective, it is the difficulty of settling 
territorial disputes, the value of territories, and states’ endurance for defending their 
interests that have paved the way for the application of the UNCSS here. Since the 
peaceful settlement of international dispute has become a principle of the contemporary 
international law, 251  only those specially challenging crises could initiate forcible 
measures, and thus inspire the writing of this thesis. Therefore, the dilemma in the 
relevant practice caused by the above characters of territorial disputes might also 
become a chance for the improvement and development of the relevant legal norms of 
international security mechanisms.  
4. The uncertainty of the results of the settlement of territorial disputes.  
If the two inherent characters of territorial disputes could affect the process of settling 
territorial disputes, then they certainly could affect the results of the settlement of 
territorial disputes as well. Interestingly, by analysing the details of these two characters, 
it could be seen that the factors which endow them with the ability to affect this sub-
topic are opposite to each other:  
On one hand, the national strength of states is not unchangeable, and as it changes, a 
state’s ambition and aggressiveness also change. On the other hand, the value of 
territories is changeable (e.g. when Russia sold Alaska to the USA, this region was a 
negative asset to the Tsar252). However, to a great extent, territories always remain a 
treasury that states cannot easily abandon in history. For example, while the USSR was 
the largest state in the world, during the WWII the Soviet commissars still used to say, 
‘Russia is big, but there is nowhere to retreat’.253  
Under the combined effect of these two key factors above, in comparison with other 
international disputes, the results and obedience of the settlement of territorial disputes 
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cannot always be guaranteed. Any change in the values of territories or the strengths of 
states, or the intervention by the third parties, all of these matters can increase the 
uncertainty of the results of the settlement. Besides, even within the relevant states 
themselves, any change in their domestic affairs, such as the rise of a nationalist regime, 
may also lead to the relapse of their territorial disputes,254 thus creating successive 
obstacles for the study and practice of territorial disputes. 
Taking the Alsace-Lorraine case before the birth of the UNCSS for instance. As its key 
point was the confrontation for the non-movable natural resources, a large portion of 
the early stage of this case was territorial dispute.255 Accordingly, the escalation of the 
tension in this region had led to repeated armed conflicts and the change of sovereignty 
ownership of this region: Initially, due to the Franco-Prussian War, Germany acquired 
Alsace-Lorraine which originally owned by France, but thanks to the Great War, this 
land was returned to France. Then, Germany occupied Alsace-Lorraine again at the 
beginning of the WWII, yet as one of the eventually victorious states, France regained 
the sovereignty of this land in 1945.256  
In contrast, after the later plan for settling this case had put the element of territorial 
disputes aside, it was obeyed properly and chronically. When Schuman, the then French 
minister of foreign affairs proposed to actualise the Coal and Steel Community by 
holding territorial disputes in abeyance after the WWII, his plan was rapidly accepted 
by Germany. Afterwards, the ECSC which was established with the joint contribution 
of France and Germany became the pioneer of the European integration, and the 
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successful operation of this organization eventually lasted for almost 50 years.257 
5. Summary.  
In summary, territorial disputes are a type of international disputes which has a 
relatively complex background situation caused by its multiple characters. No matter 
their ‘unique’ subjects, or their ‘precious’ objects, all of these characters can bring about 
numerous obstacles for the success of those simple and moderate measures here. 
Consequently, unless the parties are willing to let a territorial dispute to continue, 
otherwise the import of the coercive measures would definitely become a logical choice, 
setting the scene for the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes settlement. 
Besides, for the convenience of writing, when recalling the substance of this section in 
the subsequent chapters, the author will use shorter phrases like ‘complex situation’, 
‘abundant value’ and ‘difficult compromise’. In the corresponding sections below, these 
phrases will refer to the details of these above-mentioned characters, and the higher 
overall difficulties of settling territorial disputes which are caused by them. 
3.2 The peaceful settlement of territorial disputes 
Prior to the abolishment of war, the use of force by states was undoubtedly a common 
measure for settling international disputes, and it was broadly recognized as a legal 
instrument of national policy. 258  However, since the establishment of the United 
Nations, the peaceful settlement of various international disputes and the prohibition of 
the threat or use of force have become two basic principles of international law.259 In 
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fact, according to the findings of Tsagourias and White, ‘Both CS actors and institutions 
are empowered to facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes’.260 Therefore, before 
further discussing the UNCSS which involves the use of force, the author needs to 
review the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, so as to clarify the necessity of 
bringing coercive mechanism into this field. 
3.2.1 An overview of the various measures for the peaceful settlement of territorial 
disputes 
Reviewing the relevant provisions of the UN Charter and other credentials of 
international law, it can be seen that the international community recognizes nearly 10 
measures for the peaceful settlement of international disputes261. According to Wallace-
Bruce, despite their inherently diversified nature, the preponderant criteria for 
categorizing these measures is the level of intervention of third parties. 262 
Unfortunately, although there are quite a few practical options for the peaceful 
settlement of territorial disputes, none are perfect, each with disadvantages. 
1. Negotiation. 
Regardless of the type of international disputes, negotiation is always the most common 
and fruitful peaceful measure.263 According to Cassese, the advantage of negotiation is 
that ‘the solution is left entirely to the parties concerned, without any undue pressure 
from the outside’ 264 . In other words, negotiation basically excludes the external 
influence of the third parties, so that it is always highly praised by those sovereign states. 
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However, although negotiation could play an important role that is not neglectable, but 
it is not perfect, as it also has several drawbacks.  
Firstly, negotiation must rely on the consent of the various parties of the relevant 
international disputes. If one of the parties lacks the intention of initiating a negotiation, 
then it is impossible for the negotiation to be initiated. Secondly, the parties usually 
need to consider all the related, major or minor factors during negotiation. Thus, they 
might make unnecessary compromise on definite aspects for the purpose of achieving 
their overall goals.265 Thirdly, the character of negotiation of excluding the intervention 
of third parties makes this measure lacks in external supervision. Thereby, it may offer 
the space of making ‘backroom deals’ to definite parties. Fourthly, during negotiation, 
as the parties must directly and autonomously compete with each other, those relatively 
more powerful parties could pressure their opponents more easily. Therefore, it can be 
said that ‘negotiation may turn out to be a way by which global powers bend the will of 
lesser states, settling the issue to their own advantage’.266 
As the result, the pure application of negotiation cannot guarantee the complete 
settlement of any international dispute, especially those where the parties have severe 
contradictions. Reviewing the history, with their complex situations, abundant values 
and different compromises, territorial disputes are certainly not an exception: 
For instance, the Sino-Russian negotiation concerning the demarcation of their 
boundaries have possessed all the above-mentioned disadvantages. Firstly, during the 
Yalta conference the ‘big three’ secretly decided that the region of Outer Mongolia, 
which was then a part of China then, should be included in the USSR’s sphere of 
influence, thereby depriving China of 1.56 million square kilometres.267 Afterwards, 
the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations during the Cold War reduced both states’ 
intention and motivation for initiating negotiation, and it led to a series of armed 
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conflicts between the two states.268 Finally, in order to quickly and effectively settle the 
few remaining territorial disputes between the two states, both China and Russia made 
certain utilitarian concessions in the early 1990s, ceasing to obey the relevant rules of 
international law.269 
In summary, although negotiation is being called ‘the simplest and most utilized’ 
peaceful measure, 270  it cannot completely meet the international community’s 
expectation of peacefully settling territorial disputes. Consequently, the international 
community surely need to seek new way for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, so that here come the other peaceful measures which involve the intervention 
of the third parties. 
2. Mediation.  
Bearing the limitations of negotiation in mind, the UN Charter has listed a new measure 
which involves the intervention of third parties for the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes-mediation (Note: the good offices and mediation are almost 
identical in practice, and their names are even usually ‘interchangeable’271 )272 . In 
comparison with negotiation, the main advantage of mediation is the third parties would 
present non-binding suggestions on the basis of the consent of the various parties. 
Thereby, they may ‘persuade the parties to a dispute to reach satisfactory terms for its 
termination by themselves’273. However, despite the above improvement, mediation is 
also not the perfect measure for the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes or other 
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international disputes, as it has its own drawbacks as well. 
First, mediation is essentially a political method in which the third parties would prompt 
the initiation of the relevant negotiation. Thus, in favour of its efficiency, the process of 
mediation may ignore the necessary fairness.274 Second, Merrills has argued that the 
activation and application of mediation is largely relying on the consent of the various 
parties and the good faith of the third parties. Thus, the success of this measure in 
practice usually rest with the sense of urgency of the parties and the neutral stance of 
the third parties.275 Third, since the actual effect of mediation is to prompt the initiation 
of negotiation,276 this measure can actually be seen as a ‘pre’ process of negotiation. 
Therefore, eventually the relevant disputes still have to be peacefully settled by the latter, 
which means that the corresponding parties still may have to face all the drawbacks of 
negotiation. 
As the result, the application of mediation still cannot perfectly cover the problems of 
negotiation. Besides, its shortage of leaving hidden troubles behind has coincidently 
matched with a particular character of territorial disputes, which is the uncertainty of 
the results of the settlement of these disputes. Hence, resorting to this measure might 
easily exert certain adverse effect on the corresponding situations: 
As an example, the mediation chaired by the Pope helped Argentina and Chile settled 
their territorial dispute in the region of the Beagle channel in 1978, even though this 
case could not even be handled by judicial arbitration.277 However, in another similar 
mediation just 4 years later, the joint effort of the then Secretary-General of the United 
Nations and the US Secretary of State retrieved nothing but the pretended cordiality of 
the Argentinean junta on the negotiating table against the UK. Partly due to this failure, 
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the Falklands War broke out between the two parties.278 
Overall, the act of bringing third parties into during the application of mediation should 
not be underestimated, but it cannot always peacefully settle territorial disputes in a 
more thorough and effective way. For such purpose, the international community and 
the relevant scholars still need to introduce other measures that can further strengthen 
the general mechanism for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. 
3. Inquiry and conciliation.  
Next to mediation, the UN Charter has also listed a few other peaceful measures which 
may fill the gap of negotiation, including inquiry, conciliation, resort to regional 
organizations and other peaceful measures.279 Nevertheless, the regional organizations 
are just a user of those peaceful measures which involve the intervention of third parties, 
whilst ‘the other peaceful measures’ are largely a save clause. Therefore, among all the 
above four tactics, only inquiry and conciliation are independent measures.280  
With regard to their advantages, it can be seen that the third parties of inquiry would 
assist the parties to ascertain the facts. In addition, on the basis of their own investigation, 
the third parties of conciliation can suggest an array of solutions, so that this measure 
‘combines the characteristics of inquiry and mediation’. 281 However, although the role 
of third parties have been further strengthened during the application of inquiry and 
conciliation, but in front of various international disputes, especially territorial disputes, 
both of them still have some fatal defects. 
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Firstly, before applying inquiry in territorial disputes, the various parties must accept 
that ‘their version of event may be shown to be wrong’ and ‘the determination of the 
relevant circumstances would simply not aid a settlement’.282  In other words, the 
application of inquiry in territorial disputes may make the parties to face the dilemma 
that their territorial claims have been denied by the third parties, whilst the relevant 
territorial disputes still have not been completely and ideally settled. Secondly, 
‘combines the characteristics of inquiry and mediation’ means conciliation has also 
combined the numerous drawbacks of inquiry and mediation in the related practice. For 
example, after they have accepted the corresponding solutions, the various parties still 
need to negotiate for the details of the successive implementation of these solutions. 
Needless to say, such a measure which contains diversified risks is not expected by the 
various parties during the settlement of any severe international dispute, including 
territorial disputes.283 
Consequently, comparing to negotiation or mediation, inquiry and conciliation are not 
two measures that have been widely applied in the practice of peacefully settling 
territorial disputes. Honestly speaking, it is quite rare to see those cases in which inquiry 
or conciliation have been successfully applied in territorial disputes:284  
In terms of inquiry, the most famous case of this measure ever since it was originally 
stipulated by The Hague I, is still the Lytton commission organized by the League of 
Nations, which is the predecessor of the United Nations. This commission had made a 
partly thorough investigation on the facts that Japan seized Northeast China, but it did 
not prevent the situation from further deterioration.285 In terms of conciliation, since 
the end of the WWII the number of conciliation cases has significantly decreased,286 
and its success in settling territorial disputes is limited. For example, as a particular 
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measure proposed by the relevant parties, the application of conciliation was 
unsuccessful in the Egypt-Israel territorial dispute regarding the region of Taba.287 
More embarrassingly, in some other cases related to territorial disputes, the solutions 
provided by conciliation commissions were simply rejected.288  
Therefore, inquiry and conciliation could fill part of the gap of the other measures, and 
they have been applied in the settlement of territorial disputes before. Nevertheless, 
their own drawbacks still have determined that in the field of dealing with territorial 
disputes, they are not welcomed by the various parties. Accordingly, it is surely 
reasonable to see these parties turn to apply or induct other peaceful measures. 
4. Arbitration. 
Unlike the above four types of measures, arbitration is a judicial method supported by 
the UN Charter.289 The main advantages of this measure that the results are legally 
binding, and the entire process is generally controlled by the actual parties without 
undermining the necessary flexibility290. However, the original design of arbitration is 
not completely positive, at least in the field of peacefully settling territorial disputes, 
the inherent drawbacks of this particular measure is quite clear. 
Firstly, arbitration itself is still largely limited by the will of the various parties. From 
the appointment of the arbitrators to the jurisdiction and applicable legal rules of the 
tribunals, plus even the enforcement of the decision of the tribunals, all these matters 
are almost completely managed by the relevant parties.291 Secondly, as the process of 
arbitration is generally swayed by the will of those parties, when the process of 
arbitration is applied in territorial disputes it may be either overtly or covertly resisted 
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by the relevant parties ab initio. Accordingly, arbitration may lose its flexibility or 
working efficiency.292 Thirdly, in comparison with permanent international judicial 
institutions which largely rely on the financial support of the relevant international 
organisations, the parties must pay all the expenses of arbitration293. 
Consequently, on the one hand, arbitration may after all be accepted as a crucial measure 
for the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. Moreover, it has successfully been 
applied in certain territorial disputes, such as the Rann of Kutch case and the Taba Area 
case.294 On the other hand, in the relevant practice after the end of the Cold War, there 
is also no lack of cases in which the attempts of arbitration have failed: 
For example, in the late 1990s the application of arbitration did not settle the tripartite 
territorial dispute that occurred in the Brcko region of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 295 
Afterwards, while both parties of the Ethiopia-Eritrea territorial dispute had accepted 
the right of adjudication of the arbitral tribunal established for this case and the binding 
nature of its final decision, Ethiopia eventually did not obey the result. Thereby, this 
dispute was not settled through the application of arbitration.296 Furthermore, the latest 
application of the mechanism of the PCA is the South China Sea Arbitration between 
China and Philippines which started in 2013. However, even at its very beginning, 
China had already indicated that it would not accept or participate in this case. Hence, 
it is predictable that the result of this arbitration could only offer limited help to the 
settlement of the various territorial disputes within the South China Sea region.297  
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Taking these shortcomings into account, the international community definitely must 
seek new measures which may suitable for the peaceful settlement of various 
international disputes, including territorial disputes. Benefiting from this trend, as ‘the 
most important international judicial institutions’, the permanent international judicial 
institutions surely has acquired its own opportunity of making public appearance.298 
5. Resort to permanent international judicial institutions.  
Resorting to permanent international judicial institutions (hereinafter the ‘permanent 
institutions’) is also a measure supported by the UN Charter,299 but unlike arbitration, 
the permanent institutions would not be assembled or dissolved on account of a definite 
case.300 Thus, to a certain extent, the exterior influence from the various related parties 
can be eliminated by this measure. 301  Comparing to other peaceful measures, the 
permanent institutions would not excessively consider too many factors, other than the 
legitimate rights and interests of the various parties, and their judgments are also 
‘decisive’.302 However, although the measure of resorting to permanent international 
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judicial institutions has a variety of advantages, but it is still not flawless. According to 
Copeland, at least in terms of the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, its shortages 
could limit its actual performance. 
Firstly, the judicial nature of resorting to permanent institutions can lead to a situation 
that is similar to the ‘zero-sum game’. This may make the relevant parties do not dare 
to submit their territorial disputes, which involve the change of abundant valuable 
territories, to the permanent institutions.303 Secondly, the permanent institutions would 
rarely consider those non-legal factors related to any international dispute, whilst 
territorial disputes is a particular type of international dispute which involves a lot of 
non-legal factors (e.g. the abovementioned ‘non-legal claims’). 304  Thirdly, the 
adversarial proceeding applied by the permanent institutions could easily escalate the 
contradictions and hostilities among the relevant parties, not to mention the negative 
effect of the characters of territorial disputes here.305 
Consequently, the measure of resorting to permanent institutions has only offered 
noticeable, but also limited direct help to the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. 
Reviewing the relevant past cases, it can be seen that the specific achievement of the 
permanent institutions is far away from its theoretical status: 
Firstly, the bulk of the closed cases related to territorial disputes was heard by the ICJ,306 
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whilst quite a few other permanent institutions actually take the management of human 
rights litigations as their primary duty (the PCA is an arbitrary body, as 
aforementioned). 307  Secondly, not only just a restricted amount of permanent 
institutions have heard cases related to territorial disputes, but also just a restricted 
amount of territorial disputes have been heard by the relevant permanent institutions. 
Taking the ICJ as an example, considering the over 100 cases heard by it from 1946 to 
2008, only 14 of them involved territorial disputes.308 Thirdly, even if the permanent 
institutions have made their final decisions, they and the direct parties still need to face 
the potential difficulties emerged from the process of executing the judgments. For 
another example, until 2008, at least 6 cases related to territorial disputes had found the 
judgements difficult to execute, together they accounted for approximately 43% of all 
the related cases heard by the ICJ then.309  
In summary, resorting to permanent institutions is a judicial measure which both has 
advantages and disadvantages. At least to those related parties, it is not the perfect 
measure for the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. In other words, facing this 
particular type of international dispute, the United Nations belief that ‘in conformity 
with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international dispute or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace’ is still 
nothing more than a wishful expectation.310 
3.2.2 The common disadvantages of the various measures for the peaceful 
settlement of territorial disputes 
Reviewing the various peaceful measures listed by the above sections, it can be seen 
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that more or less, they all have some disadvantages that can reduce the peaceful 
settlement of territorial disputes. However, some of the disadvantages can be 
compensated by the corresponding advantages of other measures, only those common 
disadvantages shared by multiple peaceful measures have to be assisted by ‘special’, 
non-peaceful arrangements. 311  Therefore, before further study the UNCSS, it is 
necessary to properly summarise the common disadvantages of the above measures in 
respect to territorial disputes settlement. By comparing all the peaceful measures 
mentioned in this chapter, the author has found that in front of territorial disputes, these 
measures generally have three common disadvantages as follows: 
1. The activation of the peaceful measures is reliant on the consent of the related 
parties.  
As aforementioned, the acquisition of the consent of the relevant parties is the essential 
pre-requisite for the initiation of negotiation, otherwise no negotiation can be started. In 
addition, although mediation, inquiry and conciliation let the independent third parties 
act as the middleman, but the consent of the relevant parties is still the pre-requisite for 
the initiation of these supplementary political measures. If the relevant parties have no 
intention to accept the help offered by the third parties with regard to the corresponding 
international disputes, then the third parties certainly have no reason to actively take 
over the sovereign rights of other states.312 
In terms of the two measures which are inclined to adjudication, again as above-stated, 
the entire process of arbitration is controlled by the will of the relevant parties, and this 
obviously includes the initial activation of arbitration. Similarly, the use of permanent 
institutions is also depending on whether the relevant parties have shown their consent 
to accept adjudication of the corresponding institutions (e.g. the ICJ) or not 313 . 
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Admittedly, there are some international legal rules which refer to the mandatory 
application of adjudication. Nevertheless, Cassese has argued that the application of 
these regulations is exceptional in practice, and the right of mandatory adjudication 
cannot automatically increase the compliance of those direct parties.314 
Back to the relevant cases, a typical example with regard to this common disadvantage 
is the South China Sea Arbitration. At the beginning, Philippines wished to submit the 
territorial dispute to the UN for mediation, but this proposal was rejected by China, so 
that the use of mediation was abandoned. Afterwards, Philippines turned to international 
arbitration for help, yet the absence of China rendered the result of the mandatory 
adjudication of the arbitral tribunal useless. More sarcastically, the escalation of the 
South China Sea dispute between China and Philippines can actually be traced back to 
2012, but more than 5 years later, the relevant negotiation still has not begun.315 
2. The operation of the peaceful measures is reliant on the co-operation of the 
relevant parties.  
As the only peaceful measure which does not involve a third party, negotiation certainly 
needs the co-operation of both sides. Once a side has decided to drop out of a definite 
negotiation or boycott it, then the relevant negotiation would directly become an 
unsuccessful memory. Similarly, as subsidiary peaceful measures that usually do not in 
charge of the direct settlement of international disputes, the process of mediation, 
inquiry and conciliation is even more deeply affected by the co-operation of the relevant 
parties. Once the related parties have shown their uncooperative attitude, then the 
operation of these peaceful measures would quickly be trapped in troubles.316 
In terms of the two measures which are inclined to adjudication, since it is deeply 
dominated by the will of the relevant parties, arbitration certainly has no chance to 
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despise the co-operation of the related parties. The past practice has proved that even if 
a party has applied an uncooperative attitude in minor matters such as the appointment 
of arbitrators, then the entire process of arbitration might still fall into a dangerous 
situation.317 In comparison with arbitration, Merrills and certain other scholars have 
also pointed out that the uncooperative attitude of the relevant parties can seriously 
hinder the identification of the background facts by the permanent institutions as well. 
Besides, such an attitude may also force the permanent institutions to use 
‘inferences……public knowledge and circumstantial evidence’ as the basis of their 
judgments. As the result, the authority of these institutions and the value of the relevant 
decisions could be weakened318 . Therefore, even if the relevant parties are tried in 
absentia, the permanent institutions would still seek their co-operation via informal 
channels before they deliver any judgment.319 
Back to the relevant cases, a typical example with regard to this common disadvantage 
is the maritime delimitation and territorial questions between Qatar and Bahrain. In this 
case, the two parties had used up various methods, including accusing their opponent 
of forging documents and unilaterally drafting principles of delimitation, to delay 
settlement. As the result, the former King of Saudi Arabia spent 15 years on his 
mediation work without gaining anything, so that the ICJ had to take over this case. 
Subsequently, the ICJ also spent 4 years to determine that it had the power to judgment 
this dispute, so that the entire length of the process of this case was further extended to 
25 years.320 
3. The success of the peaceful measures is reliant on the enforcement of their results 
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by the relevant parties. 
Undoubtedly, as negotiation has eliminated the intervention of the third parties, the 
enforcement of its results is repeatedly under threat. Bearing the remarkable value of 
territories in mind, even the basic principle of international law, namely pacta sunt 
servanda, cannot prevent more powerful parties from abrogating existing agreements. 
Additionally, the third parties of mediation, inquiry and conciliation would simply 
provide suggestion for the settlement of the relevant international disputes per se. The 
advices of the mediator cannot straightforwardly settle any international dispute, 
including territorial disputes, whilst the solutions offered by the conciliation 
commission cannot directly bind the relevant parties as well.321 Consequently, the fate 
of the latter three subsidiary measures is also in the hand of the related parties, whilst 
their achievements can be easily blocked only because they are not in conformity with 
the will of a few states. 
In terms of the two measures which are inclined to adjudication, although the relevant 
decisions are legally binding in theory, but Brownlie has pointed out that ‘(arbitration 
and Adjudication) have enforcement problems’.322 Specifically in terms of territorial 
disputes, the key difference between these two judicial measures is the permanent 
institutions are more independent. However, unless some parties have designed 
additional preventive or remedial measures, otherwise both of the two measures still 
have to count on the voluntary execution of the corresponding decisions by the related 
parties.323 
Back to the relevant cases, a typical example with regard to this common disadvantage 
is the joint announcement regarding the South China Sea, issued by China and the 
ASEAN. In this announcement concluded after rounds of negotiation, the parties 
                                                        
321 Chiu Hung-Ta (author), Chen Chun-I (ed), Mordern International Law (3rd edn, San Min Bo
ok Publisher 2012) 1008-10. 
322 Ian Brownlie, ‘The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes’ (2009) 8 Chinese JIL para
 38. 
323 J.G.Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (5th edn, CUP 2011) 113-15 & 156-61. 
102 
 
declared that concerning their disagreement about sovereignty of the relevant islands 
and reefs, they would ‘exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would 
complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability’. Unfortunately, only 10 
years later, thanks to the change of the international situation and its own national 
strength, China started its land reclamation projects in this region.324 Successively, the 
South China Sea arbitration in the 2010s was also boycotted by the Chinese government, 
so that until today, the judicial result of this case is still nothing more than a piece of 
academic material.325 
4. Summary. 
In summary, from the very beginning to the end, the biggest challenge for the above-
mentioned peaceful measures is always the private will of the parties. If any 
intermediate step of any peaceful measure cannot acquire the consent of the related 
parties, then the peaceful settlement of territorial or other disputes is not effectuated. 
More seriously, as afore-mentioned, if a territorial dispute cannot be satisfyingly settled 
via peaceful measures, then historically there is no lack of cases in which the related 
parties resorting to armed conflicts. In this manner, the ‘maintenance of international 
peace and security’ emphasized by the United Nations and the ‘centralized control of 
the use of force’ pursued by the UNCSS would certainly become moot.326 
Hence, the application of all the lawful methods for ensuring that no party could abuse 
its own desire, has become a primary task that needs to be pursued by the international 
community when handling territorial or other disputes. In particular, such an act should 
help or replace the peaceful approach to control any dangerous will of the related parties, 
                                                        
324 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (adopted 4 November 2002) 
art 5 <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/yzs_673193/dqzz_673197/nanhai_673
325/t848051.shtml> accessed 2 July 2017; United States Department of Defence, ‘Annual Repor
t to Congress: 2016 China Military Power Report’ (26 April 2016) 7-11 & 13-20 <https://www.
defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf> access
ed 2 July 2017; Bill Hayton, South China Sea: the Struggle for Power in Asia (Yale 2014) ch
s 4, 7 & 9. 
325 Anthea Roberts, Is International Law International? (OUP 2017) 240-53. 
326 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 254-55. 
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or at least prompt these states not to violently pursue their indefensible claims by 
disobeying the principles of modern international law. Thereupon, when this mission 
has to resort to coercive measures for overcoming the deliberate resistance of certain 
parties, as the only lawful measure through which states can actively use armed forces, 
at least the UNCSS seems to be a theoretically reasonable choice.327  
                                                        
327 Theoretically, the collective self-defense operations conducted by multiple states can also me
et the three characters listed here, but no matter the Nicaragua case related to the concept of c
ollective self-defense or the Iraq War which involves the concept of anticipatory self-defense (o
r more accurately, pre-emptive ‘self-defense’), both of them are much more controversial than t
he collective security system favored by the UN Charter. 
104 
 
Chapter 4-The framework of the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes 
settlement 
4.1 The essential issues governing the application of the UNCSS in territorial 
disputes settlement 
4.1.1 The authoritative institutions of the UNCSS under the pressure of territorial 
disputes 
Following the customary academic rules, before assessing the actual application of the 
UNCSS in territorial disputes, the author ought to illustrate the diversified substance of 
this mechanism. According to its original design of 1945, as the higher-authoritative 
international organization of the only universal collective security system of the modern 
international community, the United Nations is mainly formed by six subsidiary 
institutions. These institutions include the UNGA, the UNSC, the UNECOSOC, the UN 
Trusteeship Council, the UN Secretariat and the ICJ.328 However, specifically in terms 
of applying the universal collective security systems in territorial disputes, the operation 
of the UNCSS does not need to involve all the subsidiary institutions. For example, 
many scholars feel that normally the UNCSS only involves the UNSC and the UNGA, 
even though the studies of Orakhelashvili and Shaw have proved that certain 
international disputes may also activate the UN Secretariat and the ICJ within the 
UNCSS.329  
Therefore, at the beginning of formally assessing the application of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes, it is necessary to analyze the subsidiary institutions of the United 
Nations closely linked to this mechanism in this field. By this means, the author could 
accurately delimit the scope of study of the subsequent sections or chapters on the actual 
                                                        
328 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 7. 
329 See Nicholas Tsagourias & Nigel D. White, Collective Security: Theory, Law and Practice 
(CUP 2013) 91; Gary Wilson, The United Nations and Collective Security (Routledge 2014) 30
-32; Alexander Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (OUP 2011) 22 & 55-56; Malcolm Shaw, Int
ernational Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 921-23. 
105 
 
application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes. 
1. Core institution. 
Just as its name shows, in the eyes of the decision-makers of the United Nations, the 
UNSC is both the core institution that is responsible for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and the core institutions of the UNCSS.330 According to the UN 
Charter, the incomparable status of the UNSC in the UNCSS is not merely reflected by 
the general duties of the council, but also related to the numerous privileges exclusively 
owned by this institution:  
Firstly, unlike the UNGA resolutions and the judgments of the ICJ,331 the resolutions 
of the UNSC are legally binding to all United Nations member states.332 Thereby, 
theoretically speaking, the council at least can ask the relevant states to respect its will 
(although it certainly cannot use this privilege to unilaterally change the status quo of 
any international dispute, including territorial disputes, such as assume the role of state 
parties and announce that a particular territory belongs to a particular state).333  
Secondly, unlike the UNGA and the UN Secretariat which only possess the right to 
make suggestions in the field of international peace and security,334 the UNSC has the 
right to determine the application of the coercive measures in international disputes. 
Thereby, theoretically speaking, the council at least can press the relevant states to 
execute its will.335  
                                                        
330 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 24. 
331 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, arts 10-12; Statute 
of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945) 3 Bevans 1179, art 36. 
332 Regarding the general scale and the comprehensive national strength of the present 193 me
mber states of the United Nations, in reality, the scope of validity of the resolutions of UNSC 
is the entire world, see United Nations, ‘Member States’ <http://www.un.org/en/members/> acces
sed 1 March 2015. 
333 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 25. 
334 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 10, 11, 98 & 9
9. 
335 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, ch 7, see especially
 art 48; Dai Yi, A Research on the Issue of Reform of the UNCSS (Chinese Social Science Pr
ess 2014) 7. 
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Thirdly, unlike the comparatively more democratic procedures of the UNGA and the 
ICJ,336 the UNSC endows the P5 with the veto power. Thereby, theoretically speaking, 
the council at least can persuade the relevant states to support its will (or more accurately, 
the coordinated will of the P5 without interference from minor states).337  
Under this circumstance, although it used to be frozen by the Cold War, and the ideal 
‘United Nations Forces’ have failed to be materialized,338 the UNSC has still obtained 
sufficient authority and efficiency for interfering territorial disputes via utilizing the 
new-born universal collective security system– 
For instance, among all the previous United Nations ‘peace operations’ deployed 
because of territorial disputes, only the UNEF I deployed in 1956 almost had nothing 
to do with the UNSC.339 Meanwhile, when the ICJ judgments pertaining to territorial 
disputes faced implementation difficulties in the past, the UNSC had also been invited 
to provide low-level military assistance in certain regions, such as the Aouzou Strip.340 
Accordingly, by right of its comprehensive advantages in terms of general status, 
theoretical power and practical records, no matter which extra subsidiary institution 
might be involved in the UNCSS, the UNSC is always the core organ that it relies on 
when it is facing territorial disputes. 
2. Supplementary institutions. 
Despite the UNSC, the UN Charter does not leave any space of activity to the other five 
subsidiary institutions of the United Nations in the UNCSS. In fact, as the most critical 
legal basis of the UNCSS,341 every article of chapter 7 of the UN Charter starts with 
the subject ‘the Security Council’. 342  Unfortunately, the Cold War destroyed the 
                                                        
336 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 18; Statute of t
he International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945) 3 Bevans 1179, art 55. 
337 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 27. 
338 J.G.Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (5th edn, CUP 2011) 244-45 & 251. 
339 Paul F. Diehl & Alexandru Balas, Peace Operation (2nd edn, Polity 2014) 43-46. 
340 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 94. 
341 John Allphin Moore Jr. & Jerry Pubantz, The New United Nations: International Organizati
on in the Twenty-First Century (Pearson 2006) 168 & 170-71. 
342 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, chs 7; Karen A. M
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optimistic arrangement of the drafters of the UN Charter. Restricted by the intense 
confrontation between the Eastern and Western Blocs, the UNSC fell into the state of 
‘inability’ for over 40 years.343 Therefore, the other subsidiary institutions of the United 
Nations were allowed to gradually play their own roles on the platform of the UNCSS, 
and subsequently started to make contact with territorial disputes. 
First, in order to work around the problem of the abuse of the veto power by the P5, the 
UNGA extensively interpreted and created its right to make suggestions and convene 
emergency special sessions by adopting the famous ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution in 
1950. Later on one occasion, it even took over several duties that primarily belonged to 
the UNSC during the Suez Crisis, a case which involved the territorial dispute in the 
Sinai Peninsula.344  
Second, to ensure the successful performance of alternatives of the ‘United Nations 
Forces’, such as the United Nations peacekeeping operations,345 the UN Secretariat 
started to frequently intervene the early ‘peace operations’ deployed by the UNSC. 
These operations include the famous UNEF I which defended the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Egypt, leading to the accidental death of the then Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Hammarskjold.346  
Third, in order to monitor the operation of the UNCSS, the ICJ examined the range of 
                                                        
ingst & Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century (4th edn, Westview Press 2
011) 104. 
343 It should be noted that the word ‘inability’ here is only referred to the original expectation 
set by the UN Charter, whilst actually in order to avoid the complete failure of the collective 
security system, the UNSC has already done plenty of beneficial works, see Antonio Cassese, I
nternational Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 324-26 & ch 17. 
344 Theoretically, the right of making suggestions in the field of international peace and securit
y of the UNGA is strictly limited by the UNSC, if the UNSC has started to handle a particul
ar international dispute, then the UNGA cannot make any further suggestion to the settlement o
f this dispute, see Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 
12; The ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution, UNGA Res 377 (V) (adopted 3 November 1950) UN 
Doc A/RES/377 (V); Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 923-24; John Allp
hin Moore Jr. & Jerry Pubantz, The New United Nations: International Organization in the Tw
enty-First Century (Pearson 2006) 173-74. 
345 Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams & Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (2nd edn, 
Polity 2010) 81-88, see especially 82-83. 
346 Roger Lipsey, Hammarskjold: A Life (University of Michigan Press 2013) chs 12-17. 
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competence and the legality of the resolutions of the UNSC in definite cases which 
involved territorial disputes. Typical examples here include the ‘Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo’ case during which Uganda occupied the Ituri region of 
Congo. Besides, to a certain extent, the ICJ even helped the development of the so-
called ‘Collective Security Law’ through judging all these cases.347  
Nonetheless, whilst the above cases have demonstrated the functions of the UNGA, the 
UN Secretariat and the ICJ, they are, after all, supplementary options for deterring 
territorial disputes and maintaining international peace and security. Comparing to the 
‘specialized’ structure of the UNSC, these subsidiary institutions seriously lack in the 
required authorities for controlling the UNCSS: 
On the one hand, the UN Charter illustrates that ‘any question dealing with international 
peace and security on which action was necessary had to be referred to the Security 
Council’. This allows the member states of the United Nations to oppose the 
corresponding resolutions of the UNGA relate to the initiation of the UNCSS by simply 
questioning the legality of these official documents.348 On the other hand, the right of 
making suggestions of the UN Secretariat and the right of judicial review of the ICJ are 
not active rights. The former needs the notice or entrustment of the UNSC, and the latter 
needs the request or consent of the UNSC, thus the fate of these two institutions in the 
UNCSS is directly depending on the attitude of the UNSC.349  
Consequently, even though the subsidiary institutions of the United Nations were once 
expressly vigorous in the UNCSS, they rarely took charge of this mechanism to fight 
against those severe international disputes. In particular, with regard to territorial 
disputes, the unsuccessful UNEF I and the then Secretary-General who was killed in his 
own action have represented all the unhappy memories of these supporting organs in 
                                                        
347 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of t
he Congo v. Rwanda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168 at 209-13; Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7th ed
n, CUP 2014) 921-23; Alexander Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (OUP 2011) 22. 
348 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 11; Malcolm Sh
aw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 924-25. 
349 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, arts 96, 98 & 99. 
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the indicated field.350 
3. Summary. 
In summary, the UNCSS may involve four subsidiary institutions of the United Nations, 
namely the UNSC, the UNGA, the ICJ and the UN Secretariat. Among them, the UNSC 
is the only institution that often participate in the settlement of territorial disputes within 
the framework of this mechanism. In addition, it should be noted that numerous 
territorial disputes have been either judged by the ICJ or mediated by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. However, in essence, these cases are under the aegis of 
the peaceful measures discussed in the previous chapter.  
Besides, theoretically speaking, the inherent goal of the UN Trusteeship Council is to 
avoid the occurrence or escalation of territorial disputes as well. Nevertheless, with 
regard to its functions, past experiences and present status, this institution is clearly 
beyond the default scope of research of this thesis.351 Hence, due to limited length of 
this thesis, here is no further discussion on the role of the UN Trusteeship Council. 
4.1.2 The operating mechanism of the UNCSS under the threat of territorial 
disputes 
As it is known to all, the UN Charter highly praises those simple and peaceful measures 
for the settlement of international disputes, and it instructs the member states of the 
United Nations to primarily consider these methods.352 Nevertheless, specifically in 
                                                        
350 Sarcastically, the UNEF I precisely revealed the questionable problem of legality of the UN
GA in the field of collective security-owing to such a defect, initially this operation was boyco
tted by several states from the aspect of financial expenses, then due to the obvious objection 
raised by one of the state-parties (Egypt), this operation was even forced to be withdrawn fro
m the set area where it was deployed, and thereby it failed to prevent the outbreak of the Six
-Day War, see David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Mak
ing of the Modern World (OUP 2009) 104-108 & 126-31; Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7
th edn, CUP 2014) 923-25; with regard to the activities of Hammarskjold in & around the prov
ince of Katanga, see also David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council a
nd the Making of the Modern World (OUP 2009) 82-89. 
351 United Nations, ‘Trusteeship Council’ <http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/trusteeship/> accessed 
9 March 2015. 
352 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, arts 2 & 33. 
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terms of applying the UNCSS in territorial disputes, the afore-mentioned measures and 
instructions have been selectively forgotten by both the UNCSS and the new-born 
territorial disputes emerged after 1945. In fact, as the only universal collective security 
system of the modern international community, the exact nature of the UNCSS is neither 
relatively single nor absolutely peaceful. 353  Meanwhile, territorial disputes have 
directly triggered multiple international armed conflicts,354 which represent all the 
actual combat experiences of the UNCSS in the field of traditional international 
disputes.355  
Therefore, at the beginning of formally assessing the application of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes, it is necessary to appraise the operating mechanism of the UNCSS 
from the perspective of territorial disputes. By this means, the author could clearly 
exhibit the focus of the research of the subsequent sections or chapters on the actual 
application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes. 
1. Supplementary legal provisions. 
With regard to the operating mechanism of the UNCSS, it can be seen that the 
mainstream international law textbooks normally focus on the corresponding provisions 
of chapter 7 of the UN Charter. 356  However, a large number of international law 
monographs separately claim that chapter 6 of the UN Charter is the genuine starting 
point for the UNCSS357 . Firstly, the latter decree can form the substantial basis for 
                                                        
353 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, chs 6-8; Gary Wils
on, The United Nations and Collective Security (Routledge 2014) 33-41. 
354 E.g. the Korean War, although the United Nations intervened the situation of Korea early in
 1947 at the request of the USA, but after the respective independence of South Korea and N
orth Korea, the war virtually broke out immediately, see Leon Gordenker, The United Nations 
and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: the Politics of Field Operations, 1947-50 (Martinus Nij
hoff 1959) chs 7-8; Norrie MacQueen, The United Nations: A Beginner’s Guide (Oneworld 201
0) 61-66. 
355 Karen A. Mingst & Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century (4th edn, 
Westview Press 2011) 104-109; Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 909-12. 
356 Jan Klabbers, International Law (CUP 2013) 171-76; Admola Abass, Complete International 
Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 376-92, see especially 387; Malcolm Sha
w, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 897-921; Christine Gray, ‘The Use of Force and the 
International Legal Order’, in Malcolm Evans (ed), International Law (4th edn, OUP 2014) 618 
at 636-40. 
357 See e.g. John Allphin Moore Jr. & Jerry Pubantz, The New United Nations: International O
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decision-making during the preparatory period of chapter 7 before this chapter has been 
activated. 358  Secondly, it also can provide the nominal legal reference for the 
replacements of chapter 7 after this chapter has been frozen.359 Thirdly, it even can 
sustain the proper operation of the UNCSS together with chapter 7 while this chapter is 
being utilized.360 Thereby, the above viewpoint has gained excessive popularity among 
recent international disputes and authoritative international legal scholars.361  
Unfortunately, although chapter 6 may potentially supplement or correct chapter 7 
within the UNCSS, it is still devoted to the peaceful settlement of international disputes. 
Bounded by its own core aim and value which are partial to ‘non-violent’ notion, the 
operating mechanism of this chapter generally lacks ‘collective security’ elements:  
For example, the UNSC ought to be the supreme institution in charge of maintaining or 
restoring international peace and security within the UNCSS, whilst chapter 6 only 
endues it with the right to investigate international disputes and offer advice. 362 
Additionally, the United Nations peacekeeping operations ought to be the bridge 
between the UNCSS and the peaceful measures for settlement of international disputes, 
                                                        
rganization in the Twenty-First Century (Pearson 2006) 168-72; Nicholas Tsagourias & Nigel D.
 White, Collective Security: Theory, Law and Practice (CUP 2013) 163 & 169-76; Gary Wilso
n, The United Nations and Collective Security (Routledge 2014) 33-34; Alexander Orakhelashvil
i, Collective Security (OUP 2011) 26-32. 
358 Theoretically speaking, none of the various international disputes can directly activate chapte
r 7 of the UN Charter, whilst in the words of Orakhelashvili, one of the vital function of cha
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te or situation has matured to justify the activation of Chapter VII’, see Alexander Orakhelashv
ili, Collective Security (OUP 2011) 26. 
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hip between chapter 6 of the UN Charter and the United Nations peacekeeping operations, but 
concerning the original wording of this chapter and the connected resolutions of the UNSC (se
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olas Sambanis, ‘Peacekeeping Operations’, in Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws (eds), The Oxfor
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n of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century (Hart 2011) 107. 
360 Alexander Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (OUP 2011) 27. 
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on in the Twenty-First Century (Pearson 2006) 171-72. 
362 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, arts 33-36; Alexand
er Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (OUP 2011) 27; Dai Yi, A Research on the Issue of Refo
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whilst there is no provision in chapter 6 addressing the concept of ‘peacekeeping’.363  
Thus, chapter 6 may be reasonably regarded as a controversial starting point of the 
UNCSS, but it can hardly participate in the daily operation of the UNCSS. Thereby, this 
chapter also cannot independently guide the UNCSS to handle major international 
disputes, especially territorial disputes which combine complex situation and abundant 
value. In fact, if people ignore the commonly seen United Nations peacekeeping 
operations deployed in disputed territories like the Middle East, then chapter 6 nearly 
has never appeared in those resolutions about applying the UNCSS in territorial disputes 
(according to the figures and explanations given by the official documents of the United 
Nations, the UNSC ‘need not refer to a specific Chapter of the Charter when passing a 
resolution authorizing the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation and has never 
invoked Chapter VI’364).365 
2. Core legal provisions. 
In contrast to chapter 6 of the UN Charter which primarily emphasizes the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes, chapter 7 of the UN Charter is exclusively designed 
for the UNCSS which focuses on the forcible settlement of international disputes.366 
By approving its detailed substance, it can be seen that the 13 articles of this chapter 
have kept a progressive relationship in which these provisions mutually supplement 
each other.367  
                                                        
363 Michael W. Doyle & Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Peacekeeping Operations’, in Thomas G. Weiss 
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First of all, as the start of chapter 7, articles 39 and 40 authorize the UNSC to determine 
that whether a definite international dispute has threatened or breached international 
peace and security. In addition, they also request the council to devise provisional 
measures for preventing the further aggravation of the matters. These may include 
‘several measures for “cooling down” the escalation of the corresponding disputes…… 
(such as) the cessation of hostile actions (and) the withdrawal of armed forces from 
certain regions’.368  
In the second place, as the crux of chapter 7, articles 41 and 42 authorize the UNSC to 
apply coercive measures in an international dispute for restoring international peace and 
security. In addition, they also allow the council to consider both non-military 
sanctionative measures and military enforcement measures. These may include 
‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations……and the severance of 
diplomatic relations’ and the stricter measure of ‘demonstrations, blockade, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations’.369  
In the third place, as the indemnificatory part of chapter 7, articles 43 to 50 authorize 
the UNSC to create a Military Staff Committee responsible for commanding the armed 
forces under the aegis of the United Nations. In addition, they have also listed the basic 
rights and obligations of the member states of the United Nations when these countries 
are participating or involved in the armed operations under the name of the United 
Nations.370  
At last, as the miscellaneous provision of chapter 7, article 51 authorizes the member 
states of the United Nations to keep their rights of unilateral and collective self-defense. 
On this ground, this regulation might atone for the chronic drawbacks of the UNCSS, 
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that the rate of reaction of this mechanism is usually hysteretic.371  
Regretfully, notwithstanding that the structure of chapter 7 is relatively more 
meticulous, 372  the key institutions behind this chapter have not totally extricated 
themselves from the same fate of their predecessor, namely the League of Nations. The 
fall of the ‘iron curtain’ paralyzed the fragile UNSC,373 and the indivisible Military 
Staff Committee and ‘United Nations Forces’ thereupon became ineffective as well.374 
Affected by such a predicament, chapter 7 remains an incomplete programmatic statute 
at the moment. The absence of the units in charge of its execution makes it impossible 
for this chapter to follow an ideal route map for regulating major international disputes, 
and territorial disputes are definitely one of them:375 
On one hand, shortly after the birth of the United Nations, the UNSC had already handed 
the power of commanding the ‘United Nations Forces’ to the USA during the Korean 
War, with similar coalition only recurring once during the Gulf War.376 On the other 
hand, the UNSC always fears sanctioning the actions of territorial expansion of the P5, 
and the international sanctions committee administrated by it even frequently ignores 
the offensive acts of regional powers (e.g. the Crimea Crisis, see below). 377 
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Consequently, if the United Nations refuses to further amend chapter 7, then it has no 
choice but to search for effective reinforcements for the ‘teeth of the UNCSS’.378 
Naturally, this way would lead to the emergence of compromised measures which 
diverge from the scope of the UN Charter, such as the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations and the United Nations authorized use of force by states.379 
3. Summary. 
In summary, chapters 6 and 7 of the UN Charter jointly describe the operating 
mechanism of the UNCSS. Nevertheless, when interpreting the relevant operations 
which are responsible for settling territorial disputes, none of them could completely 
reflects the gradual evolution of this system. Besides, in theory chapter 8 of the UN 
Charter also regulates the ‘regional arrangements’ of the UNCSS. However, as its 
fundamental function is to ‘devolve enforcement powers, allocated to the Security 
Council under Chapter VII, on regional organizations through delegated authority’, this 
chapter is more suitable to serve the collective security functions of the regional 
organizations connected to the UNCSS.380 Therefore, taking the length of this section 
into account, here the author will not continue to discuss the details of chapter 8. 
4.1.3 The predetermined purposes of the UNCSS under the influence of territorial 
disputes 
Of the numerous provisions of the UN Charter mentioning the UNCSS, most of them 
are about the authoritative institutions and operating mechanism of this mechanism, but 
none directly states the predetermined purposes of the UNCSS. However, a systematic 
mechanism should never lack in a complete structure, and the existence of clear 
                                                        
(USA Today, 15 March 2014) <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/15/russia-vetoes
-un-resolution-crimea/6456495/> accessed 16 April 2015. 
378 Kenneth Manusama, The United Nations Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: Applyi
ng the Principle of Legality (Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 35. 
379 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 343-51. 
380 Dai Yi, A Research on the Issue of Reform of the UNCSS (Chinese Social Science Press 2
014) 8; Ademola Abass, Regional Organisations and the Development of Collective Security: B
eyond Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Hart 2004) 27. 
116 
 
purposes could offer firm standards for judging the success or failure of this mechanism. 
Meanwhile, the previous chapter has stated that the UNCSS is mean to help or replace 
other gentler measures to restrain the excessive will of the relevant parties, yet it does 
not clarify the expected effect that the UNCSS ought to achieve here. In other words, 
until now this thesis itself has also only explained the rather general bit of the detailed 
purposes of the UNCSS in the field of territorial disputes, whilst the specific outcome 
which symbols the success of this mechanism is still awaiting to be confirmed. 
Therefore, at the beginning of formally assessing the application of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes, this section needs to ascertain the predetermined purposes of the 
UNCSS in this field. By this means, the author could objectively evaluate the objects 
of study of this chapter or even this thesis. 
1. Legal Regulations. 
As afore-mentioned, there is no provision in the UN Charter which has specifically 
discussed the final target of the application of the UNCSS. Fortunately, this statute has 
provided a few clues that are worthy to be discussed. Perusing chapter 6-8 of the UN 
Charter, the only phrase appearing repeatedly and seemingly describing the effect of the 
application of the UNCSS is ‘maintain international peace and security’.381 In addition, 
as the starting and key provisions of the core chapter related to the UNCSS, articles 39 
and 42 of the UN Charter have added the words ‘restore international peace and security’ 
on the basis of the afore-listed phrase.382 Bearing these facts in mind, and for the 
following reasons, this thesis believes that this combined phrase is the predetermined 
purpose of the application of the UNCSS in various international disputes, including 
territorial disputes: 
Firstly, ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’ fits the purpose of the 
parent organization of the UNCSS. Although the UN Charter does not mention the name 
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or purpose of the UNCSS, it has listed the purposes of the parent organization of this 
mechanism. According to article 1 of the UN Charter, the primary purpose of the United 
Nations is ‘to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace’.383 Thereby, it 
can be seen that the purposes of the parent organization of the UNCSS have already 
contained ‘maintain (or restore) international peace and security’. In addition, the 
special measure used by the organization for realizing this purpose is exactly the 
application of the UNCSS. Thus, in view of the requirement that the subordinate 
mechanism is obligated to obey the will of its parent organization,384 the author can see 
‘maintain or restore international peace and security’ as the predetermined purpose of 
the UNCSS. 
Secondly, ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’ fits the responsibilities 
of the authoritative institution of the UNCSS. Although the UN Charter does not 
mention the name or purpose of the UNCSS, it has illustrated the responsibilities of the 
authoritative institution of this mechanism. According to articles 24 and 26 of the UN 
Charter, the core responsibilities of the UNSC are ‘the establishment and maintenance 
of international peace and security’. Besides, according to the same articles, the 
privilege of the UNSC upon which it could undertake its due responsibilities has also 
be ‘laid down in Chapter VI, VII, VIII and XII’.385 Thereby, it can be seen that the 
responsibilities of the authoritative institution of the UNCSS have already contained 
‘maintain (or restore) international peace and security’. In addition, the special tool used 
by the institution for implementing these responsibilities is again the UNCSS. Thus, in 
view of the requirement that the subsidiary mechanism is obligated to work in with the 
duties of the institutions in charge, 386  the author can see ‘maintain or restore 
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international peace and security’ as the predetermined purpose of the UNCSS. 
Thirdly, ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’ fits the functions of the 
sanctionative measures of the UNCSS. Although the UN Charter does not mention the 
name or purpose of the UNCSS, it has clarified the functions of the sanctionative 
measures of this mechanism. According to articles 39 and 42 of the UN Charter, the 
only function of the two sets of measures involve the use of force under the framework 
of the UNCSS is ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’.387 Thereby, it 
can be seen that the functions of the sanctionative measures of the UNCSS have already 
contained ‘maintain (or restore) international peace and security’. In addition, the 
special platform on which these measures could function effectively is again the 
UNCSS. Thus, in view of the requirement that the abstract mechanism is obligated to 
echo its substantial works, the author can see ‘maintain or restore international peace 
and security’ as the predetermined purpose of the UNCSS. 
Besides, it is noteworthy that although the academia has not reached any agreement 
upon the predetermined purposes of the UNCSS, the above method of analyzing 
existing statutes is supported by the related scholars. Taking the three monographs of 
Orakhelashvili, Tsagourias, White and Wilson as an example. None of these 
international legal scholars has specifically discussed the predetermined purposes of the 
UNCSS in relation to territorial disputes, or any other particular international dispute. 
However, all four of them have explained the purposes of the entire system of the United 
Nations in-depth, and their emphasis on the judicial interpretation of the provisions of 
the UN Charter is almost as same as the present section. Moreover, none of these 
monographs have excessively separated the purposes of the UNCSS in their subsequent 
studies, yet they claim, ‘the purposes of the UN give the first indication of the broad 
conception of collective security envisaged for it’.388 Therefore, it can be seen that the 
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thought of the author here has its mature precedent, so that it is not a groundless talk. 
In short, in the original design of the drafters of the UN Charter, the predetermined 
purposes of the UNCSS are simply the maintenance or restoration of ‘international 
peace and security’ to the best of the ability of this mechanism. However, based on the 
literal meaning of this phrase, ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’ 
refers only to the act of creating a favorable environment for the following process of 
settling territorial and other disputes.389 In contrast, based on the judgment of the PCIJ 
on the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, ‘settlement’ asks for the elimination 
of the ‘disagreement over a point of law or fact (among parties)’ via written protocols. 
That is to say, merely preventing the relevant situations from being escalated into ‘a 
threat to international peace and security’ is not enough.390 Therefore, the role of the 
UNCSS on paper contradicts the ultimate requirement of completely ‘settling’ territorial 
disputes, so that the actual status of this mechanism in territorial dispute is yet to be 
verified by the relevant practical cases. 
2. Practical operations. 
As aforementioned, in a judicial sense, the phrase ‘maintain (or restore) international 
peace and security’ is not tantamount to ‘settling (international disputes)’. Bearing this 
fact in mind, and taking the research topic of this thesis into account, this thesis will 
continuously explore the actual status of the UNCSS from the perspective of territorial 
disputes. Reviewing the past world history, as two cases of which the origin could be 
traced back to territorial disputes between sovereign states and the use of force via 
UNCSS had been activated, the Korean War and the Gulf War are undoubtedly two 
proper examples here.391 
At the end of the Korean War, the ‘United Nations Forces’ signed the Korean Armistice 
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Agreement with the Allied Forces of China and North Korea, thus they established a 
‘Demilitarized Zone’ which roughly across the 38th parallel.392 In the next 65 years until 
recent days, there was no large-scale exchange of fire between the armies of North 
Korea and South Korea, nor had the conflicts involved the armies of a third party (the 
successive exchanges of fire between the USA and North Korea occurred in the Sea of 
Japan, and were irrelevant to South Korea).393 Correspondingly, despite the American 
troops stationed in South Korea as required by bilateral military agreements, the armed 
forces of other 15 contributing states of the ‘United Nations Forces’ quickly left this 
region after approving the Armistice. 394  Besides, the ‘United Nations Command’ 
commanding the ‘United Nations Forces’ had been gradually transformed into the 
ROK/US Combined Forces Command, and the UNGA even passed a specific resolution 
in 1975 calling for the revocation of this institution.395 
However, although the intervention of the UNCSS successfully ‘restored’ the peace and 
security of the Korean Peninsula, the territorial dispute between North Korea and South 
Korea remains unsettled. On the one hand, to this day, each party is still claiming the 
ownership of all the territories of the Korean Peninsula. Thereinto, North Korea has 
established the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, whilst 
South Korea has established the Ministry of Unification.396 On the other hand, the 
Korean Armistice Agreement is only a political document which terminated the state of 
belligerency, and the armistice demarcation line does not coincide with the 38th parallel. 
Just as the Armistice of 1918 cannot replace the Peace of Versailles, the provisions of 
this agreement never address the legal delimitation of the disputed territories.397 By 
combining the above-stated facts, it can be said that the real purposes of the UNCSS are 
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definitely no more than ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’, whilst the 
‘settlement of territorial disputes’ in the legal sense is not really set for this mechanism. 
Almost 40 years later, the policy adopted by the Coalition Forces and the UNSC after 
the end of the Gulf War repeated Korean War scenario. Firstly, after the Saddam regime 
accepted resolution 687 of the UNSC and withdrew its troops from the territories of 
Kuwait, the Coalition Forces assembled to enforce the decision of the UNSC were 
dissolved.398 Secondly, although the UNSC deployed the UNIKOM soon afterwards, 
this operation was obligated to ‘monitor……a demilitarized zone’, limiting it to 
‘deter……potential threats to peace’. In other words, this operation would not 
participate in the work of reconfirming the Iraq-Kuwait border.399 Thirdly, Saddam 
only announced that Iraq would abandon its territorial claims against Kuwait at the end 
of 2002 under the threat of the USA, not to mention that 11 years had already passed 
since the initial intervention of the UNCSS.400 Fourthly, the mandate of the UNIKOM 
was terminated on October 6th of 2003, but 6 months earlier, this operations had already 
been expelled from the disputed border line between Iraq and Kuwait by the Iraq War 
(and the Saddam regime which started this dispute was no longer in existence then).401 
By combining the above-stated facts, it can be said that the real purposes of the UNCSS 
are always no more than ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’. In 
addition to this, the ‘settlement of territorial disputes’ in the legal sense has been left to 
the officials/advisors of the various parties, backed up by the other measures available 
to them. 
In short, these typical cases have proved that the predetermined purposes of the 
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application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes are the maintenance or restoration of 
‘international peace and security’. To adopt the wording of the above sub-section, 
intervention conducted by the UNCSS may produce a favorable environment, but it 
could not guarantee the elimination of the ‘disagreement over a point of law or fact’. 
Objectively speaking, this result is consistent with the role of the UNCSS on paper, as 
stipulated by the UN Charter. 
3. Judging standards. 
Since its predetermined purposes do not require the UNCSS to ‘settle’ the relevant cases 
in person, it is not appropriate to judge the UNCSS with the standards set for the above-
mentioned peaceful measures. Fortunately, by referring to the UN Charter and other 
valuable literature, this problem is not too difficult to resolve. Specifically, this thesis 
argues that there are two standards for judging the success/failure of the application of 
the UNCSS in territorial disputes. 
The first standard corresponds to when the relevant territorial dispute is only threatening 
‘international peace and security’. According to article 39 of the UN Charter, under this 
circumstance, the successful application of the UNCSS is symbolled by the deterrence 
of the escalation of the corresponding situations, thus achieving the target of 
‘maintaining international peace and security’.402 However, Simma has pointed out that 
the above-stated ‘threat to peace’ mainly includes disarmament and arms control, 
terrorism, intra-state armed conflicts, piracy, the breach of human rights law or 
principles of democracy, and the threat of force in international relations.403 From this 
list, it is not hard to find out that only the threat of force can occur in the ‘land-territory 
disputes among member states of the United Nations’ which is being studied by this 
thesis. Therefore, it is clear that the specific task of the UNCSS at this stage is to prompt 
the parties which have threatened to use armed forces to renege. 
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The second standard corresponds to when the relevant territorial disputes have breached 
‘international peace and security’. According to article 39 of the UN Charter, under this 
circumstance, the successful application of the UNCSS is symbolled by the suppression 
of the further out of control of the corresponding situations, thus achieving the target of 
‘restoring international peace and security’.404 Moreover, Simma has also pointed out 
that the above-stated ‘breach of peace’ mainly includes international armed conflicts 
and acts of invasion.405 From this list, it is not hard to find out that both of them can 
occur in the ‘land-territory disputes among member states of the United Nations’ which 
is being studied by this thesis. Therefore, it is clear that the specific task of the UNCSS 
at this stage is to prompt the parties which have initiated the armed conflict or illegally 
occupied the territories of other states to stop (including the successive withdrawal of 
the armed forces from the occupied territories). 
In short, if the UNCSS in territorial disputes could ensure the relevant situation would 
not be threatened/breached by multilateral armed conflicts or unilateral invasions, then 
it is deemed a success. Besides, this sub-section does not deny the possibility of 
prompting the parties to directly return to peaceful measures after the intervention of 
the UNCSS, but from the results of the Korean War and the Gulf War, it can be seen 
that the UNCSS is not responsible for guaranteeing this outcome. 
4. Summary. 
In summary, the predetermined purposes of the application of the UNCSS in territorial 
disputes are summarized by the phrase ‘maintain or restore international peace and 
security’. In addition, pertaining to settling territorial disputes, the specific tasks of the 
UNCSS are either to deter the threat of force or to suppress international armed 
conflicts/invasions, so as to eliminate ‘a threat to peace (or) a breach of the peace’. 
Lastly, it should be noted that there still is a gap between these purposes and the inherent 
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shortages of the peaceful measures. The parties of territorial disputes may refuse to 
peacefully settle their problem, but keep the stalemate without affecting international 
peaceful and security. Under such a circumstance, the UNCSS should not be activated, 
as in order to resort to this mechanism in the field of territorial disputes, there must exist 
‘a threat to peace’ or ‘a breach of the peace’ in advance (e.g. the Sino-Soviet border 
negotiation used to be suspended for 18 years, but as same as the issue of Gibraltar, 
even the UNGA had never followed this issue406). 
4.2 The surrounding issues accompanying the application of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes settlement 
4.2.1 The intersection of the UNCSS and the peaceful measures in territorial 
disputes settlement  
Since the UNCSS is not the first choice for handling various international disputes, 
including territorial disputes, it is also not the parties’ only choice. In other words, the 
UNCSS needs to interact with other measures in the relevant practice, whilst this thesis 
should not ignore this issue. Thereinto, as the detailed substance of the primary principle 
of modern international law, the afore-mentioned peaceful measures are the primary 
surrounding sub-issue of the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes as well. 
Originally, there was very limited overlap between this system and the peaceful 
measures for the settlement of various international disputes. The core values and 
statutes pursued by these two schemes for settling international disputes were 
incompatible. In addition, as highly placed as the supreme administrative institution of 
the UNCSS, the UNSC merely played a supplementary role that was ‘supervisory’ in 
the field of the peaceful settlement of international disputes as well.407 However, with 
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the ossification of the international political situation and the change of the international 
judicial philosophy after the WWII, the gap between the fundamental functions of the 
UNCSS and the peaceful measures had gradually lessened in practice:408  
On one hand, the stalemate between the Eastern and Western Blocs and the reduction 
in international armed conflicts let the UNCSS lose its default operational background. 
Thus, it had to incorporate more moderate methods to rebuild its own vigor and 
authority.409 On the other hand, the sublimation of the recent international legal norms 
and the amendment of the latest international judicial regulations increased the 
advantageous status of the peaceful measures and thereby overrode their past position 
while resort to war was still acceptable. Thus, they could be used to deeply improve 
those forcible methods for the purpose of consummating the vitality and authority of 
others.410  
Consequently, the peaceful measures for the settlement of modern international disputes 
have become part of the surrounding issues that cannot be neglected by the UNCSS. 
Regarding the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes, the connection between 
these two sets of measures is mostly presented in two mutually independent aspects, 
namely the quasi-judicial power of the UNSC, and the right of the parallel application 
of various peaceful measures. 
1. The quasi-judicial power of the UNSC. 
Reviewing the evolution of international law since 1648, obviously the quasi-judicial 
power of the UNSC is very recent. Its prototype cannot even be traced to the League of 
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Nations before the birth of the United Nations.411 However, since 1945, in which the 
UNCSS has been applied to territorial disputes settlement, this power has been palpably 
active. 
Early during the ‘Six-Day War’ in 1967, the UNSC had already condemned the 
occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights as ‘inadmissible acquisition of 
territories by war’ of Israel. Accordingly, it established the judicial ‘road map’ of the 
UNEF II.412 Afterward, regarding some other territorial disputes such as Iraq-Kuwait, 
the UNSC also adopted a series of resolutions implying enormous imprints of legal 
judgment, and accordingly it effectively guided the related United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.413  
Concerning the causes of the above situation, ideologically, the UNCSS is not only an 
international disputes settlement mechanism emphasizing the ‘value of morals in 
international disputes’, but also casts itself on the ‘sense of justice in international 
conflicts’. Hence, the quasi-judicial power of the UNSC surely can promote the 
authority and efficiency of the UNCSS in settling territorial disputes.414 Unfortunately, 
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even though the quasi-judicial power of the UNSC has frequently co-operated with the 
UNCSS, but it is still not perfect, when facing the challenge of territorial disputes, the 
latter actually cannot completely compatible with the former.  
Firstly, the UNSC is, after all, a non-judicial institution which mostly takes ‘primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of the international peace and security’. Thus, it 
obviously may choose to evade the legal demands in international affairs under the 
pressure of political factors.415 Secondly, the UNCSS is, after all, an international 
disputes settlement mechanism which lacks in ‘self-owned armed forces’. Thus, it 
obviously may choose to sacrifice the demand of fairness in international affairs under 
the pressure of exogenous factors. 416  Thirdly, territorial disputes are, after all, a 
dangerous type of international dispute which involves ‘sensitive national interests’. 
Thus, the authoritative institutions of the UNCSS obviously may choose to reject the 
demand of justice in international affairs under the pressure of working efficiency.417  
Affected by these negative conditions, the UNSC could not prevent its quasi-judicial 
power from descending into a ‘tactical device in the armory of rhetoric’ in settling 
territorial disputes within the framework of the UNCSS418. For example, one of the 
prerequisites for the intervention of the UNSC during the Iran-Iraq War was ‘the non-
identification of the (illegal) aggressor, namely Iraq’. Otherwise, the corresponding 
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draft resolutions might have been vetoed by the P5 which were backing Iran or Iraq.419 
2. The right of the parallel application of various peaceful measures. 
Unlike the quasi-judicial power of the UNSC, the right of the parallel application of the 
peaceful measures reveals the sequential relationship between them and the UNCSS in 
settling territorial disputes. Meanwhile, its implementation also does not need to fully 
rely on a definite institution within the framework of the UNCSS. 420 When these 
characters are reflected in the detailed practice about the sovereignty ownership of 
territories, the right of the parallel application of various peaceful measures mainly 
involves two sub-areas. They are the right of the parallel intervention of the 
political/judicial measures and the right of the independent review of the ICJ.  
On one hand, in terms of the right of the parallel intervention of the political/judicial 
measures for the settlement of territorial disputes. As its name suggests, it means the act 
of submitting certain international disputes to the authoritative institutions of the 
UNCSS by the relevant parties could not exclude the intervention of the peaceful 
measures.421 Seeking the root of this right, by taking the overall perspective of this 
thesis into account, the researcher should notice that the emergence of such a rule is 
largely caused by the macroscopic background which must be faced by it: 
Firstly, the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the centralized 
control/prohibition of the use of force are fundamental principles of the modern 
international legal system existing since the end of the WWII. They allow the UNCSS 
to be used to intervene in any international dispute in the first place, while not enabling 
the UNCSS to prioritize different measures. Besides, the UNCSS should not be utilized 
                                                        
419 Guo Xuetang, All for One, One for All-A research on the Collective Security System (Shang
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420 For an overview of the working mechanism of the various peaceful measures from the pers
pective of the United Nations, see e.g. J.G.Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (5th edn, C
UP 2011) 219-36. 
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by its practitioners to compress the living space of those peaceful measures as well.422  
Secondly, the UNSC and its supplementary units (e.g. the UNGA) are the core 
institutions which are in charge of the regular operation of the UNCSS, but not the 
peaceful measures. This allows them to take the primary responsibility for ‘the 
maintenance of international peace and security’, yet not to disturb the independent 
activation and de-activation of those peaceful measures. Besides, these authoritative 
institutions also should not stop certain parties from resorting to accessible peaceful 
measures, so as to reduce the efficiency of settling territorial disputes or other 
international disputes.423  
Thirdly, as mentioned before, territorial disputes are among the most problematic 
international disputes of the last 400 years, with dangerous progress and unpredictable 
outcomes. This allows those restraining measures which put special emphasis on 
forcible tactics to compensate for the deficiencies of non-forcible measures. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that those forcible measures can undertake the absolute 
right of handling territorial disputes. More importantly, those forcible measures should 
not be used to deny the inbuilt advantage of those non-forcible measures in terms of 
relieving tense atmosphere as well.424  
Affected by all these factors, since 1945, it has been common to witness certain cases 
in which the UNCSS and various peaceful measures co-operate. Interestingly, territorial 
disputes are a typical target of their co-operation: 
For instance, being the only actual activation of the ‘United Nations Forces’, much of 
                                                        
422 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, arts 1-2 & 33; Chri
stine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 30-33 & 254; with r
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the Korean War was accompanied by the bilateral negotiation between the American-
South Korean Bloc under the UN Flag and the Chinese-North Korean Bloc.425 More 
than 40 years later, as the symbol of the brief revive of the UNCSS, after the start of 
economic sanctions during the early stages of the Gulf War, the channel of diplomatic 
communication between the Saddam Regime and the international community was kept 
open.426 Besides, even in the difficult years of the Cold War, the sacrifice made by 
Hammarskjold and his colleagues for the success of the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations and the settlement of territorial disputes was equally memorable to the 
world.427 
On the other hand, with regard to the right of the independent review of the ICJ, its 
character in the present field is similar to the right of the parallel intervention of the 
political/judicial measures. According to Merrills, the judgments of the ICJ in the Case 
Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(hereinafter ‘the Nicaragua Case’) and the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic 
and Consular Staff in Tehran (hereinafter ‘the Tehran Case’) have already proved that 
‘the reference of a dispute to the Security Council is no bar to consideration of the same 
matter by the court……legal and political means of settling disputes are 
complementary’. In other words, the act of submitting certain international disputes to 
the authoritative institutions of the UNCSS by the relevant parties also could not 
exclude the supervision of the ICJ or other tribunals under its command.428 As a judicial 
organ, the ICJ inherently possess the basic power of hearing or re-examining different 
international disputes which have been received by it. In addition, thanks to the 
Nicaragua and Tehran Cases, which have nothing to do with territorial disputes, this 
institution has also acquired the power of controlling and regulating the written policies 
                                                        
425 Max Hastings, The Korean War (Simon & Schuster 2010) 345-50. 
426 Marc Weller, Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2010) 17-24 & 40. 
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that have been adopted by the UNSC and the UNCSS:429  
In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ announced that ‘the Charter accordingly does not confer 
exclusive responsibility upon the Security Council for the purpose (of maintaining 
international peace and security)……both organs (the UNSC and the ICJ) can therefore 
perform their separate but complementary functions with respect to the same 
events……the Court is asked to pass judgment on certain legal aspects of a situation 
which has also been considered by the Security Council, a procedure which is entirely 
consonant with its position as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations’. 
Thereby, the ICJ has enabled itself to track the steps of the UNCSS at any moment 
without UNSC intervention.430  
In the Tehran Case, the ICJ announced that ‘it does not seem to have occurred to any 
member of the Council that there was or could be anything irregular in the simultaneous 
exercise of their respective functions by the Court and the Security Council……the 
reasons are clear……it is for the Court, the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations, to resolve any legal questions that may be in issue between parties to a dispute; 
and the resolution of such legal questions by the Court may be an important, and 
sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement of the dispute’. Thereby, 
the ICJ has enabled itself to correct the mistakes of the UNCSS at any moment without 
UNSC intervention.431  
Regretfully, although it has the above two privileges, the ICJ still lacks experience in 
independently reviewing those doubtful issues surrounding the application of the 
UNCSS in territorial disputes. Among all the cases heard by the ICJ until now, the only 
exception is the guiding significance of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on West Sahara 
                                                        
429 J.G.Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (5th edn, CUP 2011) 231-36. 
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towards the MINURSO. Unfortunately, this case is not directly connected to the 
corresponding United Nations peacekeeping operation, since there is a gap of 16 years 
between the judgment and the deployment of the peacekeepers. 432  Nevertheless, 
concerning the necessity of impartially settling serious international disputes, and the 
accumulation of the new missions of the UNCSS, the author believes that the ICJ will 
have its chance to defend the reputation of the UNCSS in the field of territorial 
disputes.433 
3. The other potential intersection-the United Nations territorial administration 
system. 
Despite the above two regimes, there is another regime with a name which seems to 
combine the key words of the UNCSS, the peaceful measures and territorial disputes, 
that is the United Nations territorial administration system. Broadly speaking, the 
prototype of this system could be traced back to either the 100-years-old system of 
condominiums and the system of protectorates, or the United Nations trusteeship system. 
Nonetheless, during the later years of the 20th century, the United Nations territorial 
administration system had merely gained few chances to administrate definite regions 
in several cases that had no clear connection with territorial disputes:434 
In 1960, the outbreak of the Congo Crisis led the region of the former Belgian Congo 
into civil war and anarchy. In order to resolve this, the ONUC stationed there was forced 
to extend the mandate of the ‘traditional peacekeeping operations’ (see 4.2.2 below). 
Thereby, it temporarily took over a few domestic functions of a national government in 
the territories of a sovereign state for the first time in history.435 Several decades later, 
                                                        
432 Stephen Zunes & Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution
 (Syracuse University Press 2010) 106-10 & 200-210. 
433 Nie Hongyi, ‘A Review of the Function and Dilemma of International Law in Settling Terri
torial Disputes’ (2009) 2009 (2) Heilongjiang Chronicles 137 at 139-40. 
434 Alina Kaczorowska-Ireland, Public International Law (5th edn, Routledge 2015) 182-83 & 1
91; Carsten Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles 
to Iraq and Beyond (CUP 2010) chs 2-3. 
435 Accurately speaking, early in 1947, the UNGA had already proposed to implement internati
onal territorial administration in the region of Palestine, but this imagination never overcame th
e divergence of interests of the various states parties, see Future government of Palestine, UNG
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the Kosovo War in 1999 Resulted in the absence of administrative power in the then 
autonomous province of Kosovo of the FRY436. In order to resolve this, the UNSC was 
again forced to authorize the UNMIK to further extend the mandate of the ‘complex 
peacekeeping operations’. 437  Thus, this operation adopted nearly all the domestic 
functions of a national government in the territories of a sovereign state for the first time 
in history.438  
In terms of the causes of the above situations, it should be seen that Vis-à-vis its 
predecessors, the United Nations territorial administration system is charged by a 
theoretically neutral international organization. Consequently, this mechanism cannot 
expand the sphere of influence of any powerful state, nor enlarge the traditional 
territories of any weak state, though it can put the disputed territories under its 
jurisdiction.439 Affected by its nature, over a long period of time the United Nations 
territorial administration system was certainly not welcomed by those parties which 
aimed at putting disputed territories under their own dominance. Nevertheless, even 
though the United Nations territorial administration system is not quite popular, it is 
still an important invention that could work closely with the UNCSS. In particular, when 
confronting with those ‘standard’ territorial disputes, the former actually could offset a 
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lot of the shortages of the latter:  
Firstly, from the ‘United Nations Forces’ to the ‘Coalition Forces’, the exclusive 
application of the UNCSS was very likely to seriously rely on the military forces of the 
relevant states while handling territorial disputes. In this case, the introduction of the 
United Nations territorial administration system might moderately enrich the 
corresponding measures of management of the UNCSS.440 Secondly, from the Korean 
War to the Gulf War, the exclusive application of the UNCSS was very likely to 
seriously threaten the normal living environment of the relevant civilians while handling 
territorial disputes. In this case, the introduction of the United Nations territorial 
administration system might moderately avoid the corresponding destructive impact of 
the UNCSS.441 Thirdly, from the Korean Peninsula to the Persian Gulf, the exclusive 
application of the UNCSS was very likely to leave seriously obstacles to the restoration 
of the normal international relations of the relevant regions while handling territorial 
disputes. In this case, the introduction of the United Nations territorial administration 
system might moderately safeguard the corresponding future efficacy of the UNCSS.442  
Inspired by these positive effects, in the same year when Kosovo was taken over by the 
United Nations territorial administration system, the UNSC duplicated the UNMIK in 
Timor-Leste by deploying the practically identical UNTAET.443 As the original parties 
                                                        
440 E.g. The UNMIK possesses ‘all executive, legislative, and judicial authority’ within the regi
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 to An Internally Ethically Divided States’ (Policy Briefs Kosovo 2013) <http://www.kas.de/wf/d
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of this case, namely Indonesia and Timor-Leste, were member states of the United 
Nations, the deployment of the UNTAET was a significant step in intervening territorial 
disputes in the context of this thesis. Besides, as the duties of the ‘complex/coercive 
peacekeeping operations’ are gradually becoming more diversified, there is no reason 
to say that the United Nations territorial administration system will not be used again in 
the future cases involving the UNCSS and the ‘standard’ territorial disputes.444 
4. Summary. 
In summary, in terms of handling territorial disputes, the connection between the 
UNCSS and the peaceful measures is mainly manifested as the quasi-judicial power of 
the UNSC and the right of the parallel application of various peaceful measures. 
Thereinto, the former has consolidated the authority of the UNCSS in this field, yet the 
hidden problems of this power cannot be rapidly solved, so that it is still a supporting 
character at the moment. In contrast, the latter is not an independent right, but it could 
largely be seen as a ‘backup’, assisting the UNCSS in this field. Furthermore, the name 
of the United Nations territorial administration system is related to territorial disputes, 
and it also can potentially work with the UNCSS in this field. However, the relevant 
evidence suggests that this system still has not been widely applied in territorial disputes 
among member states of the United Nations. 
Besides, it is noteworthy that notionally speaking, the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations also involve peaceful elements. Nevertheless, as the direct substitute of the 
‘United Nations Forces’, they are certainly more suitable to be treated as part of the 
UNCSS, not an independent right or regime.445 Hence, the details of the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations should not be discussed here. 
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4.2.2 The hierarchy between the UNCSS and the right of self-defence in territorial 
disputes settlement 
Assessing the development of international law since the end of WWII, it can be seen 
that the general target of the drafters of the UN Charter was to ‘centralize control of the 
use of force in the Security Council under Chapter VII’.446 Even so, the UNCSS is still 
not the only measure for the legal resort to force by the modern sovereign states. 
According to article 51 of the UN Charter, both the United Nations authorities and all 
the member states of the United Nations do not have the right to oppose or deny ‘the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against 
a member of the United Nations’.447 Nevertheless, in terms of the application of the 
UNCSS in various international disputes, this mechanism and the right of self-defense 
are not two independent coercive measures. On the contrary, from the perspective of 
their origins, it can be seen that they are mutually contradicting and mutually 
intersecting:  
On one hand, the UN Charter defines the right of self-defence as a natural right for 
supplementing and strengthening the UNCSS, whilst the UNCSS can also ‘usefully 
complement an action in self-defence and facilitate its success’. Thus, they can be rated 
as a pair of ‘harmonious’ partners.448 On the other hand, the UNCSS is an introversive 
international security mechanism bred by the idealistic political norms, whilst the right 
of self-defence is an extroversive international security right bred by the realistic 
political norms. Thus, they can be rated as a pair of ‘antagonistic’ opponents as well.449  
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Therefore, for practical convenience, the hierarchy between the UNCSS and the right 
of self-defence must be clarified in any related international dispute. As a perilous object 
most likely to cause sovereign states to actively or passively resort to force since 1648, 
territorial disputes are certainly not an exception.450 
1. Prior to the activation of the UNCSS. 
Before the activation of the UNCSS, this system certainly needs some time to consider 
and co-ordinate the overall interests of the various member states of the UNSC 
(especially the P5).451 Thereby, the issue that has really initiated a debate among the 
Western scholars in this place is whether the prior exercise of the right of self-defence 
relies on the authorization of the UNSC or not. 452  Fortunately, the past territorial 
disputes since the birth of the United Nations have revealed that the right of self-defence 
is always not a derived right which casts itself on the recognition of the UNCSS. 
For instance, the Korean War started on July 25th, 1950. The South Korean armed forces 
immediately launched firm resistance against the aggressive act of North Korea. 
Afterwards, the successive resolutions of the UNSC simply re-affirmed ‘(the right) to 
repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area’ which 
had already been implemented by South Korea.453 Forty years later, Iraq attacked 
Kuwait on August 2nd, 1990. The Kuwaiti armed forces immediately launched firm 
resistance against the aggressive act of Iraq as well. Afterward, the successive 
resolutions of the UNSC also simply re-stated ‘the inherent right of individual or 
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collective self-defence’ which had already been implemented by Kuwait.454  
Tracking the causes of these situations, it can be seen that the right of self-defence is 
substantially an inherent right originating from the sovereignty of states and the norms 
of customary international law. 455  Contemporary territorial disputes, which are 
surrounded by high-tech armed forces and WMDs, can hardly give their parties 
adequate buffer space for receiving early warning. This makes the discussion about 
‘whether the prior exercise of the right of self-defence relies on the authorization of the 
UNSC or not’ contradictory to both abstract legal principles and the concrete logic.456 
Thus, if removing the old constraining conditions like ‘necessity’ and 
‘proportionality’,457 then in settling territorial disputes, sovereign states only need to 
undertake an optional obligation of ‘reporting the measures that have been applied by 
them while exercising the right of self-defence to the UNSC’.458 
2. After the activation of the UNCSS. 
After the activation of the UNCSS, the identification of the hierarchy between this 
mechanism and the right of self-defence has increased in practical value. In this field, 
the related Western legal literature can be split into two opposing camps:  
One of them, represented by Kelsen and Franck, argues that the right of self-defence 
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should be subservient to the UNCSS, suggesting the latter can suspend or absorb the 
right of self-defence.459 In contrast, the opposing camp, represented by Halberstam and 
Bowett, insists that right of self-defence parallels the UNCSS, meaning that the 
intervention of the latter cannot suspend or absorb the right of self-defence.460  
However, analyzing the past territorial disputes since 1945, it can be seen that the 
situation in practice is not that complex, since the UNCSS has never been a 
complementary mechanism to the right of self-defence. For example, during the Korean 
War, the South Korean armed forces accepted the unified command of the ‘United 
Nations Forces’ led by the USA. In addition, today the US forces stationed in South 
Korea still hold the highest controlling power of the South Korean armed forces.461 
Similarly, during the Gulf War, the Kuwaiti armed forces also accepted the unified 
command of the ‘Joint Forces’ led by Saudi-Arabian officers. Meanwhile, the ‘Joint 
Forces’ was subordinated to the ‘Coalition Forces’ led by the USA as well.462  
Tracking the causes of these situations, it should be noted that the UNCSS is, after all, 
a mechanism of intervention with the slogan of ‘all for one, one for all’. Not only can it 
bring the strength of third-parties (especially the P5) to the right of self-defence,463 but 
it can also endow injured states with the authoritative support from third parties.464 
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Besides, the contemporary territorial disputes which involve so many values and core 
national interests can hardly give their parties enough free space for weighing efficiency 
and fairness (e.g. those actions which exercise the right of self-defence that contravene 
the will of the UNSC may suffer indiscriminate sanctions imposed by the UNCSS465).466 
Thus, if the UNSC has already applied ‘measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security’ when handling territorial disputes in line with the UNCSS, then this 
system only needs to undertake the remedial obligation of ‘(allowing the right of self-
defence to) revive if the measures (of the UNCSS have been) prove ineffective’.467 
3. Summary. 
In summary, pertaining to the settlement of territorial disputes, the right of self-defence 
is initially independent from the UNCSS before its activation, then will be suspended 
or absorbed by the UNCSS after its activation. Besides, it should be noted that article 
51 of the UN Charter cannot be used by the parties of international disputes to ‘justify 
anticipatory, preventative, or pre-emptive action’.468 Furthermore, the scope of the use 
of the right of self-defence also cannot exceed the aforementioned elementary 
requirements determined by the international law of peace, such as ‘necessity’ and 
                                                        
Syngman Rhee regime of South Korea, but the Chinese armed forces which were deployed in 
the territories of Korea still kept calling themselves as the ‘Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’, 
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United Nations to the South Korean government, see e.g. Mark E. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein 
& Michael A. McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949 (M.E. Sharpe 2
003) 125. 
465 Yu Mincai, The Implementing Mechanism of the Right of Self-Defence in International Law 
(China Renmin University Press 2014) 132-33. 
466 E.g. Before the signature of the armistice agreement of the Korean War, the South Korean 
government used to threat that it would withdraw from the ‘unfair’ negotiation between the ‘U
nited Nations Forces' and the Communists Bloc, plus it claimed that it would ‘fight alone’, but
 sarcastically, this attitude led to unnecessary extra battle (the battle of Kumsong) and territoria
l loses, see Walter G. Hermes, Truth Tent and Fighting Front: US Army in the Korean War 
(Government Printing Office 1966) vol 2, ch 21, see especially 470-78; Hu Haibo, Memorandu
m of the Korean War: 1950-1953 (Yellow River Press 2009) ch 16. 
467 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 51; Alexander 
Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (OUP 2011) 278-80; Nigel D. White, Keeping the Peace: Th
e United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Manchester Univers
ity Press 1997) 56. 
468 Alexander Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (OUP 2011) 277; Olivier Corten, The Law aga
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hing 2010) 406-70; Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threat, Challenge, an




‘proportionality’ (e.g. the aggressive wars launched by Nazi German with the pretense 
of self-defence were certainly illegal469 ).470 Fortunately, in territorial disputes since 
1945, there is a dearth of these aforesaid concepts, which are beyond the traditional 
scope of the right of self-defence471. 
4.2.3 The inter-relationship between the UNCSS and the power of regional 
organizations in territorial disputes settlement 
Proverbially, the UN Charter has endowed the UNSC with the primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and it has designed a full set of 
international security mechanism for this institution. However, as they understood the 
limitations of the UNSC, the drafters of the UN Charter still prepared reinforcements 
originating in other inter-governmental organisations for the UNCSS. 
According to chapter 8 of the UN Charter, ‘the Security Council shall encourage the 
development of pacific settlement of local disputes through (such) regional 
arrangements or by (such) regional agencies……the Security Council shall, where 
appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action 
under its authority’.472 In addition, concerning the need to centrally control the use of 
force, the UNSC retains the final explanative, monitoring and managing rights of ‘no 
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies 
without the authorization of the Security Council’.473  
                                                        
469 See e.g. Antony Best, Jusi Hanhimaki, Joseph A. Maiolo & Kirsten E. Schulze, Internation
al History of the Twenties Century and Beyond (3rd edn, Routledge 2014) 187-94 & 201-209. 
470 Michael Wood, ‘Self-Defence and Collective Security: Key Distinctions’, in Marc Weller, Al
exia Solomou & Jake William Rylatt (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in Inter
national Law (OUP 2015) 649 at 652; Olivier Corten, The Law against War: The Prohibition 
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471 A rare exception is the ‘Six-Day War’ in 1967, but the UNSC did not reached a consensus 
on the issue of the legality of the ‘anticipatory action’ of Israel, see Anthony C. Arend, ‘Intern
ational Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force’ (2003) 26 (2) The Washington Quarterl
y 89 at 94-95. 
472 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, arts 52-53; for a ge
neral commentary on the functions of chapter 8 of the UN Charter, see e.g. Ademola Abass, R
egional Organisations and the Development of Collective Security: Beyond Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter (Hart Publishing 2004) ch 2. 
473 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 53; Christine Gr
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Regretfully, with the rapid change of the world order after the WWII, the efforts of the 
elders of the 1940th have failed to establish a positive interaction between the UNCSS 
and the regional organisations. On the contrary, based on a series of past practice, their 
relationship has evolved in two opposing directions:  
On one hand, from the Northern Hemisphere to the Sothern Hemisphere, there are 
myriad regional organisations that possess the function of collective security, covering 
most of the areas which contain or conceal international disputes.474 On the other hand, 
from the old-fashioned military-political alliances, to the newly-developed complex 
regional organisations, they have all conducted many military enforcement actions 
which arrogate the scope of control of the UNCSS. Unsurprisingly, this has caused both 
the states and relevant scholars to challenge and query the authority of the United 
Nations.475  
Bearing these situations in mind, the related research programs would certainly be 
attracted to explore the relationship between the UNCSS and the collective security 
functions of the regional organisations in settling various international disputes. As one 
of the dangerous international disputes which always threats the contemporary 
international community, territorial disputes are clearly not an exception. 
1. Positive relationship. 
Logically, this sub-section should start with the positive relationship between the 
                                                        
ay, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 254-55. 
474 E.g. The SCO of Asia, the Warsaw Pact/CSTO of the region of the sphere of influence of 
the former USSR, the NATO/OSCE of Western Europe & North America, the AU/ECOWAS of
 Africa, the OAS of America and the PIF of Oceania, see The North Atlantic Treaty (signed 
4 April 1949) 34 UNTS 243, art 5; Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
(Warsaw Pact) (signed 14 May 1955) 219 UNTS 3, art 4; Alexander Orakhelashvili, Collective 
Security (OUP 2011) 64-88; Peter Wallensteen & Anders Bjurner (eds), Regional Organizations 
and Peacemaking: Challengers to the UN? (Routledge 2015) app 2. 
475 E.g. The Kosovo War and a series of military intervention operations implemented by the E
COWAS in the region of Western Africa, see Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of
 Force (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 400-407 & 411-17; Nico Krisch, ‘Unilaterial Enforcement of the 
Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security Council’ (1999) 3 Marx Planck UNYB 59 at 7
9-86; Ademola Abass, ‘The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and 
Problems’ (2000) 5 J. Conflict & Sec. L. 211 at 220-28.  
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UNCSS and the collective security functions of the regional organisations in territorial 
disputes settlement. After acquiring the authorization of the UNSC, these two 
mechanisms can perform three levels of progressively positive interaction:  
Firstly, if the UNCSS has not or could not be activated, then the collective security 
functions of the regional organisations can act as the emergency measure for preventing 
the deterioration of the related situations.476 Secondly, if the intervention of the UNCSS 
seems to be powerless, then the collective security functions of the regional 
organisations can act as the supplementary measure for suppressing the escalation of 
the related situations.477 Thirdly, if the intervention of the UNCSS seems to be tardy, 
then the collective security functions of the regional organisations can act as the 
substitutive measure for deferring the wide spread of the related situations.478  
More importantly, back into the relevant practice of handling territorial disputes, the 
above positive interaction between the UNCSS and the collective security functions of 
the regional organisations does not only rest on paper. In contrast, it could frequently 
be seen in several past cases- 
For instance, in the early 1960th, the League of Arab States assumed the national defense 
affairs of Kuwait. By deploying well-directed regional peacekeeping operations, the 
League earned sufficient time for Kuwait to become a member state of the United 
Nations. Accordingly, Kuwait could then enjoy the security protection provided by the 
UNCSS, and therefrom the government of Iraq was forced to recognize its 
independence.479 Thirty years later, under the aegis of the UNSC, the CSCE also sent 
                                                        
476 Dai Yi, A Research on the Issue of Reform of the UNCSS (Chinese Social Science Press 2
014) 78-79. 
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a peacekeeping force to the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan in 1994, 
monitoring the armistice agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia.480  
Regarding the causes of these good examples, as afore-mentioned, territorial disputes 
are a particular type of severe international dispute with intricate origin, dangerous 
process and unpredictable consequence. Thus, the international mechanisms which wish 
to control territorial disputes must have the ability to understand the background of the 
relevant cases. Then, they must efficiently intervene the settlement of the relevant cases, 
and constantly track the escalation of the relevant cases as well 481 . Under such a 
circumstance, since territorial disputes are both diversified and all over the world, the 
regional organizations and their collective security functions would automatically 
become the superior choice. To name some of their asymmetric advantages but a few, 
they are closer to the disputed territories, have better knowledge of the local situations, 
and enjoy a tighter connection with the corresponding parties. Moreover, members of 
regional organizations may reach an agreement more easily, as they have lesser core 
states which are similar to the P5. In comparison with the UNCSS or the UNSC which 
is always being trapped by the global powers and their affairs, these advantages 
definitely can help the regional organisations to meet the afore-mentioned requirements 
more easily.482  
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Therefore, since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, the positive 
interaction between the UNCSS and collective security functions of the regional 
organisations has been continuously praised and encouraged. In fact, the successive 
Secretaries-General of the United Nations have put high expectations on the relationship 
between these two mechanisms, surpassing the original design in chapter 8 of the UN 
Charter.483 
2. Negative relationship. 
Nevertheless, although the collective functions of the regional organisations can help 
the UNCSS to deal with territorial disputes, their relationship is not always harmonious. 
Reviewing the relevant past cases, numerous examples exist where regional 
organisations have either distressed or humiliated authoritative institutions of the United 
Nations: 
For instance, as a famous case which was not a ‘standard’ territorial dispute but ended 
up with the change of ownership of a piece of territory, the issue of Kosovo is a typical 
example here. The unilateral armed attack launched by the NATO against the former 
Yugoslavia did not acquire the explicit authorization of the UNSC. Meanwhile, this 
operation also forced the observer group of the OSCE which aimed at peacefully 
monitoring the situation in the region of Kosovo to momentarily leave its post. Then, 
the new-born ‘hybrid’ peacekeeping operation under the UNCSS aegis merely got the 
chance to clean up the situation after the former Yugoslavia succumbed to the powerful 
NATO.484  
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Similarly, the long-term military confrontation between the Eastern and Western 
regional organisations during the Cold War almost froze the normal operation of the 
UNSC, which was the central institution of the UNCSS. In addition, this competition 
directly induced or escalated the territorial contradictions among many small/weak 
states which were involved in the NATO/Warsaw Pact system.485 More alarmingly, 
even when facing other controversies, such as domestic human rights issues, it is still 
possible that the UNCSS might be selectively ignored by the collective security 
functions of the regional organisations. Afterwards, the UNSC often can merely answer 
or conceal its dilemma with subsequent ratification.486 
Tracking the root of these ‘bad’ examples, it can be said that owing to their scope of 
jurisdiction and legal basis, the perspective and purposes of the United Nations and the 
regional organisations are already different.487 Other than that, it is also clear that the 
ideological sources of the UNCSS and the collective security functions of the regional 
organisations are significantly different from each other as well: 
As the only universal security mechanism of the modern world, the former emphasizes 
the voluntary mutual protection of the internal order of its member states. Thus, its norm 
follows the slogan of ‘all for one, one for all’, which is an invention of the classical 
thought of collective security.488 In contrast, as a smaller type of international security 
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mechanism which covers a definite region, the latter emphasizes the passive mutual 
assistance of its member states against their external threats. Thus, its norm follows the 
concept of ‘collective defense’ which can be dated back to the system of the balance of 
power.489 
Under the influence of these differences, it is unavoidable that the UNCSS and the 
collective security functions may make contradicting decisions when jointly handling 
complex and severe international disputes, including territorial disputes.490 Besides, 
while they have praised the positive relationship between these two international 
security mechanisms, some legal scholars are still cautious about the future of the co-
operation between the UNCSS and the collective security functions of the regional 
organisations.491 
3. Summary. 
In summary, the UNCSS and the collective security functions of the regional 
organisations have a double-edged inter-relationship during their joint process of 
settling territorial disputes. This relationship combines both advantages and 
disadvantages, but after all, they are two different kinds of international security 
mechanism. Consequently, when engaging territorial disputes in practice, the UNCSS 
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still must predominantly trust in its own power, and that is the topic of the next chapter 




Chapter 5-The practice of the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes 
settlement 
As aforesaid, the land-territory disputes among member states of the United Nations are 
a particular type of severe international dispute, since their subjects can endure heavy 
external pressure, and their objects are invaluable. Given this, and the fact that their 
entire process of application is limited by the commitment of individual parties, the 
various peaceful measures cannot guarantee a good result in intervening territorial 
disputes. In this context, the UNCSS has been endowed with a chance to demonstrate 
its ability. Specifically in the relevant practice, since the literal meaning of ‘settling’ 
various international disputes contracts the pre-determined purposes of the UNCSS, this 
mechanism actually has two mutually independent tasks (see 4.1.3):  
Firstly, if a definite party of the relevant territorial dispute has threatened to use its force, 
then the UNCSS ought to compel this state to retract this threat, so as to ‘return to peace’. 
Secondly, if a definite party of the relevant territorial dispute has already resorted to 
force, then the UNCSS ought to compel this state to stop the act of using armed forces, 
so as to ‘return to peace’. Based on these two requirements, this chapter will set out the 
various measures that can be used by the UNCSS to bring about ‘peace and security’ in 
territorial disputes, and assess their respective success or failure.  
5.1 The performance of the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS in territorial 
disputes settlement 
5.1.1 The theoretical role and practical records of the United Nations authorized 
diplomatic sanctions in territorial disputes settlement 
Reviewing the relevant articles of the UN Charter, it can be seen that as the survivors 
of the WWII who had the dream of ‘peacefully settling international disputes’, the 
architects of the United Nations designed two sets of progressive practical plan 
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according to their ideas for the gestating UNCSS:492  
The first set of plan applies to such situation in which the UNSC has determined that a 
definite international dispute has formed ‘any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression’. In this case, the UNSC has the authority to urge every member 
state of the United Nations to impose various non-forcible sanctions not involving the 
use of force on those parties to the dispute that are suspected of threatening or breaching 
international peace and security, so as to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.493 The second set of plan applies to such situation in which the UNSC has 
determined that a definite international dispute has formed ‘measures provided for in 
article 41 (of the UN Charter) would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate’. 
In this case, the UNSC has the authority to deploy the ‘United Nation Forces’ against 
those parties to the dispute that are suspected of threatening or breaching international 
peace and security, so as to maintain or restore international peace and security.494 
From these words, it is not difficult to realize that although the UNCSS has envisaged 
the use of force, but the UN Charter does not contain explicit provision that stipulate 
the hierarchy between the above plans. Thus, if taking the existing principles of the 
United Nations into account, then it can be argued that the intention of the drafters was 
still in favor of restricting the frequency with which those non-peaceful measures might 
be used.495 Due to this, and the freezing effect of the Cold War on the UNSC and the 
‘United Nations Forces’,496 ever since its establishment, the United Nations has always 
valued those measures of the UNCSS without resorting to armed forces.497 As the result, 
the United Nations authorized diplomatic sanctions which put more emphasis on the 
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gentle derogation of reputation rather than the fierce deprivation of interests have 
reasonably become the proper starting point of the relevant legal studies. 498 
Specifically in terms of territorial disputes, through revising the viewpoints of the 
relevant authoritative legal scholars, it can be found that the subsequent development 
of the preliminary rules in the UN Charter has generally evolved three measures of 
diplomatic sanction. These include the open condemnation, the announcement of non-
recognition and the severance of diplomatic relations, which are both inter-connected 
and different from each other.499  
1. The theoretical role and practical records of open condemnation. 
The open condemnation, as its name suggests, refers to the situation where a competent 
institution of the United Nations, normally the UNSC (the ‘recommendation’ of the 
UNGA cannot guarantee the stable operation of the UNCSS, see above500) adopts a 
resolution to denounce the stance, policies or activities of certain parties of a definite 
international dispute as absolutely ‘unfounded’, since they have violated the basic 
norms of international law501. In other words, once open condemnation has been applied 
to handle territorial disputes and various other international disputes, it usually can lead 
to the following consequences on multiple levels: 
The first consequence of open condemnation is that, with the assistance of the 
clarification provided by the corresponding resolutions, the officials of the United 
Nations can identify the guilty parties of the relevant international disputes 
(meaningfully, in the Badme case and a few other territorial disputes, the UNSC only 
identified the unlawful activities themselves, but avoided an assessment of the 
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correctness and the wrongfulness of the various parties502). The second consequence of 
open condemnation is that, with the legal basis founded by the corresponding 
resolutions, the officials of the United Nations can activate the entire procedure for 
investigating the guilty parties of the relevant international disputes 503 . The third 
consequence of open condemnation is that, with the widespread of the corresponding 
resolutions, the officials of the United Nations can expose the guilty parties of the 
relevant international disputes to the world (e.g. as the UNSC condemned North Korea 
in 1950, it also clarified the issue of ‘who shot first’ between North Korea and South 
Korea while these two parties were blaming each other504).505  
From the above list, it can be seen that being solely an ‘oral criticism’ (in the form of 
‘written statement’), the open condemnation has simple form, concise content and 
restrained goals. Thereby, this measure is well adapted as an initial step while the entire 
set of following UNCSS actions is gradually being activated. Realistically speaking, 
however, despite the ‘mental stress’ which is praised by some idealistic officials of the 
United Nations, since open condemnation is reliant purely on the power of words, it is 
a measure that cannot directly deprive the interests of its targets. Therefore, the open 
condemnation can rarely exert enough pressure on the relevant parties to force them to 
make meaningful compromises, and thus it cannot individually assume the duty of 
‘maintaining or restoring international peace and security’. Back into the topic of this 
thesis, as a definite type of international dispute which combines a few characters that 
are unfavorable for making easy compromises, territorial disputes are certainly not a 
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For instance, in a series of resolutions related to the Korean War, the decision-makers 
of the UNSC omitted the phase of condemning the invaders in written form. Instead, 
they rapidly chose to deploy the ‘United Nations Forces’ in their third corresponding 
resolution in succession. 506  Moreover, after Iraq had suddenly invaded Kuwait in 
August of 1990, the UNSC quickly and openly condemned the aggressive operation of 
the Saddam regime.507 However, this method did not stop the annexation of Kuwait by 
Iraq,508 and this crisis was only reversed by the Gulf War, which involved the use of 
force.509 
In short, with regard to territorial disputes and several other international disputes with 
similar features, the open condemnation has only served to declare the start of an 
escalating process of intervention by the UNCSS. Apart from that, in comparison with 
other measures with higher mandatory power, it can be said that the open condemnation 
cannot in itself meet the aim of ‘maintaining or restoring international peace and 
security’. Therefore, the open condemnation can provide nominal help to the 
management of territorial disputes, but the authoritative institutions of the UNCSS also 
have realistic reasons to occasionally abandon this ‘initial step’. 
2. The theoretical role and practical records of the announcement of non-
recognition. 
As with the open condemnation, the announcement of non-recognition is also a 
diplomatic measure within the framework of the UNCSS which intends to handle 
various international disputes via ‘written statement’. According to articles 9 to 11 of 
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the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, every state ‘has the duty to refrain 
from recognizing any territorial acquisition by another states acting in violation 
of ……the duty to refrain from……the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of another states’.510 However, although the open 
condemnation and the announcement of non-recognition share the same form, but by 
means of examining their substance, it still can be found out that the nature of these 
measures is indeed different from each other:  
On the one hand, the mode of ‘oral criticism’ seen with the former focuses on reducing 
the illusory reputation of the guilty parties of the relevant international disputes. In 
contrast, through refusing to ‘recognize any territorial acquisition’, the mode of 
boycotting ‘de facto situation’ seen with the latter focuses on reducing the actual 
benefits that may be acquired by the guilty parties.511 On the other hand, the primary 
target of punishment of the former is always the subjects of the relevant international 
disputes (namely the various parties). In contrast, by refusing to endorse the legality of 
the unlawful actions of the guilty parties, the primary target of punishment of the latter 
has been transferred to the objects of the relevant international disputes (e.g. disputed 
territories).512 A typical example for explaining the above argument is the Crimea case, 
which involves a territorial dispute. Affected by the ‘non-recognition’ policy of most of 
the member states of the United Nations, it is clear that the region of Crimea can hardly 
become a sub-beneficiary party of the trade agreements between Russia and other states 
in the predictable future. Meanwhile, the key industries of this peninsula have also lost 
a large amount of their international market, thus forcing the central government of 
Russia to commit to continually investing its own resources into this region.513 
                                                        
510 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operati
on among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res 2625 (XX
V) (adopted 24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625 (XXV); Draft Declaration on the Right
s and Duties of States, UNGA Res 375 (adopted 6 December 1949) UN Doc A/RES/375 (IV); 
Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 338-40. 
511 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 338-40. 
512 Peter Liberman, ‘Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains’ (1996) 21
 (1) International Security 147 at 167-73, see especially 169. 
513 See e.g. Richard Galpin, ‘Russians count the cost a year after Crimea annexation’ (BBC Ne
155 
 
Summing up the impact of these differences, researchers are justified in claiming that 
the announcement of non-recognition is a diplomatic measure which has a slightly 
higher mandatory power than the open condemnation. Realistically speaking, unless the 
officials of the United Nations have blind faith in ‘oral criticism’, this measure can 
clearly bring about heavier and more precise external pressure. However, since the 
announcement of non-recognition does not primarily target the subjects of the relevant 
disputes and their inherent interests, this measure allows the guilty parties to retain some 
prestige. Thereby, the corresponding states have also acquired definite room for 
maneuver that is at their own discretion. Besides, Cassese has further sharply illustrated 
that the pre-condition for the application of the announcement of non-recognition is that 
the United Nations must ‘not in a position to terminate, or against which it proved 
unable to recommend or enjoin sanctions on unlawful behavior of states’.514 In other 
words, although it seems that the announcement of non-recognition has recognized the 
importance of depriving potential benefit from illegal interests, but indeed, its efficacy 
is still resting idealistically on the self-consciousness of the guilty parties. 
Given such a circumstance, it should be admitted that there is a visible gap between the 
degree of punishment arising from the announcement of non-recognition and that 
arising from open condemnation on paper. Nevertheless, to the corresponding parties, 
when these measures are being implemented in practice, they are not very different to 
the corresponding parties. On the one hand, it is true that the illegal interests newly 
acquired by the guilty parties are not recognized by the United Nations, but neither has 
the inherent strength of these states been undermined by international sanctions. Thus, 
it certainly let the guilty parties have the will and ability to seek the recognition of the 
international community. On the other hand, it is true that inherent strength of the 
victims has been undermined by the guilty parties, but it is also the case that their 
legitimate interests are still recognized by the United Nations. Thus, it certainly gives 
the victims an incentive to take back their losses. Paradoxically, therefore, it seems that 
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the announcement of non-recognition has spoken boldly in defense of ‘international 
peace and security’, but in fact, this measure has also created hidden troubles for 
‘maintenance or restoration’. Back into the topic of this thesis, as a definite type of 
international dispute which has invaluable objects, territorial disputes are, again, 
certainly not a counter-example- 
For instance, the UNSC once adopted a series of resolutions in the early 1980s, refusing 
to recognize Israel’s annexation of the disputed territories between itself and its 
neighbors. Unfortunately, the effective occupation of these territories by Israel was not 
meaningfully interrupted by these resolutions, and the armed conflicts among different 
local states were also endless.515 Likewise, during the Gulf Crisis which almost can be 
seen as a textbook case for the UNCSS, the ‘non-recognition’ resolution adopted by the 
UNSC regarding the annexation of Kuwait also did not impede the wilful regime of 
Saddam. As proven by the relevant historical records, much tougher measures than 
simply announcements of non-recognition were required to force the Iraqi invaders to 
make concessions.516 
In short, the announcement of non-recognition is a diplomatic measure that, while 
having more mandatory power than simply condemnation, remains unable to ‘maintain 
or restore international peace and security’. Actually, in comparison with condemnation 
which focuses on damaging the reputation of its targets, the policy of non-recognition 
may even provoke the relevant parties to ‘threaten or breach’ international peace and 
security. After all, even though this measure can touch upon the realistic interests of the 
parties, its mandatory power is still not enough. Therefore, when facing those severe 
international disputes, including territorial disputes, the authoritative institutions of the 
UNCSS need powerful measures that are more effective. 
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3. The theoretical role and practical records of the severance of diplomatic 
relations. 
As with the open condemnation and the announcement of non-recognition, the 
severance of diplomatic sanctions is still a diplomatic measure which intend to handle 
various international disputes largely via ‘written statement’. According to the 
definition given by Giegerich, the severance of diplomatic relations will ‘effectively 
ends all direct official communications between (the) two governments……by express 
notification’.517 Fortunately, however, if one examines the numerous details involved 
in this measure, it still can be seen that the severance of diplomatic relations does 
contain features that highlight its higher mandatory power:  
Firstly, unlike the open condemnation which sticks with ‘oral criticism’, the severance 
of diplomatic relations makes it impossible for guilty parties in international disputes to 
develop formal international relations on the inter-governmental level with the member 
states of the United Nations. Thus, this measure is bound to touch upon the realistic 
national interests of these states. 518  Secondly, unlike the announcement of non-
recognition which prefers to ‘punish the objects’, the severance of diplomatic relations 
makes it impossible for guilty parties in international disputes to compete with other 
states by only resorting to their newly acquired illegal interests. Thus, this measure is 
bound to undermine the inherent national strength of these states.519  
From the above discussion, it can be seen that while the severance of diplomatic 
relations continues to use the form of ‘written statement’, its substance has been actively 
changed. On the one hand, in comparison with the open condemnation, the severance 
of diplomatic relations is a more pragmatic measure. On the other hand, in comparison 
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with the announcement of non-recognition, the severance of diplomatic relations is a 
measure which does not allow the guilty parties to retain their prestige or react at their 
own discretion. Therefore, it can be argued that this measure is the strictest diplomatic 
measure under the framework of the UNCSS, and is therefore never rashly activated by 
its authoritative institutions in practice. In reality, the United Nations has only adopted 
a series of resolutions that called for the severance of diplomatic relations on one 
occasion against South Africa, and there is no other similar case.520 
However, although the severance of diplomatic relations has the highest mandatory 
power among its own kind, but this measure is not perfect. After all, it is still a measure 
which belongs to the field of diplomacy, so that it cannot break away from its exterior 
facade as part of diplomatic sanctions. Realistically speaking, the problems observed 
above in respect to open condemnation and the announcement of non-recognition may 
also apply to the severance of diplomatic relations- 
Firstly, politically isolating a state cannot directly undermine its inherent strength. The 
subsequent suspension of the corresponding international economic interactions which 
is the natural next step to this measure, is the penalty which really works (see below). 
In other words, the severance of diplomatic relations needs the co-operation of other 
measures, such as the economic sanctions, otherwise it may turn out to be another empty 
talk in the form of ‘written statement’ as well. Secondly, if definite guilty parties have 
some unique political/economic advantages (e.g. possessing rare mineral resources), 
then those third parties may be encouraged to continue ‘unofficial’ interaction with them, 
bypassing the United Nations. In other words, the severance of diplomatic relations 
needs to choose the suitable objects of sanction, otherwise it may turn out to be an 
ineffective punishment as well. 
Therefore, even though the severance of diplomatic relations can directly target the 
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guilty parties, it is highly likely that the decline of the resistance of the latter is very 
slow. In this manner, the predetermined purposes of ‘maintaining or restoring 
international peace and security’ of the UNCSS may still go beyond the capacity of this 
measure. Coincidentally, in the only case of the United Nations authorized severance of 
diplomatic relations-South Africa, both of the above-mentioned weaknesses can be seen 
by the researchers, and this case actually contains a few territorial elements:521 
According to the related resolutions, the initial intention of the authoritative institutions 
of the UNCSS was to politically isolate the racist regime of South Africa, and it had 
nothing to do with territorial disputes.522 Nonetheless, after South Africa had illegally 
occupied Namibia, the UNSC added the phrase of ‘in violation of the international 
status of the territory’ to its reasons for authorizing sanctions.523 Unfortunately, the 
development of the situation had proved that the exclusive application of the severance 
of diplomatic relations not only could not ‘maintain or restore’ the international peace 
and security of Southern Africa, but also might reveal the shortages of this measure- 
Firstly, each of the two official resolutions of the United Nations on diplomatic 
sanctions against South Africa also made reference to the use of economic sanctions. In 
addition, a series of supplementary resolutions of them had only concentrated on 
expanding the economic sanctions as well.524 Secondly, after the adoption of the afore-
mentioned resolutions, the biggest punishment received by South Africa was the 
suspension of its participation in the UNGA, yet it still retained its UN membership. 
Besides, the overall national strength of South Africa only started to decrease 
appreciably after the Western superpowers had joined in the economic sanctions in the 
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1980s.525 Thirdly, although the diplomatic sanctions were initiated in the 1960s, it took 
until the 1990s for the regime to change in South Africa and for Namibia to be granted 
independence. During this period, both Namibia and South Africa had to experience the 
lengthy Namibian War of Independence.526 
In short, although the severance of diplomatic relations has addressed some of the 
drawbacks of open condemnation and the announcement of non-recognition, it cannot 
even plainly resolve the domestic crisis of a regional power. More seriously, while the 
corresponding case of South Africa only loosely involved a few minor territorial issues, 
this measure still could not pledge to ‘maintain or restore’ the local peace and security. 
On this account, it is not surprising to know that the severance of diplomatic relations 
is absent from those ‘standard’ territorial disputes which have frequently threatened or 
breached international peace and security. 
4. Summary. 
In summary, territorial disputes may successively engage a number of United Nations 
authorized diplomatic sanctions ranging from the open condemnation, the 
announcement of non-recognition to the severance of diplomatic relation. Regretfully, 
all three methods are intrinsically supplementary measures which are not quite effective 
on their own in terms of achieving the purpose of ‘maintaining or restoring international 
peace and security’ of the UCNSS. Actually, in their newly published monograph, White 
and Tsagourias have stated that in the field of collective security, the narrow sense of 
the word ‘sanction’ tends to be used to refer purely to ‘economic sanctions’. This, then, 
is the subject of research of the next section of this thesis.527  
5.1.2 The theoretical role and practical records of the United Nations authorized 
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economic sanctions in territorial disputes settlement 
Reviewing the original wording of the UN Charter, it can be seen that as with the 
argument in the preceding section, the United Nations authorized diplomatic sanctions 
are largely supplementary measure with limited effect. In contrast, it is the United 
Nations authorized economic sanctions that can truly be called ‘the most important 
method among all the sanctions that might be imposed on a state’.528 Quoting the 
stipulations of chapter 7 of this statute, the UNSC has the right to ‘decide what measures 
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its 
decisions……these may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and 
the severance of diplomatic relations’.529 In other words, it is true that the drafters did 
not straightly elucidate the hierarchy of those non-forcible measures within the 
framework of the UNCSS. Nevertheless, the economic elements still account for an 
overwhelming proportion that is far beyond the proportion of the diplomatic elements 
in the non-exhausted list of specific measure given by this provision.530  
Exploring the root of this arrangement, it is clear that this measure has initially replaced 
the indirect reduction of the diplomatic reputation of the targeted states with the direct 
deprivation of the economic interests of those states. Then, it has also replaced the 
passive ‘written statement’ with active substantial sanctions (e.g. ‘interruptions of 
economic relations’).531 From a realistic perspective, therefore, the United Nations 
authorized economic sanctions can not only overcome some of the drawbacks of the 
diplomatic measures, but can also establish a ‘middle ground’ between ‘force’ and 
‘peace’.532 As the result, from the successive past cases since 1945 until today, it can 
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be seen that the United Nations authorized economic sanctions have gradually become 
a notable and widely applied ‘weapon’ of the UNCSS. On this basis, they have naturally 
acquired the opportunity to handle the various severe international disputes, including 
territorial disputes.533 
1. The practical records of the United Nations authorized economic sanctions. 
As with its parent mechanism, the early years of the United Nations authorized 
economic sanctions were not memorable. As afore-mentioned, although the UN Charter 
denied the legality of the so-called ‘hot wars’,534 but in virtue of the veto power of the 
P5, the outbreak of the Cold War immediately after the founding of the United Nations 
still paralyzed the entire UNCSS. 535  Consequently, the United Nations authorized 
economic sanctions were activated only twice from 1945 to 1990, in both cases in 
respect to the domestic racist regimes of South Africa and South Rhodesia respectively. 
Additionally, with regard to the narrow field of territorial disputes, merely in the latter 
case did the UNCSS indirectly offered limited assist to the independence of Namibia. 
This was a special case, however, with only a limited territorial component in the terms 
meant by this thesis, and there was no lack of certain details which had ‘threatened’ or 
‘breached’ international peace and security in this case (see above). 536  More 
disappointedly, during the Korean War while the absence of the USSR from the voting 
procedure briefly untied the UNSC, this institution even skipped the option of economic 
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sanctions, and move straight to sending the ’United Nations Forces’ to the war zone.537 
Entering the 1990s, the end of the Cold War finally gave the United Nations a chance 
to break free from being ‘a tool of superpower’ for the first time in its lifetime. 
Meanwhile, the rapid formation of the new world order in which the Western Bloc held 
the dominant position also permitted the UNCSS to shortly regain its vitality. 538 
Affected by these new alterations, since the end of the Cold War, the frequency of the 
application of the United Nations authorized economic sanctions has increased, and 
their content has also broadened. In recent years, therefore, the UNCSS has developed 
some noticeable experience in the practical application of economic sanctions in respect 
to various international disputes other than territorial disputes539- 
According to the statistics calculated by Cortright and several other scholars, from 
around 1990 to 2006, the UNSC had already imposed dozens of economic sanctions 
involving arms embargo, traffic blockade, freezing of assets and restriction of trading 
activities upon over 10 states. Thanks to these sanctions, the appropriate settlement of 
many cases which used to threaten international peace and security, including the 
Lockerbie bombing, the coup d’état in Haiti and the civil war in Angola, had been 
promoted.540 Furthermore, with the subsequent economic sanctions imposed on the 
Ahmadinejad regime of Iran, the Gaddafi regime of Libya and the Kim regime of North 
Korea, the use of this measure has continued to grow since then.541  
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However, despite this apparently encouraging trend in terms of handling other 
international disputes, the United Nations authorized economic sanctions have not had 
much success in respect to latest territorial disputes. On the contrary, this measure has 
even caused a number of obvious problems in the relevant practice:542 
Firstly, comparing to its repeated appearances in other international disputes, economic 
sanctions have only been used occasionally in territorial disputes after the 1990s, such 
as in the case of the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait and that between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. Meanwhile, even in the limited opportunities to show their usefulness, this 
measure has had a tendency to create new troubles, such as the ‘humanitarian crisis’ in 
Iraq partly caused by the economic sanctions against the Saddam regime.543 Besides, it 
is worth mentioning that the Iraq case is also one that initially began with territorial 
dispute, but soon turned to other controversies (e.g. the WMDs). Objectively speaking, 
considering the date of adoption of resolution 687 of the UNSC and the details of this 
case which occurred soon afterwards, it can be said that the starting point and the focus 
of this particular economic sanction were not in respect to the same matter.544 
Secondly, comparing to its successful appearances in other international disputes, 
economic sanctions cannot guarantee the ‘maintenance or restoration of international 
peace and security’ in territorial disputes. Taking the two above-stated cases as an 
example, during the Eritrean–Ethiopian War, Ethiopia actually annihilated more 
Eritrean troops and occupied more disputed territories after the adoption of resolution 
1298 of the UNSC.545 Similarly, during the Gulf Crisis, Iraq continued to prepare for 
the upcoming war after the adoption of resolution 661 of the UNSC, plus it also formally 
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annexed Kuwait where it deployed dozens of its army divisions in this short period.546 
More seriously, even if the author taking the delay caused by the characters of the 
subjects of territorial disputes into account, the long-term effect of economic sanctions 
may still be as unpleasant as their short-term effect. For instance, although both Ethiopia 
and Eritrea are among the ‘least developed states’, but more than ten years after the 
United Nations started to intervene, they were still fighting each other along their border 
(see below). Similarly, it is true that an economic downturn can undermine the potential 
for the territorial expansion of a state. However, as the Iraq-Kuwait dispute shows, over 
ten years after the initiation of the economic sanctions, the Iraqi army which was 
directly responsible for breaching international peace and security could still play a non-
ignorable role in the Iraq War in 2003.547 
Thirdly, while economic sanctions have been generally fairly applied in cases related to 
‘ordinary’ states, they are impotent in the face of the annexation of the territories of their 
neighbours by the superpowers. Therefore, the use of this measure in such cases could 
result in the rapid deterioration of the ‘international peace and security’ situation of the 
disputed regions (e.g. Crimea).548 Indeed, if certain key regional powers, such as Israel 
or India/Pakistan, have gained the support of superpowers, then it is usually also 
impossible to apply United Nations authorized economic sanctions against their 
territorial annexations. A clear example here is the stalemate in the Middle East. 
Although Israel has occupied the territories of its neighbors for a long time, but owing 
to the objection of the USA, the ‘United Nations authorized economic sanctions against 
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Israel’ appealed by the Arabs have never come true.549 
Facing such a chequered history of performance, the real ability of the United Nations 
authorized economic sanctions to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’ 
has certainly been questioned by the related scholars.550 For instance, as an American 
scholar, Bennis once claimed that a series of recent cases related to territorial disputes 
(e.g. the Gulf War) had proven that the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS only served 
the interests of ‘the United States and its allies’.551 In other words, even in the eyes of 
some scholars from the Western superpowers, the function of economic sanctions has 
deviated from the predetermined purposes of the UNCSS. 
2. The inherent disadvantages of the United Nations authorized economic 
sanctions in respect to territorial disputes. 
Refining the discussion of the above paragraphs, the United Nations authorized 
economic sanctions can be defined as a moderate type of ‘collective security’ measure 
which is not very popular in territorial disputes settlement. Additionally, there is no 
guarantee that this measure can maintain or restore ‘international peace and security’. 
Tracking its origin from the realistic perspective, despite the intrinsic problems suffered 
by all the UNCSS economic and diplomatic sanctions (e.g. they are slow to take effect, 
see below), it can be seen that economic sanctions themselves also have two particular 
disadvantages: 
Firstly, the United Nations authorized economic sanctions may easily impair the 
legal rights and interests of the civilians of the sanctioned states by mistake.  
In contrast to diplomatic measures which focus on ‘oral criticism’, the United Nations 
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authorized economic sanctions seek the ‘gradual paralysis’ of the economy and the 
livelihood of the civilians of the corresponding guilty parties. Thus in theory, the plain 
application of this measure may realistically undermine the ability of the sanctioned 
states to pursue their territorial expansion.552 Both Merrills and Farrell, however, have 
pointed out that owing to the fragile ability of ordinary people to protect themselves, 
compared to that of their rulers, the use of this measure might ‘(firstly victimize) the 
civilian population and not the government of the delinquent’. Besides, if taking the fact 
that the territorial disputes usually persist for years into account as well, then it should 
be admitted that the lengthy economic sanctions can easily push the civilians of the 
sanctioned states into a humanitarian crisis.553 
Using the case of Iraq as an example. The lengthy economic sanctions imposed by the 
UNSC on Iraq as a result of the invasion of Kuwait and thereafter the suspected 
development of WMDs by Iraq fully destroyed the ability for territorial expansion of 
the Saddam regime by obliterating 80% of Iraqi economy.554 However, due to the 
political structure of authoritative states, this punishment also led to a massive widening 
of the inequality in income and in quality of life between the innocent Iraqi citizens and 
the leaders of the Ba'ath Party. Until the eve of the outbreak of the Iraqi War in 2003, 
the civilians of Iraq could not even obtain sufficient medical products, whilst by using 
the imported goods and materials, Saddam was still enjoying a luxurious life in his 
palaces. Therefore, the United Nations authorized economic sanctions actually forced 
the UNSC to be criticized by the wider international community and several human 
rights organizations. To find a way out of this dilemma, the UNSC had to adopt a few 
opposite resolutions, and thus invented the compensative ‘Oil for Food’ programme 
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which undermined the power of the economic sanctions.555 
Secondly, the United Nations authorized economic sanctions may easily impair the 
legal rights and interests of the governments of the sanctioning states by mistake.  
In contrast to the forcible measures of the UNCSS, economic sanctions do not require 
the third parties of the various international disputes to make excessive compromise or 
sacrifice (see below). Hence, they can offset the apprehension of the sanctioning states 
on deeply intervening territorial disputes.556 Both Merrills and Farrell, however, have 
pointed out that owing to the multilateral nature of international commercial relations, 
the use of this measure might ‘(negatively) affecting not only the delinquent state, but 
also its trading partners’. In other words, as international economic interactions are not 
a unilateral phenomenon, the use of the economic weapon is indeed a double-edged 
sword. Besides, if taking the endurance of the subjects of territorial disputes into 
consideration, then it should be admitted that the governments of the sanctioning states 
often have no other choice but to ostensibly obey the UNCSS.557 
Using the case of Iraq as an example again. In March of 2000, the then trade minister 
of the Saddam clique, Salah, announced that the 10-years-long economic sanction 
imposed by the UNSC had caused Iraq to lose over 140 billion US dollars. Nevertheless, 
he simultaneously claimed that the world economy had also ‘suffered a total loss of over 
200 billion US dollars’. Thereinto, Russia had lost 40 US billion dollars, France had 
lost 35 billion US dollars, plus the USA, the UK and China had lost 25 billion US dollars 
respectively. Since Iraq was still the fourth largest oil exporter in the world with the fifth 
largest oil reserves even after the chaotic year of 2003, these figures listed by Salah was 
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probably not just a well-designed lie to intimidate the international community.558 
Consequently, just shortly after the Gulf Crisis, several allies of the USA had already 
started to request the termination of the economic sanctions against Iraq, as they did not 
want to be the injured third parties anymore.559 
3. Summary. 
In summary, the United Nations authorized economic sanctions are a non-forcible form 
of sanction but one which may inevitably hurt the third parties. This character not only 
has negatively affected their performance in territorial disputes, but also means that the 
international community must be cautious about applying them in practice. 
Undoubtedly, when making its decision on the basis of practicalities, no state is willing 
to be hurt for doing the right thing, not to mention that they are simply third parties 
which assist the UNCSS to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’. Under 
such a circumstance, the United Nations authorized economic sanctions certainly 
cannot be widely applied in the territorial disputes as understood in the context of this 
thesis. Moreover, this measure can hardly achieve the predetermined purposes of 
‘maintain or restore international peace and security’ of the UNCSS as well. 
5.1.3 The shared weaknesses of the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes settlement: a case study of the United Nations authorized non-
forcible sanctions against Ethiopia/Eritrea 
From the previous sections, it can be seen the United Nations authorized diplomatic 
sanctions and economic sanctions are two types of non-forcible, but imperfect measures 
of the UNCSS. In particular, the former is largely trapped by the form of ‘oral criticism’, 
the latter could hurt the innocent third parties, and such characters have disturbed the 
brilliant performance of these measures in territorial disputes. However, as stated earlier, 
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since the measures of same category might be mutually complementary, it is the shared 
weaknesses of all the non-forcible measures that might primarily hinder the successful 
use of this approach in territorial disputes.560 Besides, concerning the balance between 
the width and the depth of this thesis, the last two sub-sections have focused on broadly 
enumerating the records of applying the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes from the perspective of ‘collective security’. Hence, at the end of the 
first half, the present sub-section should focus on specifically examining the progress 
of applying the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS in territorial disputes from the 
perspective of ‘territorial disputes’.  
Therefore, in the last part that concerns the present issue, the author will arrange a 
detailed case study on one relevant case, so as to more thoroughly reveal the shared 
weaknesses of the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS. In terms of selecting the 
suitable incident, as one of the two recent territorial disputes which is related to both of 
the two non-forcible measures of the UNCSS, the Eritrean-Ethiopian War and its 
successive development in the next decade are undoubtedly a perfect choice.561 
1. Historical background. 
Throughout the African history of the 19th century, Ethiopia was a glorious name-it was 
one of the few surviving independent states.562 In contrast, from the 16th century to the 
end of the 19th century, the region of Eritrea on the western coast of the Red Sea was 
continuously under the control of the Ottoman Empire. Afterwards, with the decline of 
the Ottoman Empire, Italian influence in the region started to increase from the 1880s, 
and it formally annexed this region and changed its status to an Italian colony in 1890. 
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Through this foothold in the Horn of Africa, Italy repeatedly invaded Ethiopia during 
the next decade, yet it eventually met with a military disaster which was seldom seen in 
the colonial history of European states.563 
Entering the early 20th Century, the exhausted Italians were forced to sign a series of 
treaties which defined the border line between Ethiopia and Eritrea with the 
Ethiopians.564 However, Italy did not abandon its hope of annexing Ethiopia, and the 
substance of these treaties was deliberately simple and unclear, so that they had stored 
up hidden troubles for future territorial disputes.565 In 1936, the regime of Mussolini 
eventually occupied Ethiopia in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War. For convenience of 
colonial management, the main body of Ethiopia was divided into four governorates of 
the Italian East Africa, and the remaining Ethiopian lands were given to Italian Eritrea 
and Somalia.566 
During and after the WWII, Ethiopia and Eritrea freed themselves from the control of 
Italy, respectively. The former regained its independence early in 1941, and the latter 
was put under the administration of the UK, waiting for the decision of the international 
community regarding its future status. 567  In 1952, based on the suggestion of the 
UNGA, Ethiopia and Eritrea formed a united federation, and their border line was set 
back to its old status in 1935, before the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.568 Unfortunately, 
such an arrangement ignored the disparity between the national strength of Ethiopia and 
that of Eritrea, and it also ignored the independent will of the Eritreans. Thus, even from 
its date of birth, this federation had already bogged down in crisis. In 1962, Ethiopia 
declared the abolishment of the federal system, and Eritrea accordingly became the 14th 
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province of Ethiopia.569 
Undoubtedly, this new system was inherently unstable. One after another, the Eritreans 
established numerous armed groups which devoted themselves to the national liberation 
movement, while in Ethiopia, the coup d’état in 1974 initiated the Ethiopian Civil War 
which would last until 1991.570 During this lengthy struggle, the opposition movements 
within Ethiopia/Eritrea reached a consensus on allowing the local Eritreans to hold a 
referendum after the overthrow of the dictatorial Mengistu regime.571 Accordingly, in 
April of 1993, under the agreement of the new government of Ethiopia and the 
supervision of the United Nations, Eritrea ended its nearly 60-years-long history of 
being subsumed within Ethiopia. Simultaneously, the territorial issue which was left 
behind by the colonial days was put back on the negotiating table by this 
independence:572 
Firstly, it was true that during the Ethiopian Civil War, the opposition faction of Ethiopia 
and the national liberation movement of Eritrea had reached an agreement to use the 
existing provincial border line as their post-war border. 573  Nevertheless, such an 
idealistic design did not survive the disappearance of their common enemy. Indeed, as 
two newly formed governments which still had to stabilize their dominance, the current 
ruling groups of either Ethiopia or Eritrea certainly could ill-afford any compromise left 
over by history. 
Secondly, from the end of the civil war in 1991 until 1997, the governments of the two 
states established several special committees in succession, as they sought to settle their 
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territorial dispute via various peaceful measures.574 Regretfully, although both of them 
were willing to handle the potential crisis in conformity of law, the legal materials 
available to them were still those treaties/agreements concluded between Italy and 
Ethiopia over 90 years ago. As aforementioned, the substance of these documents was 
too simple and unclear, meaning that the governments of the two parties could interpret 
them in their own national interests. Therefore, the advisors from the special committees 
could not persuade the parties to accept any solution which was only drafted on the 
basis of the original words of the treaties/agreements. Meanwhile, the failure of the 
diplomatic units had retroactively led to the further deterioration of the situation.575 
Thirdly, as well as the disputed national interests, the private background of the senior 
leaders of the two sides also militated against agreement in respect to the disputed 
border. On the one hand, the former opposition group that won the Ethiopia Civil War 
originated from the north of this state, and the hometown of their president, Meles, was 
located in the Tigray province which contained much of the disputed territories.576 On 
the other hand, as the ‘North Korea of Africa’, the dictator of Eritrea, Isaias, also 
desperately needed to use the disputed territories to strengthen his domestic and 
international authority.577 In other words, even if the work of the special committees 
was productive, their achievements still could hardly escape from the fate of being 
rejected by the relevant leaders. 
As a result, the efforts of Ethiopia and Eritrea to peacefully settle their territorial dispute 
eventually came to a dead end after nearly seven years of delay. In May of 1998, the 
Eritrean army marched into the most controversial Badme region, thus initiating the 
Eritrean-Ethiopian War.578 One week later, when Ethiopia started its counter-attack, the 
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territorial dispute between these two states formally turned into an armed conflict 
without declaration of war. On June 5th, the air force of Ethiopia attacked the capital 
airport of Eritrea, and in response, the Eritrean army soon bombed the hub airports of 
Northern Ethiopia as well. The attack launched by the two parties on each other’s 
civilian facilities eventually made international intervention inevitable.579 
2. The performance of the UNCSS. 
An armed conflict between two of the least developed states in a region lacking in 
natural resources was definitely not an ideal environment for United Nations 
intervention, yet the reaction of the UNSC was not slow at all.580 On June 26th, the 
UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1177 which openly condemned the use of force 
by both Ethiopia and Eritrea, and urged the two parties to settle their territorial dispute 
peacefully.581 Afterwards, the two belligerent state welcomed the intervention of the 
United Nations respectively, and the disputed territories began to enter a ‘quiet period’, 
which it can be argued was a result of the nature of the non-forcible measures of the 
UNCSS:582  
Firstly, as an international organization which was established in 1945, the most 
essential aim of the United Nations was to prevent or suppress the recurrence of the 
illegal territorial expansion conducted by the former ‘enemy states’, such as Germany, 
Italy and Japan. Correspondingly, the escalation of the territorial dispute between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea brought this case clearly within the natural scope of jurisdiction of 
this essential aim.583 Secondly, as a type of international security mechanism which 
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emphasizes the principle of unanimity, the bane of the UNCSS has been the deliberate 
resistance or ignorance of any member of the P5. Correspondingly, in this case none of 
the P5 had any perceived vital interests at stake that would cause them to stand in the 
way of the operation of the UNCSS, as the warring parties were two agriculture-based 
states of the Horn of Africa.584 Thirdly, as a set of non-forcible measures that contains 
several types of side-effect, the fundamental challenge in respect to activating the 
diplomatic/economic sanctions of the UNCSS is to ensure that the estimated gains must 
surpass or offset the estimated losses. Correspondingly, there was no doubt that neither 
Ethiopia nor Eritrea had the ability to resist or even reject international sanctions.585  
Regretfully, despite these positive conditions, the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS 
were still unable to settle the territorial issue between the two parties in the subsequent 
practice. Using the opportunity offered by the armistice period, Ethiopia and Eritrea 
respectively finished the mobilization of their various resources and resumed their 
military actions in early 1999. This in turn forced the UNSC to initiate a new round of 
non-forcible sanctions: 
From February of 1999, Ethiopia restarted its attack, with the war spreading to the 
Eritrea’s midlands, where used to be less controversial.586 For more than a year after 
this, Ethiopia pretended to be willing to negotiate with Eritrea, whilst it used old-
fashioned ‘trench warfare’ to wear down Eritrea in tandem with gradually building up 
more military resources of its own. On May 12th of 2000, the well-prepared Ethiopian 
army suddenly started a new general offensive operation, and quickly pierced through 
the defensive line of the Eritrean army. Thereby, the direct intervention of the UNCSS 
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now became pressing.587 
On May 18th of 2000, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1298, which formally 
initiated economic sanctions against Ethiopia and Eritrea. According to the wording of 
this resolution, every member state of the United Nations must stop to ‘sale or 
supply……arms and related material of all types…… (or provide) technical assistance 
or training related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items 
(above)’ to the belligerent states. In short, since both Ethiopia and Eritrea were lacking 
in military industrial capacity, the UNSC wanted to force the two states to disengage 
each other by effecting an arms embargo.588 
Ironically, only one week after the adoption of resolution 1298, the Ethiopian army 
started its largest full-attack on Eritrea, using its existing materials in storage. On May 
24th, the Ethiopian army completely destroyed the main force of the Eritrean army after 
two days of fighting, and even began to threaten the outskirts of the capital of Eritrea. 
By the end of May, Ethiopia had occupied almost all the disputed territories, and then 
announced that it would suspend its military action. Simultaneously, Ethiopia even 
made the gesture of making compromise right in front of the UNSC, offering to retreat 
to the line of actual control of May 6th, 1998 provided that Eritrea stop intimidating 
Ethiopia by threatening to use its armed forces.589 
In early June of 2000, the envoys of Ethiopia and Eritrea returned to the negotiating 
table for the third time in the past two years. On June 18th, exactly one month after the 
adoption of resolution 1298, the two parties reached a settlement, in which they agreed 
to cease fire and submit their territorial dispute to the PCA. On July 31st, the UNSC 
adopted resolution 1312, through which it established a security zone along the two 
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sides of the entire length of the disputed borderline, and decided to deploy the UNMEE 
to separate the armies of the two parties. On December 12th, the ministers of foreign 
affairs of the two parties formally signed the Algiers Agreement which aimed at 
peacefully settling the subsequent issues, the Eritrean-Ethiopian War was thus brought 
to an end.590 
With the signing of the peace agreement and the submission of the case to the PCA, it 
seemed that the international community could believe that the ‘international peace and 
security’ of the Horn of Africa had been restored. On May 15th 2001, the UNSC 
terminated the economic sanctions against Ethiopia and Eritrea imposed by resolution 
1298 in the form of a presidential statement.591 However, to the surprise of the United 
Nations, the intervention of the international judicial institutions and the United Nations 
peacekeeping forces not only did not help to settle this territorial dispute in the long 
term. On the contrary, this arrangement even further promoted the mutual hostility 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea: 
In terms of peaceful measures, on April 13th of 2002, the arbitration committee delivered 
its award which was meant to be legally binding. According to its plan, the disputed 
territories would be divided equally between the two parties, but the key region of 
Badme would be put under the sovereignty of Eritrea.592 Naturally, such an award 
which attempted to implement ‘egalitarianism’ was quite provocative to Ethiopia. For 
more than two years after this, the government of Ethiopia repeatedly sought to overturn 
the judgment of the arbitration committee. It was only in early December 2005 that 
Ethiopia, under pressure from the international community, gradually started to 
withdraw its armed forces from the disputed territories that it had occupied.593 
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Nevertheless, just three weeks after Ethiopia started to soften its attitude, a subsidiary 
department of the PCA found that the Eritrea had in fact started the original attack in 
1998, thus it violated international law before its opponent.594 Taking advantage of this 
opportunity, Ethiopia sent its troops back to the disputed territories, whilst the Eritrean 
army which had been reorganized in the preceding five years also actively prepared to 
fight back. Consequently, for nearly the next ten years until the 2010s, although the 
officials of the United Nations warned that they might reactivate the economic sanctions, 
but small-scale skirmishes between the two parties continued.595 
In terms of the UNCSS, at the end of July of 2000, the UNMEE was formally deployed 
in the security zone along the borderline between Ethiopia and Eritrea. According to 
resolution 1320 of the UNSC, the major mission of this operation was to monitor the 
ceasefire and separate the armies of the two parties, so as to create a positive 
environment for the application of the peaceful measures.596 Therefore, after Ethiopia 
had announced that it would accept the award of the arbitration committee, the UNMEE 
began to cut down the number of its peacekeepers from mid-December of 2005.597 
However, after the resumption of the military confrontation between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, the prospect of the UNMEE started to make a turn in the course of this event. 
Eritrea, being disappointed in the United Nations peacekeeping operations, began to 
refuse to provide fuel for UNMEE patrols, and Ethiopia kept its silence like a bystander. 
By February of 2008, the remaining peacekeepers were forced to withdraw from the 
security zone due to the lack of fuel. Five months later, the UNSC decided to end the 
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mission of the UNMEE by adopting resolution 1827, thus leaving the field open for the 
approximately 200,000 troops of Ethiopia and Eritrea to continue to fight their small-
scale skirmishes along the disputed borderline.598 
Besides, it should be mentioned that on July 9th of 2018, when the draft of this thesis 
had already been finished, Ethiopia and Eritrea suddenly signed a joint declaration 
seeking to settle their territorial dispute through cooperation. Based on the consent of 
the heads of state of the two parties, the award of the arbitration committee would be 
effectively implemented, whilst their political and economic interaction would also 
return to normal.599 Nonetheless, this occurred more than fifteen years after the signing 
of the Algiers Agreement and the delivery of the award of the arbitration committee. In 
addition, there was also a remarkable gap of ten years between this moment and the end 
of the mission of the UNMEE. This joint declaration could therefore be seen as a victory 
gained by the direct communication between the governments of the two parties, but 
not as a success of the intervention of any third party. Of course, the relevant 
international judicial institutions did provide the authoritative references and legal basis 
for handling this case, and the objective value of their intervention deserved to be 
affirmed and praised. 
3. Assessment and Analysis. 
Taking a panoramic view of the journey of the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS in 
the Ethiopia-Eritrea territorial dispute, their function of containing large-scale 
international warfare should surely be appreciated. Unfortunately, however, the United 
Nations authorized diplomatic/economic sanctions failed to achieve their predetermined 
purposes of ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’. Additionally, these 
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measures did not independently lead the various parties to follow the path of peacefully 
settling territorial disputes as well. Furthermore, Ethiopia even gained its decisive 
victory after the adoption of resolution 1298 of the UNSC, whilst Eritrea launched its 
own ‘economic sanctions’ against the UNMEE after the end of the real economic 
sanctions. Regarding the origins of such performance from the realistic perspective, 
despite the individual shortages of the various non-forcible measures, there are several 
following weaknesses shared by the diplomatic sanctions and the economic sanctions 
that might also be blamed: 
Firstly, the intensity of punishment of the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS is 
comparatively moderate.  
Analyzing the known details of the case, it can be seen that the emergence of this 
shortcoming is directly caused by the character of the objects of territorial disputes. On 
one hand, the status of territories and the various values possessed by territories mean 
that the relevant parties are usually willing to pay a high price before considering their 
abandonment (see 3.1.2). On the other hand, limited by the idea of ‘non-violence’, the 
diplomatic measures normally just focus on undermining the reputation of the guilty 
parties, whilst the economic measures would selectively focus on a particular field of 
economy. Therefore, it seems that the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS may good 
at handling other international disputes. However, when facing the proprietorship of 
several territories that have a high cost-performance ratio, these measures could 
frequently end up with no significant impact on the case at all. 
Taking the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea as an example. Through 
invading and occupying all the disputed territories, the two parties could at least acquire 
the following noticeable profits- 
Firstly, as afore-mentioned, the Tigray province which contained most of the disputed 
territories were the birth-land and base camp of the current ruling party of Ethiopia, 
whilst Eritrea also had a typical dictatorial regime. Thus, the capture of the disputed 
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territories could either improve the internal unity of the leaders of Ethiopia, or promote 
the prestige of the leaders of Eritrea. In other words, no matter which party had 
controlled the disputed territories, it could always use them as an effective tool for 
stabilizing its domestic dominance.600 
Secondly, as afore-mentioned, technically speaking, this case was a competition 
between the border line of the Italian colonies and the border line of the provinces of 
the former Ethiopian Empire. Thus, although the common people might have limited 
consciousness of this, to the social elite of the two parties, this territorial dispute could 
easily be turned into a serious issue of nationalism. In other words, the sovereign 
ownership of the disputed territories related to this case not only could determine the 
unity of the relevant leaders, but could also determine the popularity of the two 
governments among their social elite (Not to mention the reality that due to the level of 
education of the least developed states, it can be said that gaining the support of the rare 
social elite is more crucial than gaining the internal unity of the leaders over there).601 
Thirdly, although the two parties had little status or influence internationally, Ethiopia 
was still a regional power of East Africa, whilst its capital city was also the seat of the 
headquarters of the AU. Thus, unlike the newly independent Eritrea, Ethiopia had a 
certain regional status to live up to, and also faced historic threats from other neighbours 
(e.g. Somalia, see the history of the Ogaden War602). In other words, maybe the loss of 
the Badme region would not severely undermine the inherent national strength of 
Ethiopia, its inability to suppress the weakest neighbor might encourage the territorial 
ambitions of its other neighbors.603 Likewise, if Eritrea chose simply to concede the 
disputed territories to Ethiopia in its first international dispute after its independence, 
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then it could hardly deter its other neighbours from imitating the act of Ethiopia in later 
similar cases.604 
Under the influence of these multi-level problems, it was unsurprising that Ethiopia and 
Eritrea would be unmoved by the oral criticism and written statements issued by the 
United Nations. More seriously, since resolution 1298 focused only on an arms embargo 
because it took the livelihood of the common people into account, the pressure imposed 
by the one-year-long economic sanctions was not completely intolerable. Consequently, 
the reaction of the two parties upon resolutions 1177 and 1298 was to follow a path of 
only ostensible obedience. In addition, after the end of the arms embargo, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea resumed their military confrontation within the disputed area.605 Furthermore, 
although the UNSC had threatened to reactivate economic sanctions, this could only 
help to avoid large-scale war, whilst the small-scale armed conflicts between the two 
parties continued to recur until the 2010s.606 
Secondly, the speed at which the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS take effect 
is comparatively slow. 
Analyzing the known details of the case, it can be seen that the emergence of this 
shortcoming is jointly caused by the character of the subjects of territorial disputes (see 
3.1.2). On one hand, the comprehensive strength of a state in different sorts of fields 
can usually guarantee the basic endurance of those parties while they are defending the 
territories claimed by them.607 On the other hand, the relative powerlessness of the 
measures effected by the non-forcible measures can actually bolster the confidence of 
the parties, and over time, they can actually become more inured to them (see above). 
Therefore, it may seem that the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS are vigorous at 
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handling weaker states in territorial disputes, but while dealing with stronger states, they 
are rather less effective. 
Taking the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea as an example. Although 
both parties were least developed states, but in the years around the beginning of the 
21st century, their armies and national strength definitely were capable of sustaining a 
significant military engagement- 
On the one hand, Ethiopia deployed a total of over 300,000 troops in the relevant large-
scale offensive operations, and it also deployed a few hundred pieces of heavy weapons, 
including main battle tanks and advanced jet fighters. Thanks to its military capacity, 
during and after the period of economic sanctions, Ethiopia could continuously station 
its armed forces in the disputed territories for five years.608 On the other hand, as the 
weaker party, Eritrea had also mobilized more than ten divisions of armed forces in 
practice, and it could maintain an uninterrupted battle line even after it had lost 
thousands of soldiers. Thanks to its military capacity, during and after the period of 
economic sanctions, Eritrea could reorganize its troops as well, and this army once kept 
an authorized strength of more than 250,000 servicemen.609 
Safeguarded by the above-mentioned conditions, Ethiopia and Eritrea were surely 
capable of enduring the economic sanctions which only had a ‘moderate intensity of 
punishment’, not to mention the less powerful diplomatic sanctions. As a result, whilst 
the international community had not yet even got enough time to make a list of the 
prohibited weapons, Ethiopia had already won its decisive victory in the next two weeks 
after the adoption of resolution 1298.610 Besides, as a similar but more typical case, in 
the roughly six months from the adoption of resolutions 660/661 of the UNSC to the 
outbreak of the Gulf War, the international community had enough time to exert 
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comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq. However, during this period, the Saddam 
regime not only did not show any sign of decline, but it completed the legal procedure 
of annexing Kuwait in an orderly way, plus it had arranged its preparation for war 
against the Coalition. In fact, Iraq only approved the ‘Oil-for-Food’ programme which 
symbolized that it could not endure the economic sanctions anymore in May 1996, after 
various sorts of unnecessary delay.611 
Thirdly, the execution of non-forcible measures of the UNCSS is comparatively 
depending on the private will (and coordination) of a few particular member states 
of the United Nations.  
Analyzing the details of the case that are already known, it can be seen that the 
emergence of this shortcoming is indirectly caused by the privilege of some third parties 
of territorial disputes. On the one hand, the veto power of the P5 of the UNSC can 
determine the activation or de-activation of the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS.612 
On the other hand, the total volume of international trade of the P5 can also determine 
the effectiveness of non-forcible measures, especially the economic sanctions imposed 
by the UNCSS.613 Therefore, while the proper fulfillment of the principle of unanimity 
may guarantee the adoption of resolutions 1177/1298, in practice the non-forcible 
measures of the UNCSS could still be failed by the attitude of a few particular states 
(e.g. the P5). 
Taking the Eritrean-Ethiopian War and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 as 
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a combined example. Comparing the nature of the corresponding guilty parties, it can 
be seen that when facing an ‘unordinary’ state with a special international status, the 
officials of the United Nations at least need to face three levels of difficulties:  
Firstly, Eritrea/Ethiopia were common member states of the United Nations, but Russia 
was one of the P5. Thus, despite their unilateral acts in practice, the former must 
welcome the intervention of the United Nations. In contrast, as long as the value of the 
new territories could meet with the psychological bottom-line of Russia, its veto power 
would certainly hamstring any hope of activating United Nations authorized non-
forcible sanctions.614  
Secondly, Ethiopia was regional powers of the most impoverished continent, and Eritrea 
was a new state then, but Russia was widely recognized as the qualified successor of a 
former superpower. Thus, as long as the value of the new territories could meet with the 
psychological bottom-line of Russia, its resistance against any external intervention 
would certainly dwarf the resistance of Ethiopia/Eritrea against an arms embargo.615  
Thirdly, Ethiopia/Eritrea were least developed states which had not participated in any 
military-political alliance, but Russia had a stable sphere of influence which covered a 
large part of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In addition, it also had some strong 
economic allies, such as China which was also a member of the P5 and the second 
largest economy in the world. Thus, as long as the value of the new territories could 
meet with the psychological bottom-line of Russia, it certainly had the ability to ensure 
that half of the entire Eurasia would be reluctant to support any non-forcible sanction.616  
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For these various reasons, Ethiopia and Eritrea were punished by the arms embargo 
imposed by the UNCSS, whilst Russia was merely affected by the unilateral sanctions 
imposed by few states of the Western Bloc. 617  As the result, while the relevant 
skirmishes continued to recur, the arms embargo at least made Ethiopia and Eritrea 
partially restrained their military actions. On the contrary, although it seemed that 
Russia was eager to improve the relationship between itself and the Western states, it 
never showed any intention of returning Crimea to Ukraine under a wider economic 
sanction. Thereby, the political mutual trust that was essential to the improvement of 
the above bilateral relations could not be decisively promoted.618 
4. Summary. 
In summary, the Eritrean-Ethiopian War and the subsequent development of this case 
have completely exposed multiple shared weaknesses of the non-forcible measures of 
the UNCSS. Realistically speaking, the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS not only 
lack in sufficient mandatory power and efficiency, but also lack in the necessary 
autonomy. Therefore, the United Nations authorized diplomatic/economic sanctions 
cannot always suppress the resistance of the subjects of territorial disputes, nor can they 
offset the value of the objects of territorial disputes. Thus, these measures can hardly 
achieve the predetermined purposes of the UNCSS by themselves. On this account, the 
parties of the various international disputes in the modern international community 
would definitely demand the non-forcible measures to be supplemented by other more 
effective measures. Specifically within the framework of the UNCSS, such a 
requirement would naturally endow the forcible measures of the UNCSS with the 
necessary space of performance. According to the outline of this thesis, these are set to 
be the topic of the next part of this chapter. 
5.2 The performance of the forcible measures of the UNCSS in territorial disputes 
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5.2.1 The theoretical role and practical records of the United Nations authorized 
military enforcement actions in territorial disputes settlement 
Within the legal system of the UN Charter, which places so much emphasis on the 
prohibition of the use of force, the United Nations authorized military enforcement 
actions are one of only two existing legal justifications for the use of force that can be 
cited by any sovereign state (including non-member states of the United Nations619).620 
In addition, this measure is also the only purely violent sanction that is directly 
controlled by the UNSC in person621. According to the concise wording of chapter 7 of 
this statute, if the UNSC has confirmed that there is ‘any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression’ in any international dispute, and its decision-makers 
have enough evidence to believe that ‘measures not involving the use of armed force’ 
are still not enough for turning the trend of deterioration around, then it may apply ‘such 
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security’. In details, the specific measures of intervention include 
demonstration and blockade by air, sea, or land forces of member states of the United 
Nations, or ‘other operations’, which are described ambiguously.622  
As a result of such an original design, at least realistically speaking, the authoritative 
institutions of the UNCSS have no other measures available to them that are stricter 
than United Nations authorized military action.623 Therefore, as the last resort available 
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to the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, there is 
no doubt that military enforcement actions would only be activated in the most serious 
international crises.624 In turn, although they are the primary cause of most of the 
international armed conflicts ever since the era of the Peace of Westphalia, territorial 
disputes have only twice activated this measure in the 70-years-long history of the 
United Nations.625 
1. The first practical records of the United Nations authorized military 
enforcement actions. 
Checking the early history of the UNCSS, the first use of the United Nations authorized 
military enforcement actions in the context of a territorial dispute took place in the 
Korean Peninsula in the 1950s.626 Soon after the end of the WWII, on the basis of the 
secret terms that was concluded during the Yalta Conference, the two superpowers then, 
namely the USA and the USSR, divided and occupied the Korean Peninsula which used 
to be a Japanese colony.627 Subsequently, these superpowers respectively supervised 
the establishment of the two regimes of North Korea and South Korea, with the 38th 
parallel serving as their line of demarcation. Thereby, the tragic separation of the once 
united race, nation and culture within the area of the old Kingdom of Korea had been 
manually created.628  
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However, under the pressure of the ideological and strategic competition between the 
Eastern and the Western Blocs during the Cold War, such a careless arrangement was 
inherently unstable and indeed lasted for less than 5 years. After the establishment of 
the two antagonistic governments, the Kim Il-Sung regime and the Syngman Rhee 
regime immediately claimed that they would ‘recover’ all the territories of their 
opponent in separate announcements. Therefrom, these twin brothers started a series of 
cross-border armed skirmishes which were accompanied by an intense arms race, and 
gradually fell into the unpredictable abyss of a civil war.629 In the early morning of June 
25th of 1950, the well-prepared North Korean People’s Army suddenly attacked and 
totally defeated the chaotic resistance of the unprepared and ill-trained South Korean 
Army. Then, while planting the responsibility of provocation on the South Koreans in 
retreat, the government of North Korea openly declared that it shall ‘complete the re-
unification of our motherland before the 5th anniversary of the Liberation Day on 
August 15th’.630  
Fortunately, although it was ruthlessly tested by an unexpected large-scale war, but the 
young UNSC and the UNCSS under its command were not frozen by the veto power of 
the P5 at this time. In protest at the fact that the Chinese seat was still being occupied 
by the nationalist government of China which had recently lost the Chinese Civil War, 
the Soviet representative was deliberately boycotting the voting procedure of the UNSC 
in the midyear of 1950.631 Thanks to this special condition, this institution quickly came 
to a unanimous response, and adopted an incredibly tough attitude towards the North 
Koreans:  
Firstly, on the very evening when the then Secretary-General of the United Nations 
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received the urgent report about the Korean situation that was passed on to him by the 
US officials, the UNSC passed the admonitory resolution 82. In this resolution, it urged 
the Kim Il-Sung regime to both stop the invasion which had formed ‘a breach of the 
peace’, and to retreat the North Korean Army back to its territories to the north of the 
38th parallel. Undoubtedly, such a purely diplomatic sanctionative measure could not 
achieve the predetermined purposes of the UNCSS in the field of territorial disputes. As 
it had just acquired a significant victory, North Korea chose to turn a deaf ear to ‘oral 
criticism’, and its army reached the suburbs of Seoul on June 26th.632  
Secondly, concerning the facts that the Kim Il-Sung regime ‘neither ceased hostilities 
nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel’, the UNSC successively passed 
the complementary resolution 83 on June 27th. In this resolution, it recommended the 
member states of the United Nations to ‘furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea 
as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and 
security in the area’. Thereby, the preparatory procedure for gathering necessary 
resources for the ‘urgent military measures’ was preliminarily activated. 633 
Undoubtedly, mobilizing large-scale armed forces on an inter-continental level takes 
time, so that the North Koreans still could not feel the power of the United Nations 
authorized military enforcement actions at that moment. On June 28th, the North Korean 
People’s Army captured Seoul, and later on July 5th, it even started to exchange fire with 
the advance task force of the American army.634 
Thirdly, facing now the facts that the army of the Kim Il-Sung regime was penetrating 
deeper into the territories of South Korea, on July 7th the UNSC passed the more 
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controversial resolution 84. In this resolution, it authorized the USA to take the 
responsibility of commanding ‘military forces and other assistance pursuant to the 
aforesaid Security Council resolutions……designate the commander of such 
forces……use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean 
forces’. Thereby, the pirated ‘United Nations Forces’ which not only lacked in the 
supervision of the affiliated organs of the United Nations,635 but also lacked in the 
command of the United Nations Military Staff Committee, was preliminarily 
invented.636 Nevertheless, no matter the ‘United Nations Forces’ were under the control 
of which third party, it was clear that the Kim Il-Sung regime was no longer unstoppable. 
At the end of July, the main units of the ‘United Nations Forces’ arrived at South Korea, 
and by early August, the North Korean People’s Army was stopped by its opponents at 
the Pusan Perimeter.637  
Consequently, relying on the comprehensive superiority of the nearly 900,000 soldiers 
sent by 17 participating states together, the ‘United Nations Forces’ overwhelmed the 
exhausted North Korean People’s Army in less than 3 months. On such a basis, this 
coalition had also largely recovered the entire original area of South Korea. 638 
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War: the Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (OUP 2008) 265 at 267-71; Li Tiechen
g & Deng Xiujie, A Short Course on the United Nations (Peking University Press 2015) 51. 
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45 & 192-93; with regard to the details of the allied forces of 17 countries, see United States 
Forces Korea, ‘United Nations Command’ (12 March 2013) <http://www.usfk.mil/About/United-
Nations-Command/> accessed 15 July 2016. 
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Afterwards, although the joint entry into battle of the ‘volunteer army’ of China and the 
USSR turned the Korean War into a direct conflict among the P5, but the frontline (later 
the demarcation line) between North Korea and South Korea was gradually 
stabilized.639 With the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement on July 27th of 1953, 
South Korea successfully retained most of its inherent territories, and the overall peace 
between the two sides along the 38th parallel was restored as well. Until the present 
2010s, this situation has been persisted for more than half a century, with merely 
occasional skirmishes between minor special forces on one hand, and peace 
negotiations between the two parties that have never been completely called-off, on the 
other.640 In other words, judging by the two above-mentioned purposes, it can be said 
that the intervention of the UNCSS upon the Korean War was generally successful. 
2. The second practical records of the United Nations authorized military 
enforcement actions. 
With the escalation and deadlock of the Korean War, the representative of the USSR 
returned to his permanent seat, and since then the UNSC has been trapped in a state of 
paralysis caused by the abuse of the veto power. As a result, the second occasion on 
which the United Nations authorized military enforcement action took place did not 
occur until the 1990s.641 As described above, the non-forcible sanctions failed to force 
the Iraqi army to retreat from the territories of Kuwait, merely serving to endow the 
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East: The Korean War (People’s Literature Publishing House 2009) chs 2-4; Max Hastings, The
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640 The total area of the Korean Peninsula is slightly smaller than the area of the UK, and its 
total population is approximately 75 million, but North Korea and South Korea have a combin
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nal Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2016 (Routledge 2016) ch 6; Wa
da Haruki, The Korean War: An International History (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2013) 
293-99 & 301-303. 
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invaders with a ‘window of opportunity’ to stabilize their newly conquered territories.642 
Fortunately, from the Operation Desert Shield to the Operation Desert Farewell, the 
United Nations authorized military enforcement actions rapidly liberated all the 
territories of Kuwait in just three months. In view of the outstanding importance of this 
case for research on the contemporary UNCSS and territorial disputes, the author plans 
to discuss it in detail in the following case study section, so it would be inappropriate to 
fully review it here. Nonetheless, it is still quite easy to notice that during the period of 
the Gulf War, the United Nations military enforcement actions had at least made two 
remarkable achievements- 
Firstly, although to a large extent, it was the successive economic sanctions which 
diminished the potential ability of Iraq to effect territorial expansion, the military 
enforcement action still directly wrecked the spearhead of the Saddam regime built for 
territorial expansion. During the relatively short 42-days-long Gulf War, the Coalition 
annihilated 38 divisions of the Iraqi Army, and completely destroyed the defensive 
system deployed in Southern Iraq.643 Under this circumstance, even if the mainland of 
Iraq was untouched, it had fallen into the awkward situation of being an abnormal state 
without basic national defence ability, making it much more difficult for it actively to 
threaten Kuwait again. 
Secondly, although Iraq only apologized to the government of Kuwait at the end of 2002, 
the so-called ‘territorial dispute’ was silently disappeared before then. During the 13-
year-long period from the withdrawal of the Coalition to the collapse of the Saddam 
regime, the Iraqi officials merely dared to curse Bush and the United Nations, but they 
had lost the courage to openly claim that Kuwait was a part of its inherent territories.644 
                                                        
642 For an overview of the Gulf Crisis before the forcible intervention of the Coalition Forces, 
see also James Cockayne & David M. Malone, ‘The Security Council and the 1991 and 2003 
Wars in Iraq’, in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh & Dominik Zaum (eds), The 
United Nations Security Council and War: the Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 
(OUP 2008) 384 at 385-88; Majid Khadduri & Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990-91: T
he Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications (OUP 2001) 122-31 & ch 9. 
643 William Thomas Allison, The Gulf War, 1990-91 (Palgrave 2012) chs 6-7. 
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Under this circumstance, while Iraq and Kuwait did not restart their peace negotiation 
or sign any agreement of demarcation after the initial armed conflict, the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Kuwait was still tacitly saved from further damage. 
From the above Discussion, it can be seen that judging by the afore-mentioned two 
purposes, the performance of the UNCSS in the Gulf War was still up to standard. After 
all, following the unilateral use of force by the Saddam regime, this mechanism did 
restore the ‘international peace and security’ of the region around the Persian Gulf. 
Regretfully, however, as mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this section, while the 
Korean War and the Gulf War are two famous cases, they are also isolated ones. Despite 
them, although the UNSC has authorized certain third parties to use force in other 
international disputes, such as Somalia and Libya, but the military enforcement actions 
against ‘acts of aggression by a state’ have never been reactivated to the present time.645 
Besides, by examining the relevant background, it also can be seen that no matter the 
cases of Somalia and Libya, or even the case of Former Yugoslavia, none of them are 
naturally land-territory disputes between member states of the United Nations.646 
3. The inherent disadvantages of the United Nations authorized military 
enforcement actions in respect to territorial disputes. 
In short, with regard to the accomplishment of the two predetermined purposes of the 
UNCSS in territorial disputes settlement, the effect of the United Nations authorized 
military enforcement actions has been comparatively significant. However, even such a 
rather useful measure is still not perfect, the fact that it has only been applied twice in 
over 70 years, is clearly not inadequate given that territorial disputes can be found 
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everywhere around the world. Tracking the causes of this shortage from the realistic 
perspective, it can be seen that in addition to the unique status of this measure as an ‘ace 
card’, its other features have also hindered it from making more of a contribution in 
territorial disputes:  
Firstly, the pre-conditions of the application of the United Nations authorized 
military enforcement actions are too hard to meet.  
Unlike other measures within the framework of the UNCSS, military enforcement 
actions usually involve the transnational combat deployment of thousands of troops and 
their equipment over a fairly lengthy period of time. Needless to say, no ordinary state 
can easily provide this grade of ‘Global Rapid Response Forces’.647 In addition, given 
that territorial disputes usually involve abundant values, complex situations and difficult 
compromises, the required strength of the armed forces prepared for this particular issue 
could be even more astonishing- 
Taking the USA which is widely recognized to have the strongest army as an example. 
The Korean War and the Gulf War led to the inter-continental maneuver of 697000 and 
302000 US armed forces respectively, and more than 10 other related states had also 
sent hundreds of thousands of servicemen together. In comparison, the total strength of 
the United Nations peacekeeping forces during the financial year 2015-16 was merely 
101600 soldiers from 121 countries (including just 68 Americans).648 Undoubtedly, 
since the relevant operations in respect to territorial disputes had limited connection 
with their private interests, it was quite hard for any third party to willingly provide such 
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a huge army to the UNCSS. 
Secondly, the mid-term expenses of the United Nations authorized military 
enforcement actions are too high to bear.  
Unlike other measures within the framework of the UNCSS, military enforcement 
actions usually involve the transnational financial costs of thousands of troops and their 
equipment over a fairly lengthy period of time. As an ancient Chinese proverb says, ‘a 
roar of the cannon means the waste of tons of gold’, no ordinary state can comfortably 
share this grade of budget.649 In addition, given that territorial disputes usually involve 
abundant values, complex situations and difficult compromises, the required amount of 
the mid-term expenses prepared for this particular issue could be even more 
astonishing- 
Taking the USA which is widely recognized to have the highest national strength as an 
example again. The Korean War and the Gulf War cost the US government two huge 
sums of 341 billion and 102 billion US dollars (2011 dollars) respectively. In 
comparison, the total budget of the 16 United Nations peacekeeping operations of the 
financial year 2015-16 was merely 8.27 billion US dollars (the USA itself accounted for 
28.38% of this cost650 ).651 Undoubtedly, since the relevant operations in respect to 
territorial disputes had limited connection with their private interests, it was also quite 
hard for any third party to willingly pay such a huge number of military expenses for 
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Thirdly, the subsequent hidden troubles left by the United Nations authorized 
military enforcement actions are too severe to accept. 
Unlike other measures within the framework of the UNCSS, military enforcement 
actions usually involve the transnational coercive punishment executed by thousands of 
armed personnel and their equipment over a fairly long period of time. Needless to say, 
no ordinary state can sincerely submit itself to this grade of ‘Big Stick Diplomacy (as 
described by Roosevelt)’.652 In addition, given that territorial disputes usually involve 
abundant values, complex situations and difficult compromises, the subsequent hidden 
troubles left by the process of handling this particular issue could be even more 
astonishing- 
For example, it is true that the major units of the ‘United Nations Command’ have 
already retreated from the peninsula, and there is no more large-scale armed conflict 
between South Korea and North Korea. Nevertheless, both parties are still claiming all 
the territories of each other. Similarly, although Iraq had stopped to publicly maintain 
its stance on Kuwait, the two parties only resumed official state visits between them 
after the collapse of the Saddam regime.653 Of course, these hidden troubles could not 
negatively influence the original effect of the sanctions imposed by the UNCSS. 
However, since decades later after the outbreak of the original armed conflicts, these 
dilemmas were still existing in the relevant regions, they might eventually affect the 
faith of the relevant parties on the UNCSS. 
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In summary, the United Nations authorized military enforcement actions are an option 
for settling territorial disputes that could provoke mixed feelings among the parties 
tasked with enforcing them or enduring them. They are completely capable of achieving 
the predetermined purposes of the UNCSS, but their relatively inferior price-
performance ratio has undermined the frequency and the prospect of their application. 
Therefore, the international community certainly need to explore new forcible measures 
within the framework of the UNCSS, and this has paved a way for the next research 
topic of this chapter-the United Nations peacekeeping operations. 
5.2.2 The theoretical role and practical records of the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations in territorial disputes settlement 
As is well-known in the relevant scholarship, the concept of United Nation 
peacekeeping operations does not exist in the UN Charter. Thus, they are not similar to 
any other measure for the settlement of international disputes that have been recorded 
by this Statute, and which have been discussed hitherto in this thesis.654 According to 
the standard definition given by ‘An Agenda for Peace’, the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations are indeed ‘the deployment of an United Nations presence in 
the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving 
United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-
keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict 
and the making of peace’. More concisely, the former Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, Hammarskjold, once compared this new-born object which hovered between 
the two key words of ‘war and peace’ to ‘operation chapter six and a half’. 655 
Realistically speaking, given that their origin and features are different from the other 
                                                        
654 Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams & Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (2nd edn, 
Polity 2010) 81-88; Hitoshi Nasu, International Law on Peacekeeping: A Study of Article 40 of
 the UN Charter (Brill 2009) 67-69. 
655 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (31 January 1992) UN Doc A/47/2
77-S/24111, para 20; John F. Hillen III, ‘UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and A Half’ (19
94) 24 (1) Parameters 27 at 28. 
199 
 
measures of the UNCSS, the United Nations peacekeeping operations and their ‘Blue 
Helmets’ do enjoy many advantages from their late-development: 
On one hand, this method is the only measure within the entire UNCSS that is purely 
based upon the existing experiences and lessons. In addition, unlike the ‘United Nations 
Forces’, the evolution of the ‘Blue Helmets’ in the past several decades also has not 
been bothered by the complicated procedure of amendment of the UN Charter.656 On 
the other hand, this method is the only measure within the entire UNCSS that has been 
able to merge violent and non-violent elements. In addition, in view of the tragic 
paralysis of the ‘United Nations Forces’ in the past several decades, it can be said that 
the ‘Blue Helmets’ have already become the de facto ‘ultimate ace’ of the UNCSS under 
normal circumstances.657  
Therefore, the United Nations peacekeeping operations would surely be used to 
constrain those severe international disputes, and the international community would 
certainly put great expectations on their effectiveness. 658  Specifically in terms of 
territorial disputes, by synthesizing the viewpoints of different scholars, it can be seen 
that the relevant cases may successively encounter with three generations of United 
Nations peacekeeping operations. They are the traditional peacekeeping operations of 
the era of the Cold War, the complex (or ‘multi-dimensional’) peacekeeping operations 
that were active around the 1990s and the coercive (or ‘robust’) peacekeeping 
operations that have been active since the beginning of the 21st century.659  
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1. The theoretical role and practical records of the traditional United Nations 
peacekeeping operations. 
The first United Nations peacekeeping operation deployed by this organisation was the 
UNTSO sent by the UNSC to the region of Palestine in 1948. However, the first United 
Nations peacekeeping force deployed by this organisation was the UNEF I sent by the 
UNSC to the Suez Canal in 1956. Together, these two famous territorial disputes defined 
the basic features of the traditional peacekeeping operations. 660  According to the 
personal explanation of Hammarskjold, when accomplishing the ‘peace missions’ 
assigned by the UNSC or the UNGA, the traditional United Nations peacekeeping 
operations must also comply with three interrelated principles:661  
The first norm was the principle of consent, which meant that the participants of the 
traditional peacekeeping operations should ‘(be) deployed with the consent of the main 
parties of the conflicts’. In addition, they also needed to seek ‘the necessary freedom of 
action, both political and physical, to carry out (their) mandated tasks’. Meanwhile, they 
must strive to avoid ‘becoming a party to the conflict, and being drawn towards 
enforcement action, and away from its fundamental role of keeping the peace’.662  
The second norm was the principle of impartiality, which meant that the participants of 
the traditional peacekeeping operations should ‘be impartial in their dealings with the 
parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate’. In addition, 
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they also needed to seek ‘not (to) condone actions by the parties that violate the 
undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United 
Nations peacekeeping operation upholds’. Meanwhile, they must strive to avoid 
‘(undermining) the peacekeeping operation’s credibility and legitimacy, that may lead 
to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties’.663  
The third norm was the principle of self-defence, which meant that the participants of 
the traditional peacekeeping operations should ‘use force at the tactical level, with the 
authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence and defence of the 
mandate’. In addition, they also needed to seek ‘(to) deter forceful attempts to disrupt 
the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or 
assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order’. Meanwhile, they must 
strive to avoid ‘(negative) political implications and……unforeseen circumstances’.664  
Analyzing the above information, it could be found out that the traditional peacekeeping 
operations were merely a type of forcible method which was discreet in words and deed. 
On the one hand, this measure laid extra emphasis on separating those parties which 
were in a stalemate, so as to reduce the risk of worsening the related international 
disputes and increase the probability of resolving them. On the other hand, the 
traditional peacekeeping operations would not directly take the responsibilities of 
punishing the individuals, political groups or states. Thus, they could hardly suppress 
the settled will of the various parties as driven by their realistic national interests. 
Besides, since it did not have the coerciveness similar to that of the United Nations 
military enforcement actions, this measure could not guarantee that it would restrain 
severe international disputes, including territorial disputes.665  
As a result, from 1948 to 1978, only thirteen traditional peacekeeping operations were 
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initiated by the United Nations, followed by a long gap from 1979 to 1987. 666 
Meanwhile, although the initial two traditional peacekeeping operations did have a 
close connection with territorial disputes, none of them could independently ‘maintain 
or restore international peace and security’667- 
For instance, the UNEF I was deported by the Nasser regime of Egypt, invoking the 
principle of consent, so that it failed to prevent the outbreak of the ‘Six-Day War’ and 
the consequent change of control of the Sinai Peninsula.668 Moreover, limited by the 
size of military observer groups or the arms of ‘security forces’, the UNTSO, the 
UNMOGIP and the UNSF silently viewed every Arab-Israeli War, Indo-Pakistani War 
and the occupation of West Papua by Indonesia. Ultimately, they did not fulfil their 
simple function of ‘supervising the ceasefire’, and they did not do much to prevent 
changes in the de facto control of Palestine, Kashmir and the island of New Guinea, 
respectively.669 More ironically, the only traditional peacekeeping operation which had 
successfully safeguarded the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a member state of 
the United Nations was the ONUC. However, this case was neither a ‘standard’ 
territorial dispute in the context of this thesis, nor a peaceful issue in which the 
peacekeepers had not been successively authorized to resort to force in the territories of 
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In short, the past history has clearly proved that the traditional peacekeeping operations 
cannot guarantee to achieve the predetermined purposes of the UNCSS. In fact, as 
described in the previous sections, even the UNMEE of the early 21st century could no 
longer succeed in ‘supervising the ceasefire’ after it had lost the consent of the weaker 
party of the relevant case. When facing the test imposed by territorial disputes, therefore, 
the traditional peacekeeping operations are not enough to ‘maintain or restore 
international peace and security’. But then, it is also the realization of this that 
eventually led to the development of new types of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations in the following decades. 
2. The theoretical role and practical records of the complex United Nations 
peacekeeping operations. 
Entering the 1990s, the end of the Cold War allowed the UNSC to temporarily regain 
its vigor, whilst the collapse of the Yalta System also gave plenty of opportunities for 
the extensive use of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Using the invaluable 
lessons learned from over 10 peacekeeping operations which were deployed between 
1988 and 1992 for reference, the famous ‘An Agenda for Peace’ of Ghali widely 
reformed the substance of the United Nations peacekeeping operations:671  
On the one hand, concerning the drawbacks evident in the peacekeeping operations 
before the 1990s, especially their rigorous adherence to the role of monitor and their 
lack of interest in punishing guilty parties, this document proposed the idea of 
‘peacemaking’. According to its original text, the peacekeepers of the new era should 
‘(take) action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful 
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means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations’.672  
On the other hand, concerning the brand-new background situation of the 1990s, in 
which international confrontations were decreasing and domestic tensions were 
growing, this document proposed the idea of ‘peacebuilding’. According to its original 
text, the peacekeepers of the new era should ‘(undertake) new tasks as varied as 
conducting elections, civil administration, repatriating refugees, and protecting 
humanitarian convoys’.673 
Analyzing the above information, it can be found out that the newborn complex 
peacekeeping operations that were created by ‘An Agenda for Peace’ had largely re-
invented the details of peacekeeping. Specifically speaking, the idea of ‘peacemaking’ 
had deepened the jurisdiction of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. In 
addition, it could also better fit the active, rather than passive nature of the 
predetermined purposes of the UNCSS, which were ‘maintain or restore international 
peace and security’. Similarly, the idea of ‘peacebuilding’ had broadened the 
jurisdiction of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. In addition, comparing to 
the limited capacity of individual parties, the joint civil administration of multiple third 
parties definitely could raise the chance of achieving better results by gathering the 
wisdom and strength of the collective. Thereby, the complex peacekeeping operations 
were much more popular and fruitful than their predecessor-approximately 35 of them 
were formed in the 1990s, almost three times more than the traditional peacekeeping 
operations. Besides, it was noteworthy that this measure was exceptionally active in the 
process of the domestic ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ within certain states, such as 
Cambodia, Haiti and Namibia.674  
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However, although the complex peacekeeping operations had helped to alleviate some 
of the disadvantages of traditional peacekeeping operations, it remained a measure that 
was not impeccable. Realistically speaking, when dealing with various serious 
international disputes, the diversified functions of these operations envisaged by ‘An 
Agenda for Peace’ were actually a ‘double-edged sword’- 
Firstly, the deepening of the jurisdiction of peacekeeping operations served to limit the 
diplomatic autonomy of those states disputing the relevant territories. The idea of 
‘peacemaking’ meant that the ‘Blue Helmets’ possessed the right to force the parties to 
reach agreements on settling their international disputes, risking thereby arousing 
resentment within these states. 675  Secondly, the broadening of jurisdiction of the 
peacekeeping operations served to limit those same states’ autonomy of decision-
making in respect to their internal affairs. The idea of ‘peacebuilding’ meant that the 
‘Blue Helmets’ possessed the right to take over many of the civil administrative duties 
of the parties, and this again would certainly be liable to arouse resentment.676 More 
seriously, since territorial disputes were traditionally long lasting and involve plenty of 
values and core national interests, they were not especially suitable for the application 
of the complex peacekeeping operations. The characters of territorial disputes, along 
with the negative sentiment within the related states aroused by ‘peacemaking’ or 
‘peacebuilding’, meant that the peacekeepers usually had to deal with particular parties 
which not only dared to refuse external intervention, but also were difficult to be 
deterred. Needless to say, such a predicament could easily further expose the shortages 
of the complex peacekeeping operations. 
Under the comprehensive influence of the above factors, with their wide-ranging power 
and duties, the complex peacekeeping operations could indeed partly act on behalf of 
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the local governments of the targeted states. On this basis, the peacekeepers had shown 
their ability to maintain or restore the local ‘peace and security’ of those regions in 
which the internal order had already collapsed as well. However, due to the direct or 
indirect resistance of the relevant parties, provoked by that very same power and duties 
of the complex peacekeepers, the long-term effectiveness of this measure was 
comparatively fragile. Additionally, in their actual practice, the complex peacekeeping 
operations had generally avoided to intervene the ‘standard’ territorial dispute between 
member states of the United Nations as well. For instance, as two complex 
peacekeeping operations that had been tasked with the duty of civil administration, the 
UNMIK and the MINURSO which were respectively deployed at the beginning/end of 
the 1990s were quite representative here: 
Both the UNMIK and the MINURSO involved a dispute about the sovereign ownership 
of a particular piece of territories. However, the major parties of the relevant cases were 
not even sovereign states, so that these operations supposed to meet less resistance, as 
the parties do not have the necessary endurance. Correspondingly, in their actual 
practice, these two operations had at least successfully played the role of ‘peacekeeper’ 
during their period of deployment. The Former used to control most of the internal 
affairs of Kosovo in the initial years of its lifetime, and the latter had continuously kept 
the state of ceasefire within the region of Western Sahara since 1991. Regrettably, while 
five informal meetings were organized by the MINURSO which was responsible for 
communicating with Morocco/the Polisario Front, the relevant parties were still unable 
to reach any agreement on the future status of Western Sahara. By the mid-2010s, 
therefore, this operation had become the most long-lasting United Nations 
peacekeeping operation that was deployed after 1990, and the Polisario Front was still 
threatening to resort to its forces.677 Meanwhile, it seemed that the UNMIK which 
promised to respect the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’ of Yugoslavia was also 
settled for the unstable ‘international peace and security’, as it did not adequately 
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restrain the radical factions of Kosovo. As the result, the local authority of Kosovo 
unilaterally declared the independence of Kosovo in 2008, whilst the UNMIK actually 
reduced the scope of its duties in the same year.678 
Similarly, from 1988 to 1999, most of the other complex peacekeeping operations which 
had been tasked with civil administration duties were also not in charge of handling 
those ‘standard’ territorial disputes in the context of this thesis. In addition, the inherent 
problem of this measures of leaving troubles festering behind could be seen frequently 
in the practice of these operations as well (e.g. the UNTAET which stopped the riot 
initiated by pro-Indonesia militias, but successively triggered the deployment of two 
supplementary peacekeeping operations). 679  Moreover, the only exception was the 
UNASOG deployed in the Aouzou Strip between Chad and Libya. Nevertheless, this 
operation only used nine military observers to monitor the withdrawal of the Libyan 
army from the disputed territories, and it had acquired the consent of the governments 
of the relevant parties beforehand. Thus, the nature of the UNASOG was still biased 
towards the traditional peacekeeping operations.680 Besides, in the ‘Supplement to An 
Agenda for Peace’, Ghali further warned the world that the reformative tactics applied 
by the complex peacekeeping operations, through which the duties of the peacekeepers 
were greatly expanded, would risk a financial crisis for this measure. If so, then the 
autonomy of the complex peacekeeping operations would be inevitably undermined, 
and they had to increasingly rely on the support of the participants of the relevant 
operations.681 
In short, with the expansion of their duties and jurisdiction, the complex peacekeeping 
operations are more active than their predecessor, and they definitely could ‘maintain 
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or restore international peace and security’. Unfortunately, limited by its own inherent 
disadvantages, this measure did not record any noticeable achievement in the field of 
the ‘standard’ territorial disputes in the context of this thesis during the late years of the 
20th century. Besides, the afore-mentioned past cases have revealed that the long-term 
effect of this measure is also relatively fragile. Nevertheless, if only speaking from the 
perspective of reaching the predetermined purposes of the UNCSS, it can be said that 
the performance of the complex peacekeeping operations is acceptable, and this merit 
should be praised. 
3. The theoretical role and practical records of the coercive United Nations 
peacekeeping operations. 
Moving into the 21st century, Annan, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations 
who felt that the complex peacekeeping operations were still unfit for service, initiated 
a new round of reform of this measure. In particular, he entrusted Brahimi, an Algerian 
diplomat with the mission of leading the ‘Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping’ to 
write the famous Brahimi report. Following the suggestions of this report, the latest 
coercive peacekeeping operations were instituted, and thus further upgraded those 
concepts underpinning the earlier complex peacekeeping operations:682 
Initially, the first background condition for the drafting of the Brahimi Report was the 
continuous deepening of the jurisdiction of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. 
Accordingly, the panel of experts urged the related institutions of the United Nations to 
‘specify an operation’s authority to use force……it means bigger forces, better 
equipped and more costly but able to be a credible deterrent’. On this account, this report 
prompted the emergence of a series of ‘robust’ peacekeeping forces (e.g. the 
MONUSCO and the MINUSMA683) which were backed by either chapter 7 of the UN 
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Charter or even ‘all necessary means’.684  
Next, the second background condition for the drafting of the Brahimi Report was the 
continuous broadening of the jurisdiction of the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations. Accordingly, the panel of experts urged the related institutions of the United 
Nations to ‘(create) integrated planning or support cell in the Secretariat that brings 
together those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, 
electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and 
displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment…… (and 
implement) structural adjustment……in other elements of DPKO’. On this account, this 
report prompted the emergence of quite a few units or concepts attached to the United 
Nations peacekeeping operations. These include but not limited to the Department of 
Field Support of the United Nations, the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 
and the ‘Capstone Doctrine (viz. UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and 
Guidelines)’.685  
Then, the third background condition for the drafting of the Brahimi Report was the 
continuously increasing expenditure related to the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations. Accordingly, the panel of experts urged the related institutions of the United 
Nations to ‘(treat) headquarters support for peacekeeping as a core activity of the United 
Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements should be funded through 
the regular budget of the organization……(and provide) additional resources 
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for……DPKO and related headquarters support offices for peacekeeping’. On this 
account, this report prompted the adjustment of the ‘rates of reimbursement to troop 
contributing countries’ of the United Nations peacekeeping forces by the UNGA.686  
Analyzing the above information, it can be found out that the coercive peacekeeping 
operations promoted by Brahimi were basically a revised type of complex peacekeeping 
operations, surrounded by enhanced administrative, military and financial support. 
Theoretically speaking, this measure could strengthen the efficiency of the ‘Blue 
Helmets’, yet it did not totally extricate itself from the general domain of the complex 
peacekeeping operations. Practically speaking, the proposal of the Brahimi Report that 
the peacekeepers should routinely be authorized to use force687 even further risked this 
measure being infected by the aforesaid shortages of the military enforcement 
actions.688 After all, as long as the peacekeepers had been authorized to resort to force, 
they were bound to consume a large amount of resources, with or without a complete 
logistical system built by those newly-established supporting units. Besides, while the 
title of the relevant operations had the word ‘peacekeeping’, and their personnel were 
referred to as ‘peacekeepers’, the authorized use of force was still a typical character of 
the military enforcement actions. 
Eventually, between 2000 and 2015, the UNSC successively established and operated 
more than 20 United Nations peacekeeping operations. Among them, only the UNMEE 
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and the UNISFA were deployed for handling the ‘standard’ territorial disputes as meant 
in the context of this thesis, and the rather traditional UNMEE was in fact deployed 
before the publication of the Brahimi Report. From the details of these operations, 
however, it still could be seen that in accordance with the above arguments, the effect 
and the expenses of the peacekeeping operations of the new era were rapidly growing 
together689– 
For instance, as a complex peacekeeping operation which had nothing to do with 
territorial disputes, the UNOSOM II, which mobilized a peak of 28000 troops from 34 
countries, just spent 1.6 billion US dollars in two years.690 In contrast, the UNISFA 
which was deployed for the territorial dispute in the region of Abyei already had more 
than 4200 personnel at the start, yet due to the expansion of its coercive missions, this 
operation soon assembled another 1100 servicemen. Meanwhile, the initial authorized 
strength of the UNISFA was merely one-sixth of the strength of the UNOSOM II, but 
its average annual budget was as high as approximately 200 million US dollars. 
Fortunately, since the arrival of the UNISFA, the ‘international peace and security’ of 
the Abyei region, which used to be the battlefield of Sudan and South Sudan, had been 
kept for nearly 10 years without a fruitful peace negotiation. Besides, although the 
armies of Sudan and South Sudan had a combined strength of over 200,000 soldiers, 
the two parties had never really provoked the United Nations peacekeepers who 
possessed the authorized right to use force.691  
In short, the coercive peacekeeping operations are generally an improved version of the 
complex peacekeeping operations, and at the suggestion of the Brahimi Report, their 
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‘Blue Helmets’ have been widely authorized to use force. However, such reform might 
result in the significant rise of extra costs that are usually seen in military enforcement 
actions, so that the application of this measure could easily trigger the apprehension of 
the relevant parties. Even so, since this measure has successfully defended the ‘peace 
and security’ of some African states, its ability to achieve the set purposes of the UNCSS 
should not be denied. 
4. Summary. 
In Summary, the United Nations peacekeeping operations are both a lineal substitute 
for the ‘United Nations Forces’, and the only measure of the entire UNCSS that can be 
said to have been completely created by junior practitioners. Realistically speaking, 
however, they are still not the best choice for settling territorial disputes in the field of 
‘collective security’. Firstly, limited by the ‘three principles of peacekeeping’, the 
traditional peacekeeping operations cannot guarantee the ‘maintenance or restoration of 
international peace and security’. Secondly, the complex peacekeeping operations have 
not yet engaged with those ‘standard’ territorial disputes, and they can easily leave 
hidden troubles behind, but they are better at the original mission of ‘peacekeeping’. 
Thirdly, the latest coercive peacekeeping operations have revealed their ability to 
maintain peace and security, but the relevant practice has shown that they could also be 
infected by the problems of the military enforcement actions. Anyway, with the 
expansion of their jurisdiction, duties and mandatory power, the working efficiency of 
the three generations of peacekeeping operations in terms of ‘maintaining or restoring 
international peace and security’ is gradually increasing, albeit their opponents are not 
necessarily be territorial disputes. 
5.2.3 The shared weaknesses of the forcible measures of the UNCSS in territorial 
disputes settlement: a case study of the United Nations authorized forcible 
sanctions against Iraq 
From the previous sections, it can be noted that the United Nations authorized military 
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enforcement actions and the United Nations peacekeeping operations are two forcible, 
but also imperfect measures of the UNCSS. In particular, their advantages and 
disadvantages are equally conspicuous, their price-performance ratio is questionable, 
and the performance of them in territorial disputes has been undermined by these 
problems. However, as stated earlier, since the measures of same category might be 
mutually complementary, it is the shared weaknesses of all the forcible measures that 
are most likely to hinder the successful use of this approach in territorial disputes.692 
Besides, concerning the balance between the width and the depth of this thesis, the last 
two sub-sections have focused on broadly enumerating the records of applying the 
forcible measures of the UNCSS in territorial disputes from the perspective of 
‘collective security’. Hence, at the end of the second half, the present sub-section should 
focus on specifically examining the progress of applying the forcible measures of the 
UNCSS in territorial disputes from the perspective of ‘territorial disputes’.  
Therefore, in the last part that concerns the present issue, the author will arrange a 
detailed case study on one relevant case, so as to more thoroughly reveal the shared 
weaknesses of the forcible measures of the UNCSS. In terms of selecting the suitable 
incident, as a recent forcible operation of the UNCSS which has been described as 
having the most ideal pre-conditions and case details, the situation in Iraq since 1990 is 
undoubtedly a perfect choice.693 
1. Historical background. 
Reviewing the history of the Middle East before the 1910s, it could be seen that both 
Kuwait and Iraq were initially territories of the Ottoman Empire. In particular, the 
former was subordinate to the Basra Vilayet centered on the region of Southern Iraq for 
several times, and this past event was the foremost source of the future territorial claim 
of the latter.694 After the end of WWI, the UK and France, as the victors, and with assent 
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of the League of Nations, took control of large parts of the now collapsed Ottoman 
Empire, including certain regions that would later become Kuwait and Iraq. 
Unfortunately, owning the devastating influence of the WWII and the anti-colonial 
movements triggered in the aftermath of this war, such a post-WWI settlement in the 
area around the Persian Gulf merely lasted for less than 30 years.695 From the late 1940s, 
the old colonial empires were forced to gradually abandon their de facto dominion in 
Mesopotamia, and it was the result of this decolonization that created the territorial 
dispute between the new states of Iraq and Kuwait:696  
In 1958, a group of Ba’athists who promoted a form of pan-Arabian nationalism, 
overthrew the pro-Western Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq via a bloody coup d’état, 
thereby founding the Republic of Iraq. 697  In 1961, Kuwait also announced its 
independence after a 60-years-long administration by the UK, and was immediately met 
with a threat of invasion from the Iraqi government.698 Consequently, as the former 
suzerainty of Kuwait, the UK had to dispatch its troops again to ‘protect’ the House of 
Al-Sabah. Nevertheless, the territorial ambition of Iraq only temporarily subsided after 
the Arab League had firmly accepted Kuwait, and further organized the Arab League 
Security Force which took over the responsibility of the British armed forces.699 
The good moment did not last long enough. In June of 1979, Saddam Hussein deposed 
the then President of Iraq, Al-Bakr, in a new coup d’état, and the foreign policy of the 
Ba’ath Party began to turn once again to around to invasion and territorial expansion. 
Initially, the target of the new dictator was Iran, which was apparently in a fragile state 
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after its domestic Islamic Revolution in the same year. 700  However, although the 
sudden attack of the Iraqi army did gain a certain amount of success, the quick victory 
that was expected by Saddam did not materialize. Thanks to its remaining national 
strength, Iran was able to force the contest into a desperate stalemate which ultimately 
lasted for about eight years.701 In August of 1988, the two exhausted sides finally 
signed an armistice agreement, but the Iraqi economy had already been disastrously 
depleted by the war at that point, and the Saddam regime also owed other Arab states a 
huge sum of debts.702  
For the purpose of extricating himself from such a dilemma, therefore, Saddam and his 
advisors started to ask the OPEC to reduce the production of oil, so as to increase its 
price and thus gain extra revenue to pay Iraq’s debt. Meanwhile, these unwise decision-
makers also switched their attention back to Kuwait, the small and less populated 
neighbor of Iraq, but one with abundant petroleum reserves.703 Before dawn of August 
2nd of 1990, thousands of elite soldiers of the Iraqi Republican Guard crossed into the 
land territories of Kuwait. After only a few hours of poorly organized resistance from 
the Kuwaiti army, Kuwait was totally occupied by Iraq, and the Kuwaiti Emir, Jaber III 
and his legal government, fled into exile to Saudi Arabia.704 
2. The performance of the UNCSS. 
As aforementioned, facing the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the United Nations and the 
international community of the early 1990s actually responded toughly, especially after 
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they had got over the initial surprise and astonishment.705 Tracking the origin of such a 
reaction, it could be seen that this situation was largely caused by the combination of 
the background of the current case and the content of the forcible measures of the 
UNCSS- 
Firstly, as a universal international organization born in 1945, the primary aim of the 
United Nations was to prevent or suppress the recurrence of the illegal territorial 
expansion conducted by those former fascist states via invading other states. 
Coincidentally, the military adventure of the Saddam regime had entered the natural 
scope of jurisdiction of this target.706 Secondly, as an international security mechanism 
which was largely based on the emphasis of the principle of unanimity, the primary bane 
of the UNCSS was the deliberate obstruction of one or more members of the P5. 
Coincidentally, during the last days of the Cold War, the former USSR was in an 
advanced state of decay and China was focusing on its own ‘Reform and Open-Up’ 
policy. Thereby, both of them were unwilling to veto the collective stance of the Western 
Bloc, as at least one of them had been wont to do.707 Thirdly, as a series of forcible 
measures that had some side-effects, the primary challenge for the forcible measures of 
the UNCSS was that the expected gains of activating them must surpass or offset the 
expected losses of activating them. Coincidentally, both Iraq and Kuwait were widely 
recognized as fertile territories with high strategic value and rich energy reserves.708  
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With the help of the above-listed positive factors, and relying on the temporarily revived 
UNSC, the forcible measures of the UNCSS eventually started to operate as it was 
originally intended for the first time since the Korean War: 
At the beginning, on the same day that it received the message of the outbreak of the 
Iraq-Kuwait armed conflict, the UNSC passed the resolution 660 with an unusual 
activeness which was rarely seen during the period of the Cold War.709 According to 
the original text which was chiefly drafted by the USA and UK ambassadors to the 
United Nations, this resolution confirmed that the attack on Kuwait by Iraq had formed 
‘a breach of international peace and security’. Additionally, it also condemned the 
armed invasion implemented by the Saddam regime, and requested the Iraqi army to 
retreat back to their homeland without extra conditions.710 Unsurprisingly, in the midst 
of their apparent rapid and total victory, and doubtless inured by the years of impotence 
demonstrated by the UNCSS, the Ba’athists ignored this warning from the international 
community. After weighing the deterrent force of ‘oral criticism’ and the value of the 
prize of Kuwait, the Iraqi leadership confidently continued to establish their new ruling 
order in Kuwait, and the Iraqi troops stationed there showed no sign of re-deployment 
as well.711 
Given that the diplomatic measures had encountered with deliberate resistance, the 
UNSC passed the more serious resolution 661 with regard to the Iraq-Kuwait situation 
on August 6th of 1990.712 According to the text of this resolution, all the member 
states/non-member states of the United Nations had to immediately stop building up 
any commercial connection with Iraq or Kuwait. Meanwhile, they were also prohibited 
from transferring any financial funds, military equipment or economic resources to 
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these two states. In other words, the short-sightedness of the leadership of Iraq had 
initiated the first comprehensive economic sanction that was authorized by the United 
Nations since the establishment of this organization in 1945.713 Surprisingly, even 
before the international community could put every aspect of these economic sanctions 
in place, Saddam had already announced that Kuwait would become the 19th province 
of Iraq on the 8th of August.714 
Feeling the humiliation of the conceited acts of Iraq, the UNSC hurriedly passed the 
supplementary resolution 662 on the very next day. According to the text of this 
resolution, the UNSC ordered ‘all states, international organizations and specialized 
agencies’ not to recognize the so-called ‘comprehensive and eternal merger’ of Iraq and 
Kuwait.715 Nonetheless, for the next three months, despite wave after wave of heavy 
diplomatic and economic pressure, there was still no evidence to indicate that Iraq had 
felt repentance and sorrow. More ironically, the Saddam regime even did not cut off its 
secret economic trade or public diplomatic co-operation with some of its allies, such as 
Yemen.716 
Afterwards, seeing that the various non-forcible measures were not effecting any 
change, the UNSC was forced to consider the activation of forcible measures. On 
November 29th of 1990, this institution passed resolution 678, in which it required Iraq 
to ‘comply fully with resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions……on or 
before 15 January 1991’, this was equivalent to sending an ultimatum to Iraq. On this 
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basis, the UNSC also further authorized all member states of the United Nations ‘to use 
all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant 
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area’, this was 
equivalent to sending the signal of resorting to forces to the world.717 
Recalling the unusual working efficiency of the UNSC as shown above, the then 
Secretary-General, De Cuellar, once commented with mixed feelings that the P5 had 
never before ‘reacted with such unanimity to an invasion, occupation and purported 
annexation’.718 Moreover, under the supervision of the then Secretary of State of the 
USA, Baker, a pro-Kuwait coalition comprising of 34 states was quickly formed. By 
early December of 1990, these states had already deployed nearly 1 million ‘Coalition 
Forces’ (including around 700,000 US troops) along the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait border, 
ready to undertake any military enforcement action. Breathtakingly, however, during 
the subsequent ‘buffer period’ of 48 days, the leadership of Iraq were still defending 
their own stance through referring to the issue of Palestine. Besides, it also sent over 
600,000 soldiers to the territories of Kuwait, so that it was quite obvious that Iraq had 
prepared to make a last-ditch fight.719 
Then, on January 17th of 1991 or two days after the ultimatum had expired, the 
‘Coalition Forces’ initiated Operation Desert Storm which aimed at expelling the 
invaders from Kuwait, thus starting the Gulf War. Nonetheless, even though this was 
yet another United Nations authorized military enforcement action, but in comparison 
with the Korean War of the 1950s, the Gulf War still had a few distinctive features: 
First, the two cases had different forms. According to resolution 84 of the UNSC, the 
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‘United Nations Forces’ of the Korean War had the right to use the title and banners of 
the United Nations. In addition, the UNSC also suggested the ‘United Nations Forces’ 
to put itself under the control of a joint ‘United Nations Command’ in written form.720 
In contrast, according to resolution 678, the ‘Coalition Forces’ of the Gulf War was not 
required to use the title and banners of the United Nations, and it was under the name 
of the ‘member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait’. In addition, the 
UNSC did not suggest the ‘Coalition Forces’ to establish a joint headquarter-though a 
general of the US Army, Schwarzkopf, actually held the post of the commander in chief 
of the allied forces.721 
Second, the two cases had different participants. In terms of the ‘enforcer’ of the two 
cases, the ‘United Nations Forces’ of the Korean War was formed by troops from 17 
states, and the USA alone provided over 300,000 soldiers. However, South Korea itself 
also assembled around 600,000 combatants, and it progressively took over multiple 
defensive positions of the ‘United Nations Forces’ during the later stage of this war. In 
contrast, the number of states involved in the ‘Coalition Forces’ of the Gulf War was 
two times more than that of the ‘United Nations Forces’, and the number of US Troops 
was at least doubled as well. However, Kuwait itself was a conquered nation at the 
moment, so that it could not offer any necessary assistance to the coalition.722 In terms 
of the law-breakers of the two cases, the Kim regime had the direct support of two 
permanent members of the UNSC, namely China and the USSR, during the Korean War. 
Besides, After the North Korean army had been defeated by the ‘United Nations Forces’, 
the Chinese army even assumed most of the combat missions. In contrast, the Saddam 
regime was isolated by the world during the Gulf War, and its sole anchor was the Iraqi 
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Third, the two cases had different leaders. According to resolution 84 of the UNSC, the 
USA was responsible for appointing the command in chief of the ‘United Nations 
Forces’ of the Korean War, and the ‘United Nations Command’ was dominated by the 
USA as well. Additionally, this resolution suggested all the member states to pass on 
their corresponding armed forces and resources to the ‘United Nations Command’ for 
redistribution in written form.724 In contrast, according to resolution 678, the ‘Coalition 
Forces’ of the Gulf War was only permitted to ‘use all necessary means’, whilst the 
status of Schwarzkopf was created by the dominant position of the Army of the United 
States. In addition, this resolution merely urged the international community to ‘provide 
appropriate support for the actions’ in written form. In fact, the joint logistical service 
of the ‘Coalition Forces’ was created by the foresight of Baker manifested in earlier 
negotiations.725 
Fortunately, despite the above differences, it can be said that the level of strikes of both 
of these two military operations against the invaders were quite remarkable. More 
importantly, unlike the Kim regime, the Saddam regime could not expect any permanent 
member of the UNSC to come to its aid. Started from January 17th of 1991, the 
‘Coalition Forces’ destroyed 42 divisions of the Iraqi Army in 38 days, and accordingly 
liberated all the inherent territories of Kuwait. On February 26th, Saddam announced 
that Iraq was willing to accept a series of related resolutions of the UNSC, and he would 
like to withdraw all the Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait. On February 28th, the then 
president of the USA, Bush, declared that the ‘Coalition Forces’ had accomplished its 
pre-set tasks, thus marked the victorious end of the Gulf War.726 
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Finally, with the mission of ‘liberating Kuwait’ having been rapidly accomplished,727 
the UNSC passed resolution 687 setting out the post-conflict arrangement of the Iraq-
Kuwait situation on April 3rd of 1991.728 According to the text of this resolution, the 
Saddam regime must continue to endure the comprehensive economic sanctions, so as 
to completely eliminate the possible revival of the territorial ambition of Iraq.729 Other 
than that, resolution 687 also created a demilitarized zone which aimed at separating 
the invader and the victim, plus it established a supporting United Nations peacekeeping 
operation–the UNIKOM, in this region.730 Interestingly, as a peacekeeping operation 
which was deployed before the publication of ‘An Agenda to Peace’, the mandate of 
the UNIKOM was already quite different from that of the traditional peacekeeping 
operations: 
First, the mission of the UNIKOM was rather complex. According to resolution 687, 
the core mission of the UNIKOM was ‘to deter violations of the boundary……to 
observe any hostile or potentially hostile action……and to report……serious violations 
of the zone or potential threats to peace’.731 For this purpose, the peacekeepers of early 
stage of the UNIKOM did not have side arms, and there was no fundamental distinction 
between the role of them and that of those traditional peacekeepers. Besides, the 
responsibility to maintain the security of the demilitarized zone was given to the 
governments of Iraq and/or Kuwait, and their policemen could even carry small arms.732 
Nevertheless, with the gradual stabilization of the situation of the Persian Gulf, the 
Saddam regime indeed no longer cast its eyes on Kuwait, but it did make multiple 
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attempts to take back the Iraqi properties which were left in Kuwait.733 In order to 
resolve this new problem, the UNSC adopted the supplementary resolution 806 on 
February 5th of 1993. Based on its text, the UNIKOM was authorized to correct the 
irregular behavior of Iraq, and it was also allowed to participate in the affairs concerning 
the disposal of the Iraqi civilians, equipment and facilities that were left in the territories 
of Kuwait.734 For this purpose, the peacekeepers in the later stages of the UNIKOM 
were augmented and reorganized into mechanized troops, and they were also given the 
task of patrolling the coastal waters. Thereby, the substance of the UNIKOM had gone 
beyond that of traditional peacekeeping operations which merely sought to ‘separate the 
related parties’.735 
Second, the size of the UNIKOM was rather enormous. Since the list of tasks mentioned 
by resolution 687 was comparatively simple, the initial UNIKOM force consisted of 
merely 300 military observers. In addition, those peacekeepers who were in charge of 
security works of this operation were also spared from other peacekeeping 
operations.736 However, with the adoption of resolution 806 and the expansion of the 
duties and jurisdiction of the UNIKOM, it was clear that there were insufficient 
personnel on the ground and, as a result, UNIKOM was expanded to 3645 personnel. 
Moreover, even in the second half of 2003, when this operation was about to be closed, 
the UNIKOM still had more than 1000 military personnel.737 In fact, despite the ONUC 
which was authorized to use force, the relatively unsuccessful UNEFs and the UNIFIL 
which lasted for several decades, the total strength of UNIKOM was higher than all ten 
other traditional peacekeeping operations.738 
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Third, the end of the UNIKOM was rather unique. From the arrival of the peacekeepers 
in May 1991 until the adoption of resolution 806 by the UNSC, Iraq was mainly 
focusing on taking back its properties. Meanwhile, only a few Iraqi forces were 
symbolically sent to the areas adjacent to the border when the work of demarcation was 
being executed. Afterwards, from the adoption of resolution 806 to the spring of 2003, 
the situation in the demilitarized zone remained generally calm, as was confirmed by 
the officials of the United Nations. The governments of Iraq and Kuwait maintained a 
positively cooperative relationship with the UNIKOM, and most of the corresponding 
controversies were related to the independent United Nations WMD inspection 
groups.739 
Unfortunately, this relatively harmonious relationship came to an abrupt end at the 
beginning of 2003. Paradoxically, the state which took the lead in interrupting the work 
of the UNIKOM was the USA, which used to support the deployment of this operation. 
In March 2003, the government of George Bush Jr. initiated the invasion of Iraq on the 
pretext of human rights and WMDs issues, but without the authorization of the UNSC. 
Three days before the outbreak of the Iraq War, the UNIKOM which had anticipated 
the danger was forced to withdraw from the demilitarized zone, leaving only a liaison 
office behind in Kuwait City.740 After the collapse of the Saddam regime, the then 
Secretary-General, Annan, acknowledged in his report to the UNSC that the UNIKOM 
was no longer relevant, as he pointed out that this operation had lost its target of sanction. 
In the next few months, UNIKOM was obliged to transfer its materials and properties 
to Iraq and Kuwait, since it had no better things to do. On October 6th, the mandate of 
the UNIKOM reached its expiry date, thus a peacekeeping operation which was 
intended to defend the territories of Kuwait was eventually driven out of its task area 
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by the liberators of Kuwait.741 
In short, the nature of the UNIKOM generally coincided with the trend of evolution of 
the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the present case, yet the details of this 
operation were a mixture of achievements and failures. Consequently, as mentioned 
above, the contribution and the fortune of this operation did not match each other. On 
the one hand, although those parties directly involved did not strongly resist its 
intervention, the UNIKOM was still brought to an end by its former partner, and it also 
only witnessed yet another unilateral use of force conducted by a superpower like a 
bystander. On the other hand, under the surveillance of the UNIKOM, although the 
Saddam regime refused to keep a low profile in words, the ‘international peace and 
security’ of the regions around Kuwait were still successfully maintained for a 
decade.742 Undoubtedly, this kind of contrast could be regarded as a rather biased full 
stop to the application of the forcible measures of the UNCSS in the settlement of 
territorial disputes. 
3. Assessment and Analysis. 
Taking a panoramic view of the journey of the forcible measures of the UNCSS in the 
Iraq-Kuwait territorial dispute, the ability of this set of measures to ‘maintain or restore 
international peace and security’ should be praised. However, although these measures 
were relatively effective, the Gulf War was only the second United Nations authorized 
military enforcement action, and the end of the corresponding peacekeeping operation 
was also rather hasty. In other words, while the forcible measures of the UNCSS can 
definitely achieve the predetermined purposes of this mechanism, there is still room for 
improvement that should be duly noted. Regarding the origins of such performance 
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from the realistic perspective, despite the individual shortages of the various forcible 
measures, there are several following weaknesses shared by the military enforcement 
actions and the peacekeeping operations that might also be blamed: 
Firstly, the legal basis of the forcible measures of the UNCSS is comparatively 
ambiguous.  
Analyzing the details of the present case, it can be seen that this shortcoming is caused 
by the political competition between those third parties to territorial disputes, namely 
powerful participants of the relevant operations of the UNCSS. On the one hand, the 
relative paralysis of the UNSC during the Cold War period and the renewed 
confrontation between the Eastern and Western Blocs since the late-1990s left the 
‘United Nations Forces’ as a mere theory on paper.743 On the other hand, the absence 
of related regulations in the UN Charter and the trivialness of the related legal 
documents like ‘An Agenda for Peace’, also left the peacekeeping operations as a 
‘substitute’ without sufficient endorsement. 744  Therefore, when dealing with other 
international disputes in which the parties can rather easily make compromise, the 
forcible measures of the UNCSS could still be called a flexible invention that has 
provided a new path. However, when dealing with territorial disputes in which the 
parties find it more difficult to compromise, these measures might inevitably be 
obstructed by those states whose private interests have been involved in these cases. 
Taking the reaction of the UNSC towards the Gulf War as an example, during the 
process of forcibly sanctioning Iraq, the legal basis of the forcible measures of the 
UNCSS at least had to face the following unavoidable difficulties: 
In the first place, as two key inventions of the UN Charter, the standing ‘United Nations 
Forces’ and their commanding headquarters, namely the Military Staff Committee, had 
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already been paralyzed for nearly 50 years. Thereby, even though the UNSC decided to 
apply the military enforcement actions to liberate Kuwait, it still had to abandon the 
idealized design of its founders, together its power to supervise the relevant operation. 
In this way, the UNSC had to entrust those member states of the United Nations who 
were willing to send their troops to join the corresponding actions by giving them the 
right to organize and command the relevant armed forces by themselves.745  
In the second Place, there was no sign of the United Nations peacekeeping operations 
in the UN Charter, and the UNDPKO was lately established in 1992. In addition, the 
structure, duties and tasks of the complex peacekeeping operations that emerged in the 
1990s were still being slowly explored. Thereby, many peacekeeping operations, 
including the UNIMIK, belonged to the category of new-born ‘supplementary measures’ 
which were deployed at first, and then amended their substance later. This contrast had 
not only been a gap of research for the international legal academia, but had been a 
matter of debate within the international community.746  
In the third place, despite the above two points on the vague part of the legal basis of 
the UNCSS, there were still some clear provisions of the UN Charter which concerned 
the ‘maintenance of international peace and security’. Among them, the most famous 
stipulation was obviously the veto power. Thereby, no matter the declining USSR, or 
the Western superpowers who was about to win the Cold War, both sides could always 
transfer their dissatisfaction with those forcible sanctions into a vote which would freeze 
the UNSC.747  
Under the safeguard of such a legal basis, it was quite easy for the P5 to mutually oppose 
the stance of each other when facing the present case, and the participants of the relevant 
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coercive operations were almost bound to overly come from the same political Bloc. 
Consequently, as the ultimate ace of the UNCSS, the military enforcement actions or 
the complex peacekeeping operations which involved the use of force could surely 
become too difficult to be activated or organized. Moreover, the fate of these measures 
might usually be determined by the support of a particular Bloc, and this was certainly 
less stable than the expected coordinated will of the entire world. Hence, in front of the 
actual events before and after the Gulf War, De Cuellar would naturally give out a sigh 
with subjective emotion when it seemed that everything was going well. Meanwhile, it 
was also not a surprise that after almost 12 years of successful operation, the UNIKOM 
was suddenly closed by the unilateral activities of some of its past partners. 
Secondly, the operating environment of the forcible measures of the UNCSS is 
comparatively tough.  
Analyzing the details of the present case, it can be seen that the appearance of this 
shortcoming is indirectly caused by the natural characters of the objects of territorial 
disputes, namely disputed territories. On the one hand, the inherent value of territories 
in various respects, such as strategy, ethnics and culture, has reinforced the will and 
self-assurance of the parties involved to protect what they lay claim to (see above).748 
On the other hand, the ordinary nature of territories in various respects, such as their 
location, size and physical topography, has made it challenging for third parties to rein 
the territories that they have touched upon as well.749 Therefore, when dealing with 
certain other international disputes in which the resistance is ignorable or relatively light, 
the forcible measures of the UNCSS could still be considered effective. However, when 
dealing with territorial disputes in which resistance is more likely and more persistent, 
they might inevitably be caught in straitened circumstances by their own resources, 
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power or efficiency. Taking the background conditions of the ‘Coalition Forces’ and the 
UNIKOM as an example, during the process of forcibly sanctioning Iraq, the operating 
environment of the UNCSS at least had to face the following unavoidable difficulties: 
In the first place, Kuwait was a rich state located in the Oil producing areas around the 
Persian Gulf, and its territories were adjacent to the narrow coastline of Iraq. By 
occupying all the territories of Kuwait, Iraq could at least gain three major benefits. 
Firstly, the coastline of Iraq would be expanded from 58 kilometers to 457 kilometers, 
and the Iraqi Navy would acquire a large deep-water port and the necessary buffer area 
for defence.750 Secondly, the oil reserves of Iraq would be almost doubled, and it would 
become one of the top three members of OPEC in terms of total oil reserves.751 Thirdly, 
Iraq used to owe 13-15 billion US dollars of debt to Kuwait before the Gulf Crisis, yet 
that figure would immediately return to zero after the invasion, and the cash flow of 
Iraq would be additionally supplemented by the assets of Kuwait.752 
In the second place, before the Gulf War, Iraq had not only controlled most of the plain 
areas of Mesopotamia, but also served as the ‘crossroad’ of the entire region of the 
Middle East. Relying on these inborn advantages of its inherent territories, Iraq was a 
state which had the overall national strength of a typical regional power at the end of 
1990. Firstly, Iraq was the fifth largest state in the Middle East, with a population of 
17.5 million, and with a total labor forces higher than the total population of many 
developed states of today.753 Secondly, the strategic position of Iraq meant that both 
superpowers were keen to forge solid relationship or alliances with it, so that with their 
economic aid, the GNI of Iraq was still more than 10,000 US dollars even after the Iran-
                                                        
750 The CIA World Fact Book, ‘Coastal Line’ (2017) <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the
-world-factbook/fields/2060.html> accessed 20 August 2017. 
751 The CIA World Fact Book, ‘Crude Oil-Proved Reserves’ (2017) <https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2244rank.html> accessed 20 August 2017. 
752 In 1990, the GNI of Kuwait was more than 17,000 US dollars, nearly 1.7 times more than 
the GNI of Iraq, see The World Bank, ‘Data-Kuwait’ (2017) <http://data.worldbank.org/country/k
uwait?view=chart> accessed 20 August 2017. 
753 The World Bank, ‘Data-Iraq’ (2017) <http://data.worldbank.org/country/iraq?view=chart> acces
sed 20 August 2017. 
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Iraq War.754 Thirdly, thanks to the rich legacy of its zenith, even after the Gulf War, the 
regular army of Iraq still had 41 divisions, which was enough to crush nearly all its 
neighbours, except Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.755 
In the third place, despite the above two points respectively related to the two direct 
parties of this case, the general conditions of the disputed territories were also not very 
suitable for the application of the UNCSS. On the one hand, as part of the heartland of 
the Middle East, Iraq and Kuwait were quite distant from the armed forces of the 
potential third parties (e.g. the ‘Coalition Forces’ were largely formed by the armed 
forces of the member states of the NATO, yet both the Supreme Headquarter and the 
Supply Centre for the NATO were located in Belgium756 ). On the other hand, both 
Southern Iraq and Kuwait used to be part of the Basra Vilayet of the Ottoman Empire, 
and the latter was a piece of territories which had been by claimed by Iraq ever since 
the era of the Cold War. The historical value of Kuwait to Iraq and the Iraqi nationalism 
derived from it had determined that sooner or later the Saddam regime, which was not 
good at managing its internal affairs, would pick up the territorial claim of the previous 
regime. 
Under the limitation of such an operating environment, the United Nations and the 
relevant member states would certainly be cautious about activating certain measures 
of the UNCSS that were relatively more forcible in territorial disputes. In the meantime, 
the ‘Coalition Forces’ and the UNIKOM that had already been deployed could also 
barely improve their own cost effectiveness. As a result, since the use of force was 
already meant to consume a lot of manpower, at the peaks of the ‘Coalition Forces’ and 
the UNIKOM, they used to deploy nearly 1 million personnel and more than 3600 
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755 The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1992 (Routledge
 1992) 102-26. 
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personnel respectively (see above). More seriously, other than manpower, the forcible 
measures of the UNCSS were also astonishingly expensive in terms of financial power. 
According to the statistics that were declassified after the Gulf War, from the start of 
the Gulf crisis to the end of the Gulf War, the ‘Coalition Forces’ spent approximately 
70 billion USD in less than half a year. Similarly, although the size of the ‘Coalition 
Forces’ was 260 times more than that of the UNIKOM, but the latter still spent nearly 
600 million USD, meaning that its cost per unit was even higher than that of the 
‘Coalition Forces’.757 
Thirdly, the background of the decision-making process of the forcible measures 
of the UNCSS are comparatively imbalanced.  
Analyzing the details of the present case, it can be seen that the appearance of this 
shortcoming is directly caused by the different national strength of the subjects of 
territorial disputes, namely the member states of the United Nations. On the one hand, 
overviewing all the ‘major members’ of the international community, only a small 
amount of them have the necessary military preparedness, financial resources and 
knowhow to send their troops to overseas territories.758 On the other hand, recalling the 
negative influence of ‘power politics’ (see 6.1 below) upon modern international 
relations, it is also unrealistic to expect those capable states to willingly lend their troops 
without asking for compensation or rewards.759 Therefore, when dealing with other 
international disputes in which the costs are relatively low, the forcible measures of the 
UNCSS could still be called a fair choice with a neutral stance. However, when dealing 
with territorial disputes in which the costs are relatively high, they might inevitably be 
                                                        
757 Tencent News, ‘Intolerable Numbers: How much money have been spent during the Gulf W
ar and Afterwards’ (16 May 2016) <https://new.qq.com/cmsn/20160516/20160516010739> accesse
d 1 September 2018; United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘Iraq/Kuwait-UNIKOM-Facts and Figures’ <
https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unikom/facts.html> accessed 6 September 2018. 
758 Through calculating the military history of development of the world from 1945 to 1989, it 
can be found that only the USA and the USSR might afford to send large-scale armed forces 
around the planet, and simultaneously fight a regional war in some places far away from their 
mainland, whilst the USSR had already ceased to exist in 1991, see Robert E. Harkavy, Bases 
Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence (OUP 1989) chs 2-4. 
759 Liu Dan, The Predicament and Prospect of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (C
urrent Affairs Press 2015) 49-58. 
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reduced to an involuntary tool dictated by the private desire of those global powers. 
Taking the suppliers of the ‘Coalition Forces’ and the UNIKOM as an example, during 
the process of forcibly sanctioning Iraq, the background of the decision-making process 
of the UNCSS at least had to face the following unavoidable difficulties:  
Firstly, the historical experience had proved that the expenses of the military 
enforcement actions were primarily shared by those states who either voluntarily 
provided their armed forces or voluntarily provided financial support. In contrast, the 
expenses of the peacekeeping operations were gathered from regular budget of the 
United Nations that was proportionally shared by member states of the United Nations 
on the basis of their economic size. Nevertheless, no matter in the former case or in the 
latter case, the Western Bloc which contained most of the developed states would 
always account for more than half of these expenses.760  
Secondly, the historical experience had also proved that the military/civilian personnel 
of the peacekeeping operations could largely come from developing states, such as the 
Bengal soldiers of the UNIKOM. Nevertheless, in terms of the armed forces that were 
involved in the military enforcement actions, at least one superpower which possessed 
the rare ability of intercontinental expedition and strategic logistics must form the 
backbone of these troops. This was evidenced by the American army in both the Korean 
War and the Gulf War. Besides, as a peacekeeping operation which was deployed 
immediately after the end of the Gulf War, it was doubtless that the participants of the 
UNIKOM and those of the ‘Coalition Forces’ were largely the same batch of states. This 
was evidenced by both the Western superpowers and their Bengal colleagues.761  
Thirdly, as mentioned above, territorial disputes were inherently not a kind of 
                                                        
760 UNGA Res 55/235 (23 December 2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/235; The Institute for Economi
cs and Peace, ‘Economic Consequences of War on the U.S. Economy’ (2012) 10 & 15-17 <htt
p://thereformedbroker.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Economic-Consequences-of-War.pdf> accesse
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761 D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study (Frederick A. Praeger 1964) pt 2, see
 especially chs 9, 11 & 14; United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘Iraq/Kuwait-UNIKOM-Facts and Fig
ures’ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unikom/facts.html> accessed 6 September 2018. 
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international dispute in which the intervening troops would be welcomed, or where the 
process of intervention would be simple to manage and cost-effective. Furthermore, 
ever since 1990 until the collapse of the Saddam regime in 2003, the Western Bloc led 
by the USA had tracked this case for more than ten years. Therefore, no matter acting 
within the framework of the UNCSS or not, the Western Bloc had no reason to let the 
arrangement of the United Nations became an obstacle that would undermine its 
interests.762  
Under the influence of such a background, the Western superpowers which afforded 
most of the financial expenses/armed forces would surely seek to dominate the decision-
making process of the ‘Coalition Forces’ and the UNIKOM. Meanwhile, with the help 
of their veto power, the implementation of the private desire of these superpowers in 
practice could not really be regulated inside the system of the United Nations as well. 
As the result, the announcement which declared the end of the Gulf War was actually 
made by Bush, the then president of the USA, not the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.763 Even worse, after the son of Bush had decided to attack Iraq in March of 
2003, the Secretary-General of the United Nations went so far as to suggest the 
UNIKOM to retreat from the demilitarized zone.764 Undoubtedly, facing the inherent 
advantages of their opponents in terms of ‘hard power’ and the above embarrassing 
situation, China and Russia would boycott the activation of the forcible measures of the 
UNCSS whenever it was possible. But say, if the Chinese or Russian opposition was 
adequately effective, then there was no need for the Western superpowers to indirectly 
make their rivals successful by wasting their resources. Therefore, it was not a surprise 
that the military enforcement actions were not used for such a long time, and it was also 
not a surprise that the peacekeeping operations could be suspended by the unilateral 
action of a few members of the P5. 
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In summary, the Gulf Crisis/War of the early 1990s has shown the effectiveness of the 
forcible measures of the UNCSS in handling territorial disputes. In addition, this case 
has also manifestly exposed multiple shared weaknesses of the United Nations 
authorized military enforcement actions and the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations. Realistically speaking, the forcible measures of the UNCSS definitely could 
achieve the predetermined purposes of ‘maintaining or restoring international peace and 
security’ of their parent mechanism. However, the inherent shortages of these measures, 
as listed above, could also hinder the perfect application of them in territorial disputes. 
Since the forcible measures are already the last weapon of the UNCSS, therefore, a 
reform plan for extricating the United Nations authorized military enforcement actions 
and peacekeeping operations from the present dilemma is certainly needed. According 




Chapter 6-The reform plan of the thesis 
Summarizing the substance of the previous chapter, it can be seen that the author does 
not stick to the examination of the legal shortages, theoretical flaws or ideological 
shortcomings of the UNCSS. In contrast, following the practice of the realists of the 
international relations academia, the author put more attention on exploring the practical 
power, costs and effect of the sanctionative measures of the UNCSS. However, although 
this thesis has partly deviated from the traditional paradigm of legal studies, but via the 
above analysis, it is still clear that the current UNCSS is not the perfect choice for 
‘maintaining or restoring international peace and security’- 
On the one hand, the capacity of the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS is relatively 
poor, and they cannot guarantee to achieve the predetermined purposes of their parent 
mechanism. On the other hand, the capacity of the forcible measures of the UNCSS is 
relatively good, but they have a variety of negative side-effects which could disturb the 
performance of themselves. As the ‘ultimate weapon’ of the entire system of the United 
Nations, such a status quo of the UNCSS is obviously not quite acceptable. 
Therefore, to finish the main chapters, and to enhance the originality and completeness 
of this thesis, it is necessary to provide an appropriate reform plan for the application 
of the UNCSS in territorial disputes. Besides, in view of the potential practical demands, 
a case study will be delineated for the purpose of testing and verifying the future 
application of the newly-proposed reform plan below. In terms of selecting the 
representative incident, being one of the famous, recent and ‘standard’ territorial 
disputes which has involved the P5, the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 is 
undoubtedly a perfectly suitable choice. 
6.1 The thoughts on the reform of the UNCSS 
Logically speaking, reform plans should be directed at the existing problems of their 
targets, and the reform plan regarding the UNCSS is of course not an exception. The 
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UNCSS, however, is a complex set of international security mechanism, and while the 
four types of measures available within its framework share some common 
disadvantages, each of them also has its own unique drawbacks. In addition, it must be 
recognized that both the non-forcible and the forcible measures of the UNCSS are in 
some circumstances capable of achieving the purpose of ‘maintaining or restoring 
international peace and security’. Thus, the upcoming reform should inherit the relevant 
positive features. Given the above, if the author attempts to construct a reform plan 
directly on the basis of the arguments of the preceding chapters, then it is highly likely 
that he will get a less ideal proposal that is quite trivial and partial. 
On this account, before touching upon the topic of this chapter, the author needs to 
collate the advantages and disadvantages of the UNCSS, which have been exposed 
during the process of applying this mechanism in territorial disputes. Based on the 
theories of the selected school of thought, the present section should illustrate the 
common characters shared by the above research findings and their origins, so as to 
provide a concise and accurate basis for the following reform plan. Bearing this 
requirement in mind and taking the realistic doctrines into account, the author believes 
that there are three general rules governing the application of the UNCSS in territorial 
disputes, as listed below:765 
In the first place, with regard to the purposes of ‘maintaining or restoring international 
peace and security’, the effectiveness of a particular measure increases in line with its 
mandatory power. Reviewing the records of the application of the UNCSS in territorial 
disputes, it can be seen that this is the clearest rule. Initially, as a particular type of non-
forcible measure which rigidly adhere to ‘oral criticism’, the United Nations authorized 
diplomatic sanctions are merely a preparatory/remedial measure that cannot 
independently defend ‘international peace and security’. As the result, this route can 
even be deliberately ignored by the authoritative institutions of the UNCSS. Next, the 
                                                        
765 Hans J. Morgenthau (author), Kenneth W. Thompson & David Clinton (revised), Politics am
ong Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power (7th edn, McGraw-Hill 2005) 4-16. 
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United Nations authorized economic sanctions have started to give up any unnecessary 
illusion about the self-control of the relevant parties. Nevertheless, the Ethiopia-Eritrea 
dispute and other related cases have indicated that this measure also cannot guarantee 
the improvement of peace and security in the context of territorial disputes. Then, with 
the gradual ‘militarization’ of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, the past 
experience of this measure in the region of Abyei is clearly better than its experience in 
the Sinai Peninsula. Lastly, as a measure that focuses entirely on the use of force, the 
United Nations authorized military enforcement actions have only been activated twice 
so far, but each time they did bring long-term peace to the disputed territories. 
In the second place, with regard to the purposes of ‘maintaining or restoring 
international peace and security’, the costs of a particular measure increase in line with 
its effectiveness. Reviewing the records of the application of the UNCSS in territorial 
disputes, it can be seen that this is the most awkward rule. Initially, as a particular type 
of measure with the form of a written statement or resolution, the United Nations 
authorized diplomatic sanctions cannot in itself lead to negative financial issues. In 
addition, the pure act of political isolation also cannot directly undermine the original 
national strength of the relevant parties, including third parties. Next, as a non-forcible 
measure which is inevitably ‘harmful’ to third parties, the United Nations authorized 
economic sanctions are virtually bound to hurt the relevant innocent states and people. 
Accordingly, the popularity of this measure has even been reduced. Then, as a forcible 
measure whose scope is constantly being expanded, the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations are consuming or taking over more and more various sources or national 
duties respectively. Lastly, since they are the ‘ultimate weapon’ of the UNCSS, the 
United Nations authorized military enforcement actions could lead to the 
intercontinental deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops of the third parties. 
Correspondingly, these operations have entailed huge budgets that are hundreds of times 
more than the regular budget of a single peacekeeping operation. 
In the third place, with regard to the purposes of ‘maintaining or restoring international 
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peace and security’, the relevance of the superpowers (especially the P5) increases in 
line with the costs of the related measure. Reviewing the records of the application of 
the UNCSS in territorial disputes, it can be seen that this is the most fatal rule. Initially, 
from South Africa to Crimea, the United Nations authorized diplomatic sanctions only 
need to fear the veto power of the P5 during their voting procedure, and the UNGA 
could occasionally become the decision-making institution of this measure. Next, from 
South Africa to Crimea, the application of the United Nations authorized economic 
sanctions always needs the cooperative will of the member states of the United Nations, 
and they also have to rely on the consent of the P5. Then, only the traditional 
peacekeeping operations used to be supervised by the UNGA, whilst the mandate of the 
complex and coercive peacekeeping operations is exclusively authorized by the UNSC. 
Meanwhile, although the peacekeepers could come from a wide range of states, they are 
funded through the regular budget of the United Nations shared by the member states 
on the basis of the size of their economy.766 Lastly, the United Nations authorized 
military enforcement actions are not only threatened by the veto power, but also 
restricted by the fact that their supreme-commanders and most of their military/financial 
resources are monopolized by the P5. More ironically, even the birth of the ‘United 
Nations Forces’ has to thank the accidental absence of one of the members of the P5. 
In short, the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes is a rather struggling issue, 
as the status quo of this mechanism has not found an equilibrium between efficiency, 
costs, fairness and effectiveness. Tracking its origin from the perspective of realism, it 
can be seen that this predicament is the specific result of the two key words that have 
been explicitly mentioned above, namely ‘power’ and ‘interests’, being reflected in the 
anarchic and international community: 
Firstly, according to Morgenthau, a confrontation between the actors of international 
relations is indeed a struggle for power by competing with their present national power 
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in hand. Once the international morality and international law of peacetime have lost 
their effectiveness, only sufficient national power can guarantee the secure position of 
the relevant parties.767 Meanwhile, the elements which form the national power can be 
divided into two categories. On the one hand, there are the intangible national character, 
national morale and the quality of diplomacy/government. On the other hand, there are 
the tangible geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness and 
population.768  
Secondly, again according to Morgenthau, the effect of the struggle for power is the 
redefinition of the relevant national interests, power is the precise route for gaining or 
losing interests, and the best defender of existing interests. Therefore, the substance of 
interests is ‘consistent with (national) power’, and the changes in power are bound to 
bring about the rise and fall of interests. 769  Meanwhile, the substance of national 
interests can also be divided into two categories, including the security interests that 
relate to the survival of states, and all other interests (e.g. economic interests) which 
serve national security.770  
Thirdly, on the basis of the doctrine of ‘classical realism’, Waltz has further pointed out 
that the international community is still being trapped in a state of anarchy. Thus, the 
United Nations is not the ‘world government’ which could discretionally command all 
the member states without any pre-condition.771 Meanwhile, states are also rational 
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actors who act on the basis of weighing their own national power and interests. Thereby, 
in order to keep their security, which is the most important national interest, the relevant 
states are allowed to abandon their remaining minor interests.772  
To sum up, international confrontations are indeed competition between various types 
of national power of states. In addition, the exercise or ‘alienation’ of national power by 
the relevant parties will not only restrain the power and interests of their targets, but 
also consume the power and interests of their own side. Furthermore, not all members 
of the current international community are willing or able to dedicate their national 
interests to others. Following these progressive principles, the spread of the above 
general rules is certainly both explainable and inevitable, as set out further below- 
On the one hand, as the main actor of international relations and the main subject of 
international law, states surely have the necessary national power that are more 
complete, persistent, or even solid than that of the other actors.773 In addition, as one 
of the four pre-conditions for qualifying a state, and the area which bears the weight of 
abundant values (see 3.1.2), the loss and gain of territories could surely affect the 
security and survival of states as well. 
On the other hand, an international security mechanism itself is nothing more than a 
collection of ‘principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures’ which is 
responsible for executing international law. Thus, when it is being applied in practice, 
the UNCSS still has to temporarily borrow a designated part of the national power of 
the member states of the United Nations (e.g. the non-forcible measures involve the 
quality of diplomacy, and the forcible-measures involve military preparedness774).775 In 
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addition, the current P5 jointly account for a quarter of the total population/land masses 
of the world, one third of the total volume of trade/consumption of natural 
resources/number of military personnel of the world, and roughly half of the total annual 
GDP/governmental budget/industrial output/military expenditure of the world. Literally 
speaking, their national power is far greater than that of the other 188 common member 
states of the United Nations.776 
Therefore, the conflict between territorial disputes and the UNCSS is indeed a 
confrontation between asymmetric types of national power. In view of the tremendous 
significance of territories in terms of national security, the relevant parties are usually 
generous with exercising their national power in handling this issue, and giving up their 
corresponding minor interests. Next, since the permanent national power of the relevant 
parties is naturally superior in almost all the other aspects, the temporary national power 
borrowed by the UNCSS clearly has no better choice but to come up with adequate 
coerciveness (or ‘mandatory power’). In details, such a mandatory power should at least 
let its partner measures touch upon the other interests that are also difficult to be 
abandoned by the relevant parties, and offset or surpass the attractiveness of the values 
of disputed territories. Then, with the increase of the coerciveness and quantity of the 
national power that has been taken away by the UNCSS, the tangible national power 
lent by the third parties will proportionally increase. Simultaneously, the supporting 
non-security interests sacrificed by these states will proportionally increase together 
with the national power on loan as well. Lastly, once the national power requisitioned 
by the UNCSS has exceeded the related threshold, the entire mechanism could easily 
fall into the predicament in which only the P5 can continue to afford the corresponding 
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heavy costs. In fact, Mearsheimer used to state that the national power of the 
superpowers is the real origin of the veto power, and the national power itself is the 
secondary veto power which further enables the P5 to willfully manipulate international 
affairs.777 
In summary, the afore-listed general rules governing the application of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes are not a series of argument without theoretical explanations. They 
should be regarded as the outcome of the contradiction between the demands of the 
UNCSS for national power and the original owners of national power, driven by the 
security interests of states. Bearing this inference in mind, and taking these three rules 
into account, the author believes that the thoughts on the reform of the UNCSS should 
also contain three corresponding points as follows: 
Firstly, the application of definite measures of the UNCSS with higher mandatory power 
should be increased, this thought answers the first general rule above. From the previous 
analysis, it can be known that under the influence of the nature of international 
confrontations, those measures of the UNCSS with higher mandatory power are more 
effective in handling territorial disputes. On this account, since the rate of success of 
the UNCSS is associated with the coerciveness of the power borrowed by this 
mechanism, the relevant reform plan ought to comply with this trend. Otherwise, if the 
United Nations choose to blindly obey the principle of ‘peacefully settling international 
disputes’, then the UNCSS will inevitably become a less effective mechanism that is 
not expected by the international community. 
Secondly, the costs of definite measures of the UNCSS with higher mandatory power 
should be reduced, this thought answers the second general rule above. From the 
previous analysis, it can be known that under the influence of the interaction between 
national power and interests, those measures of the UNCSS with higher effectiveness 
are more costly in handling territorial disputes. On this account, since the price-
                                                        




performance ratio of the UNCSS is associated with the consumption of the national 
power (and the supporting interests) of the third parties, the relevant reform plan ought 
to break this link. Otherwise, if the United Nations choose to blindly demand the 
national power/interests of its member states, then the UNCSS will inevitably become 
a less efficient mechanism that is not welcomed by the international community. 
Thirdly, the independency of definite measures of the UNCSS with higher mandatory 
power should be improved, this thought answers the third general rule above. From the 
previous analysis, it can be known that under the influence of the anarchic and rational 
international community, those measures of the UNCSS with higher expenses are 
relying more on the superpowers in handling territorial disputes. On this account, since 
the impartiality of the UNCSS is associated with the support of the will of the P5, the 
relevant reform plan ought to eliminate this hidden trouble. Otherwise, if the United 
Nations choose to blindly allow the superpowers, especially the P5 to interfere its 
decision-making process and activities at will, then the UNCSS will inevitably become 
a less impartial mechanism that is not trusted by the international community. 
6.2 The suggestions on the reform of the UNCSS 
According to the above section which is built on the arguments of the last chapter, there 
are not only some disadvantages that are waiting to be reformed, but also some general 
rules that can guide the reform of the system. Nevertheless, although both the practical 
demands and the theoretical roadmap for reforming this mechanism are quite clear, but 
from the previous literature review, it still can be seen that scholars have not really 
focused on addressing this issue. Likewise, if one examines the past reforms made to 
the United Nations in the past 70 years, it is evident that virtually no special attention 
has been paid to the narrow field of the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes-
778 
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s Law, see e.g. Peter G. Danchin & Horst Fischer (eds), United Nations Reform and the New 
Collective Security (CUP 2010), especially introduction & pt 1. 
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In the first place, due to the gigantic system of the United Nations and the depressive 
history of the UNCSS, the majority of the reforms to the United Nations have never 
particularly touched upon the UNCSS.779 For instance, although the expansion of the 
UNSC used to affect the operation of the UNCSS, the main objective of this reform was 
actually to re-balance the ‘regional representation’ of the member states.780 In the 
second place, due to the changing nature of international disputes and the shifting 
interests of the superpowers, the majority of the reforms to the United Nations also have 
never particularly touched upon territorial disputes. 781  For instance, although the 
emergence of the United Nations peacekeeping operations used to be prompted by 
territorial disputes, the main objective of this mechanism was to merely act as a 
substitute the for the ‘United Nations Forces’.782 
Therefore, as afore-mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the author needs to 
provide an independent reform plan for the application of the UNCSS in territorial 
disputes. Recalling the predetermined purposes of ‘maintaining or restoring 
international peace and security’ of the UNCSS, and based on the three afore-mentioned 
thoughts, the author recommends the United Nations to adopt a few regulatory methods 
as follows: 
1. Extensively authorizing the use of forcible measures. 
As the name shows, this suggestion addresses the first afore-mentioned thought on the 
reform of the UNCSS. On the one hand, by reviewing the two sets of measures of the 
UNCSS, it can be seen that the level of coerciveness of a particular measure is 
                                                        
779 Spencer Zifcak, United Nations Reform: Heading North or South? (Routledge 2009) chs 2, 
5 & 6, see especially 90-104. 
780 E.g. Theoretically speaking, the increase of the number of the member states from the regio
ns of Asia, Africa and Latin America has reduced the ability of the Western global powers to 
dominate the voting procedure and result of the UNSC, see e.g. Peter Nadin, UN Security Cou
ncil Reform (Routledge 2016) 72-94; Zhu Dawei, ‘The Origin, Process and Inspiration of the fi
rst expansion of the UNSC’ (2009) 11 (1) Journal of Wuhan University of Science and Techno
logy (Social Science Edition) 90 at 90-92. 
781 See e.g. Peter G. Danchin & Horst Fischer (eds), United Nations Reform and the New Coll
ective Security (CUP 2010) pts 2-3. 
782 Norrie Macqueen, Peacekeeping and the International System (Routledge 2006) 63-75. 
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determined by whether it has resorted to the use of force or not. On the other hand, from 
the United Nations authorized diplomatic sanctions to the military enforcement actions, 
it also can be seen that only the forcible measures of the UNCSS have gained relatively 
positive experiences in practice relates to territorial disputes. For these reasons, under 
the condition of seizing the right of amending their decisions, the United Nations could 
widely authorize those ‘collective security’ operations which prepare to intercept 
territorial disputes to activate forcible measures. Thus, the effectiveness of the 
intervention of the UNCSS may be further ensured. For example, by means of the 
discretion of the UNSC, the proper increase of the frequency of specifying the phrase 
of ‘calls upon (member states) to take all necessary measures’ in the relevant resolutions 
might be an acceptable idea.783 
Besides, with regard to the practical implementation of this suggestion, a preparatory 
step that must be emphasized is the determination of the definition of the ‘standard’ 
territorial disputes. As afore-mentioned, the international legal academia still has not 
reached a consensus on the definition of territorial disputes, so that even this thesis has 
to discuss the ‘working definition’ of territorial disputes in its introduction. Concerning 
the value and interests involved in territories, however, it is clear that the current 
situation actually has left a dangerous vacuum regarding the interpretation of the 
concept of territorial disputes. Thereby, the forcible measures could be abused by 
definite parties in this field, via deliberately misreading the relevant norms. On this 
account, under the condition of seizing the right of explaining their decisions, the United 
Nations could entrust its authoritative legal institutions with the task of accurately 
defining territorial disputes. Thus, the UNCSS may avoid becoming a tool for realizing 
the private will of definite superpowers. For example, by means of the discretion of the 
UNSC, the adoption of a definite statute which is similar to resolution 3314 of the 
                                                        
783 It should be clarified that having the principle of the prohibition on the use of force and t
he possible deliberate misinterpretation of several global powers in mind, the United Nations au
thorized military enforcement actions must exist in the relevant resolutions as the final measure,
 not the measure which enjoys priority, and the target, duration and operation of them must be




UNGA (the definition of ‘invasion’ was determined here) might be an acceptable 
idea.784 
2. Preventively reserving emergency funds. 
As the name shows, this suggestion addresses the second afore-mentioned thought on 
the reform of the UNCSS. On the one hand, as a particular type of international security 
mechanism which relies on national power and interests, the simplest way for the 
UNCSS to exclude the interference of third parties is to accumulate its own power and 
interests. In this way, the UNCSS may avoid begging those superpowers for help, or 
apportion its expenses among weaker states, as the relevant operations are now backed 
by first-hand resources. On the other hand, analyzing the various powers and interests 
that have been involved in the use of the forcible measures of the UNCSS, it is clear 
that the only three recurrent key words are human resources, material resources and 
financial resources. Besides, according to classical military doctrines, a substantial 
financial budget is also the basis for recruiting human resources and material 
resources.785 For these reasons, under the condition of seizing the right to distribute the 
relevant currency, the United Nations could reserve some emergency funds for 
supplying the engagement between the UNCSS and territorial disputes. Thus, the costs 
of handling territorial disputes may be compensated. For example, by means of the co-
ordination of the UNSC, the periodical raise/reserve of a sum of special funds of the 
United Nations which imitates the annual budget of the peacekeeping operations might 
be an acceptable idea. 
3. Appropriately arranging remedial measures. 
As the name shows, this suggestion also addresses the second afore-mentioned thought 
on the reform of the UNCSS. On the one hand, as a particular type of international 
security mechanism which relies on national power and interests, even the non-forcible 
                                                        
784 Definition of Aggression, UNGA Res 3314 (adopted 14 December 1974) UN Doc A/RES/3
314 (XXIX). 
785 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (John Minford tr, Penguin 2008) ch 2. 
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measures of the UNCSS could inevitably hurt the innocent third parties (e.g. economic 
sanctions). On the other hand, owing to the inherent characters of the forcible measures, 
it is even more difficult to avoid the side-effects of the peacekeeping operations/military 
enforcement actions regarding the third parties (e.g. casualties). Besides, revising those 
multilateral international conventions of the past over 70 years, it also can be seen that 
the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes has not been regulated by any 
particular remedial scheme (even the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations relates to the general remedial measures is a very recent 
product of 2011786 ). For these reasons, under the condition of seizing the right to 
weighing the corresponding remedies, the United Nations could arrange certain 
remedial measures for compensating the engagement between the UNCSS and 
territorial disputes. Thus, the hidden troubles left by the settlement of territorial disputes 
may be offset. For example, by means of the guidance of the UNSC (or the ILC), the 
compilation of a United Nations working handbook which lists the accessible remedial 
measures might be an acceptable idea. 
4. Specifically establishing supervisory department. 
As the name shows, this suggestion addresses the third afore-mentioned thought on the 
reform of the UNCSS. On the one hand, while the peacekeeping operations have their 
own UNDPKO, the supreme commanders of the military enforcement actions are 
monopolized by the P5, this is certainly harmful to the impartial settlement of territorial 
disputes. On the other hand, the history of the Military Staff Committee has proved that 
a sole ‘Military Commanding Post’ attached to the United Nations can easily be 
paralyzed by the great power politics. Besides, the authoritative institutions of the 
UNCSS, such as the UNSC, are all quite busy in managing various security issues, so 
that they certainly cannot continuously keep their attention on a single matter.787 For 
                                                        
786 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations’ (adopted 3 June 20
11) UN Doc A/66/100, arts 30-31 & 34-37. 
787 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 24; Dai Yi, A 
Research on the Issue of Reform of the UNCSS (Chinese Social Science Press 2014) 40-45. 
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these reasons, under the condition of seizing the right to lead the new department, the 
United Nations could set up a unique department for supervising the engagement 
between the UNCSS and territorial disputes. Thus, while the veto power is still there, 
the negative procedural influence of the superpowers may be reduced anyway. For 
example, by means of the organization of the UNSC, the creation of a subsidiary organ 
of the United Nations which imitates either the UNDPKO or the PBC might be an 
acceptable idea.788 
5. Tentatively assembling guarding forces. 
As the name shows, this suggestion also addresses the third afore-mentioned thought 
on the reform of the UNCSS. On the one hand, while the peacekeepers may come from 
every corner of the world, most of the military enforcers are sent by the P5, this is 
certainly harmful to the impartial settlement of territorial disputes as well. On the other 
hand, the history of the ‘United Nations Forces’ has proved that the nature of an 
independent ‘Global Standby Forces’ can easily be altered by the great power politics. 
For these reasons, under the condition of seizing the right to control the related troops, 
the United Nations could attempt to assembly a guarding force for reinforcing the 
engagement between the UNCSS and territorial disputes. Thus, while there is no match 
for the overall national strength, especially military strength of the superpowers, the 
negative influence of them upon the related cases may be reduced. For example, the 
recruitment of a United Nations ‘Guarding Forces’ which imitates the Pontifical Swiss 
Guard might be an acceptable idea. 
Besides, with regard to the practical implementation of this suggestion, a preparatory 
step that must be emphasized is the determination of the details of the guarding forces. 
As it is well-known to all the relevant practitioners, once the United Nations has 
acquired a regular armed forces under its name, it has taken an important step towards 
                                                        
788 Regarding the general structure and operational history of the DPKO or PBC, see e.g. Hylk
e Dijkstra, International Organizations and Military Affairs (Routledge 2017) 63-82; Rob Jenkin
s, Peacebuilding: From Concept to Commission (Routledge 2011) 46-52 & 76-117. 
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the establishment of a ‘world government’.789 However, in view of the fact that the 
current international community cannot even tolerate the revival of the ‘United Nations 
Forces’, such a tentative step will clearly heighten the vigilance of the relevant states, 
including the P5. On this account, other than the conservative name of ‘guarding 
forces/guards’, there are another four supplementary advises in relation to this 
suggestion: 
Firstly, concerning the reaction of the international community, the size of the guarding 
forces should neither be too large, nor too small. In details, the author believes that the 
proper figure is 1-2 brigades, or approximately 10,000 military personnel. Secondly, 
concerning the impartiality of the forcible measures of the UNCSS, the members of the 
guarding forces should not be recruited from any superpower which has complex 
international relationship with other states. In details, the author believes that the United 
Nations could seek help from neutral states and volunteers, following the example of 
the Pontifical Swiss Guard. Meanwhile, the garrisons of the guarding forces may be 
located in certain neutral cities which have liaison offices or institutions of the United 
Nations, such as Geneva. Thirdly, concerning the nature of the guarding forces, the 
deployment of them should not be discussed by the UNSC/UNGA. In details, the author 
believes that this army should be sent directly by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, at the official invitation of the legal governments of the relevant states. 
Fourthly, concerning the degree of difficulty of handling territorial disputes and other 
similar missions, the guarding forces should possess a number of heavy weaponries. In 
details, the author believes that the related costs could come from the aforesaid special 
funds, and the suppliers of these weapons could be some neutral states which have a 
highly-developed military industry, such as Sweden. Besides, these heavy weaponries 
do not have to be heavy bombers or main battle tanks, but they should be something 
(e.g. armored vehicles or utility helicopters) that cannot be destroyed by small arms or 
                                                        
789 Hans J. Morgenthau (author), Kenneth W. Thompson & David Clinton (revised), Politics am




In short, the author suggests that the United Nations should plan the applicable reform 
in regard to the settlement of territorial disputes from five directions that mutually 
supplement each other. The overall idea is to pave the way for the use of those measures 
of the UNCSS that have more mandatory power, and to consolidate the foundations for 
the same batch of measures, so as to achieve the eventual balance of efficiency, costs 
and fairness. Besides, it should of course be acknowledged that the reform plan offered 
by this section has not touched upon the most controversial issue-the veto power. 
However, since the power of veto can only be abolished through an amendment of the 
UN Charter, which itself requires the unanimity of the P5, it is certain that this must be 
discounted as a realistic proposition for the moment.790 In other words, there is still 
definite space for the further improvement of the suggestions listed by this section, but 
this has gone beyond the range of capacity of the international legal academia. 
6.3 The potential effect of the reform of the UNCSS: a case study of the application 
of the UNCSS in the Crimea Crisis 
As mentioned in the last sections, the proposed reform plan of the author needs to be 
tested and verified in practice, and in this regard the Crimea Crisis of 2014 is a suitable 
recent case. Therefore, the author will now turn to research this internal confrontation 
between two Slavdoms. On the basis of this last major section, this thesis will attempt 
to explain the practicability of the relevant reform of the UNCSS, and the positive 
influence of such reform upon future territorial disputes. 
1. Historical background. 
Crimea is a peninsula on the northern coast of the Black Sea, between the mainland of 
Ukraine and Russia, where ethnic Russians account for two thirds of its population.791 
                                                        
790 Charter of the United Nations (signed 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 108. 
791 The Government of Republic of Crimea, ‘About the Republic of Crimea’ (2017) <https://rk.
gov.ru/ru/structure/931> accessed 1 November 2018. 
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Before the 18th century, Crimea was the territory of the Tartars under the rule of the 
Ottoman Empire, but the Russian Empire took control of this region in 1783, and the 
Slavs successively began to immigrate into Crimea in large numbers.792 As Crimea 
could oversee the entire area around the Black Sea, the Russian Empire and the 
successive USSR chose to set up the headquarters of their Black Sea Fleet in the most 
important port of this peninsula-Sevastopol. Additionally, the Russians also established 
multiple military bases around the peninsula of Crimea.793 As the result, with numerous 
troops stationed over there, Crimea became one of the famous battlefields in the modern 
history of the world. From the early Russo-Turkish War, through to the Crimean War 
and the WWII, Crimea had always been a main site of the various armed conflicts which 
involved Russia/the USSR. Besides, it is also noteworthy that as an event which created 
the international system of the era of the Cold War, the Yalta conference was also held 
in Crimea.794 
In 1954, for the purpose of celebrating the 300’s birthday of the union between Ukraine 
and Russia, the ownership of Crimea was transferred from Russia to Ukraine under the 
order of the then paramount leader of the USSR, Khrushchev. Since both Russia and 
Ukraine were subordinate republics within the USSR, this change was treated as a minor 
adjustment of two domestic administrative divisions then, and it did not lead to any 
noticeable protest or objection.795 Unfortunately, such an enjoyable interaction between 
Russia and Ukraine did not last long-enough. At the end of 1991, the USSR 
disintegrated into 15 new states, and Crimea became an autonomous republic of the 
independent Ukraine under the mediation of Russia. However, according to the relevant 
agreement between these two parties, the Black Sea Fleet of Russia would continue to 
use the port of Sevastopol, thus creating one of the hidden troubles for the upcoming 
Crimea Crisis.796 
                                                        
792 Neil Kent, Crimea: A History (C. Hurst & Co. 2016) chs 2-3. 
793 Neil Kent, Crimea: A History (C. Hurst & Co. 2016) chs 4-5. 
794 Neil Kent, Crimea: A History (C. Hurst & Co. 2016) chs 6-9. 
795 Neil Kent, Crimea: A History (C. Hurst & Co. 2016) 141. 
796 Neil Kent, Crimea: A History (C. Hurst & Co. 2016) 147. 
252 
 
Entering the year of 2014, the fragile political balance of Crimea was eventually 
damaged by the influence of international politics. Due to the decades-long economic 
hardship since the collapse of the USSR, the non-Russian citizens of Ukraine 
overwhelmingly wished to join the EU. Nonetheless, the draft agreement signed 
between Ukraine and the EU was rejected by its then pro-Russian president, 
Yanukovych.797 Affected by this political decision, a large-scale pro-EU protest broke 
out within Ukraine, which quickly led to the resignation of Yanukovych and the rise to 
power of the pro-Western factions. 798  Facing the sudden change of the domestic 
situation of Ukraine, as it did not want to lose its old brother-in-arms, Russia 
immediately decided to intervene in the internal affairs of Ukraine. In terms of the 
starting point of this hegemonic operation, owing to its strategic value, historical origin 
and ethnic conditions, there was no doubt that Crimea would become the primary target 
in the eyes of Russia.799 
In late February of 2014, on the pretext of supporting Yanukovych, the local authority 
of Crimea held a special meeting, and according started the preparations for breaking 
away from Ukraine. On March 1st, the Gosduma, or Parliament of Russia authorized 
president Putin to use armed forces inside the territories of Ukraine without the 
permission of the United Nations, so as to support the pro-Russian rebels over there.800 
Soon afterwards, the Black Sea Fleet and the Russian army entered into Crimea and 
rapidly occupied the entire peninsula, whilst the local Ukrainian troops were either 
disarmed or forced to surrender to the Russians. On March 16th, the local authority of 
Crimea unilaterally held a referendum to determine the ownership of this region-
nevertheless, since there were Russia armed forces all over the place, the result of this 
referendum had already been decided.801 On March 18th, the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea and the City of Sevastopol officially applied to become new federal subjects of 
                                                        
797 Serhii Plokhy, The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine (Basic Books 2015) 333-40. 
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799 Steven Rosefielde, The Kremlin Strikes Back: Russia and the West After Crimea’s Annexatio
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Russia, and Putin approved the relevant legal documents within three days. On April 
11th, Russia announced the amendment of its constitution whereby the entire region of 
Crimea had acquired the status of a federal subject of Russia, and thus the legal 
procedure for annexing Crimea was completed.802 On June 7th, the elected president of 
Ukraine, Poroshenko, vowed to regain the lost territory of Crimea sooner or later, but 
until mid-2018, the entire peninsula had remained firmly controlled by Russia.803 
2. The absence of the UNCSS and the analysis of the problems. 
Facing this sudden test of a territorial dispute actively initiated by one of the P5, the 
responses of the members of the international community were certainly not the same, 
yet there was no lack of efficiency and clearness. On the one hand, in late March, the 
major states of the former Western Bloc successively stated their collective viewpoint, 
claiming that they would support the overthrow of the Yanukovych regime, but would 
refuse to recognize the legality of the referendum held in Crimea.804 On the other hand, 
as a member of the former Eastern Bloc who stuck to traditional legal principles, China 
announced that it would respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, but 
it did not openly oppose the annexation of Crimea.805 However, while most of the other 
major actors of the international community were busy expressing their political stance, 
the reaction of the United Nations was rather slow. More seriously, the measures 
adopted by it in respect to the present case exerted no meaningful influence on the 
development of the situation: 
On March 1st of 2014, after Putin had been authorized by his parliament to use armed 
forces, the UNSC eventually held its first urgent meeting on the situation of Crimea. 
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The only outcome of this meeting, however, was a declaration of the then Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, expressing his concern about the issue 
Ukraine. Other than that, Ban just called on the international community to respect the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. On March 15th of 2014, several Western 
states submitted a draft resolution on the upcoming referendum, in which they asked 
the UNSC to confirm that this referendum was invalid. Unsurprisingly, this draft 
resolution was vetoed by Russia, with China choosing to abstain from the voting 
procedure. On March 27th when Crimea had already been annexed by Russia for a week, 
the above draft resolution was submitted to the UNGA without any amendment. In this 
forum where each vote was equal, this resolution was eventually adopted. However, 
since the resolution of the UNGA was not legally binding on any member state of the 
United Nations, this served only to display the general attitude of most of the third 
parties to the direct parties per se.806 
Thereafter, the United Nations institutions fell into a state of inertia in terms of the 
dispute over the sovereign ownership of Crimea. Due to the unique and asymmetric 
status of the P5, the entire system of the United Nations (including the UNCSS) 
remained silent for more than three and a half years. During this period, as they already 
had a good knowledge of the procedural obstacles of this organization, the Western 
states chose to ignore the authorization of the United Nations again, and unilaterally 
imposed a series of economic sanctions upon Russia.807 Nevertheless, although these 
states hoped that their sanctions could force Russia to make compromise, but in fact, 
Russia separately initiated a new armed conflict in the Donbass region of East Ukraine 
from April of 2014 onwards. Half a year after the Putin regime had started to intervene 
in the War in Donbass under the pressure of economic decline, the Minsk Protocol 
signed in September resulted in Ukraine losing effective control over two of its border 
regions in the East.808 Then, recently on December 19th of 2017, the UNGA finally 
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passed a non-binding resolution in which it confirmed that the annexation of Crimea by 
Russia was an illegal act of occupation.809 Unfortunately, by this time, the attention of 
the international community had been transferred to Syria, and the transitional 
administrative institutions of Crimea had even been merged with the Southern Federal 
District of Russia.810 
Overviewing the role played by the United Nations in the Crimea Crisis, it can be said 
that this organization was almost a bystander to the dispute. Despite the clear forcible 
annexation of the territories of a member state of the United Nations, the intervention 
of the UNCSS could be regarded as little better than nothing. Needless to say, such a 
practical record definitely should be re-examined by the relevant researchers, and it 
needs to be corrected by the relevant reform plan as well. Fortunately, with regard to 
the origin of the above dilemma, it is not difficult to find out that the failure of the 
UNCSS in this case is in accordance with the aforementioned general rules: 
Firstly, the activation of the measures with higher mandatory power must rely on the 
will of superpowers. According to the conclusion of the previous sections, during the 
process of activating such measures, the influence of the national power of the 
superpowers is everywhere. On the one hand, the deployment of a peacekeeping 
operation needs the authorization of the UNCSS, and the budget for this measure is also 
controlled by those economic superpowers (including the P5, see above). On the other 
hand, the organization of a military enforcement action also needs the authorization of 
the UNCSS, and its human resources, material resources, financial resources and even 
commanders are all controlled/sent by the P5. Under this circumstance, the United 
Nations authorized forcible sanction against Russia is obviously unrealistic- 
Initially, given that until early 2014, Russia (as the successor to the USSR) had exercised 
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its veto more than any other member of the P5, it was unsurprising that it should do so 
again when such a use was undoubtedly in its own national interest.811 Next, Russia 
and the member states of the CIS accounted for roughly 5% of the annual budget of the 
peacekeeping operations, and as its potential, although in this case ambiguous, ally, 
China accounted for 10% of this budget. Summing up the general facts about the 
existing peacekeeping operations, it could be found that the resistance of the former 
Eastern Bloc might make 2 or 3 peacekeeping operations in other regions being beset 
by financial troubles.812 Finally, Russia was the largest country in the world, and also 
the one with the largest nuclear arsenal, plus its regular forces were among the most 
powerful armies in the world as well.813 To those Western superpowers, punishing 
Russia through military force was not a feasible option, and indeed their reluctant 
attitude in this field had already been exposed in South Ossetia. 
Secondly, those measures with less mandatory power are not effective in this 
circumstance. According to the conclusion of the previous sections, during the process 
of applying sanctions with less coercive power, the influence of the national interests of 
superpowers is also everywhere, just like their national power. On the one hand, it is 
true that the United Nations authorized diplomatic sanctions do not have to rely on the 
UNSC, but oral criticism and political isolation cannot directly undermine the inherent 
national strength of the parties. On the other hand, while the United Nations authorized 
economic sanctions certainly can undermine the inherent national strength of the parties, 
their success depends on the cooperation and sacrifice made by the relevant member 
states. Under this circumstance, the United Nations authorized non-forcible sanction 
against Russia is obviously insufficient– 
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Initially, again due to the veto power of Russia, the diplomatic sanctions proposed 
during the Crimea Crisis had to be processed by the UNGA, whilst the corresponding 
economic sanctions could not be enacted at all through the United Nations. Next, 
according to the arguments listed in previous sections, Crimea can be seen to possess 
significant military, historical, geographic and ethnic value (see 3.1.2), and thus to be 
particularly closely linked to the security interests of Russia. Given the abundant value 
of Crimea, and its own security interests, even if Russia did care about its international 
reputation, it would be exceptionally unlikely to abandon a strategically important place 
simply to preserve that reputation. Finally, it was true that the unilateral economic 
sanctions started by the Western Bloc had reduced the annual GDP of Russia. 
Nonetheless, owing to the nature of this type of punishment, over half of the members 
of the international community were not obligated to suspend their regular trade 
relations with Russia. More ironically, Russia was a long-term provider of the oil and 
gas resources consumed by Western European states, so it was even not suitable for the 
Western Bloc to overly cut off their economic ties with Russia.814 
In short, thanks to its status as one of the P5 and the power/interests attached to such a 
status, Russia could rather easily eliminate or ignore the substantial intervention of the 
UNCSS. Besides, it is noteworthy that owing to the absence of the UNCSS, and 
especially any of its more coercive measures, most of the member states of the United 
Nations did not pay any heavy price for the issue of Crimea. However, concerning the 
national power of Russia and the escalation of the situation after the start of the 
economic sanction, it is predictable that the cost of applying such coercive measures in 
respect to this case would be quite heavy. 
3. The reform of the UNCSS and the possible intervention. 
Reviewing the entire process of the settlement of the Crimea Crisis and the above 
analysis, it can be seen that the current UNCSS basically cannot deal with the territorial 
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issues involving the P5. As discussed in the previous sections, however, there are 
opportunities to make changes, and the author has prepared a series of suggestions in 
this regard. Therefore, the final part of this case study will attempt to apply the proposed 
reform plan to the settlement of the Crimea Crisis, and this will allow the author to infer 
the practical effect of his plan. In consideration of the fact that the above five 
suggestions have not directly asked for the abolishment of the veto power of the P5, this 
section will take the use or non-use of the veto power by Russia as the standard for 
division. Therefrom, the author will assess the intervention of the newly reformed 
UNCSS by dividing its practice into two separate situations: 
The first situation is the case that Russia has chosen not to use its veto power. As 
discussed before, given the abundant value of Crimea and the attraction of its own 
national security interests, it is extremely unlikely for Russia to ignore its veto power in 
this case. Nevertheless, if Russia does allow the UNCSS to play its role freely (this 
situation can also provide reference to other common cases in which the direct parties 
do not have the veto power), then the challenge for this mechanism is to deter Russia’s 
desire to annex Crimea. By examining the reformed UNCSS which has adopted all the 
above suggestions, the author believes that it is definitely possible to accomplish this 
mission– 
During the starting phase of the application of the UNCSS, since both Russia and 
Ukraine are member states of the United Nations, and Crimea is a piece of land 
territories, this case will surely be regarded as a ‘standard’ territorial dispute. On this 
basis, according to the fist suggestion of this chapter, it is highly possible that the UNSC 
will add the provision of authorizing the member states of the United Nations to use ‘all 
necessary measures’ to the relevant resolutions. Thereby, the way for the international 
community to forcibly intervene in the Crimea Crisis would be paved by the 
authoritative institution of the UNCSS. 
During the intermediate phase of the application of the UNCSS, since the UNSC has 
implied the use of force, those third parties who dislike the acts of Russia certainly can 
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organize a coercive peacekeeping force or a ‘United Nations Forces’. In addition, 
according the past experience, it can take some time to deploy the peacekeeping 
forces/’United Nations Forces’, and in this context the newly reformed supporting 
mechanism of the UNCSS could properly fill the gap. On the one hand, under the 
invitation of the government of Ukraine, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
could personally order the instant deployment of the guarding forces of the United 
Nations in Crimea. On the other hand, the supervisory department and reserved funds 
can guarantee the normal operation of the guarding forces of the United Nations in a 
short period of time. Additionally, after the ‘United Nations Forces’ have arrived at 
Crimea, the supervisory department which has got acquainted with local situation may 
immediately take over the command of these troops (the command of the peacekeeping 
forces could be given to other corresponding institutions). Besides, at the beginning of 
2014, there was only one Russian marine brigade in Crimea, this was certainly no match 
for the guarding forces of the United Nations, as the latter had more personnel in the 
name of justice.815 
During the finishing phase of the application of the UNCSS, since Russia is one of the 
P5 and a military giant, it is unrealistic to expect that the peacekeeping forces/ ‘United 
Nations Forces’ can merely pay a limited price in practice. Fortunately, the existence of 
the remedial measures may more or less improve the enthusiasm of the participants of 
the relevant coercive operations, albeit these measures cannot completely cover the 
costs of the third parties. In addition, since the guarding forces of the United Nations 
have reinforced the armed forces of the third parties, they have accordingly shared a 
few corresponding costs which used to be afforded by those third parties as well. 
Besides, being an imitation of the UNPKO, the supervisory department certainly can 
undertake more civil administrative duties than any military headquarters, and this is 
                                                        
815 Since Russia has chosen not to use its veto power in its case, it can be assumed that Russ
ia does not want to escalate the situation. Thereby, it is predictable that the Putin regime will 
send more troops to reinforce the single marine brigade of the Black Sea Fleet, otherwise he c
ould directly veto the relevant resolution, see The International Institute of Strategic Studies (II
SS), The Military Balance 2014 (Routledge 2014) 185. 
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indeed quite helpful to the post-conflict ‘peacebuilding’ of Crimea.  
The second situation is the case that Russia has chosen to use its veto power. As 
discussed before, given the abundant value of Crimea and the attraction of its own 
national security interests, the logical choice for Russia is to use its veto power. Under 
such a circumstance, the challenge for this mechanism is to defend the political status 
quo of Crimea without overly provoking Russia. By examining the reformed UNCSS 
which has adopted all the above suggestions, the author believes that it is definitely 
possible to accomplish this mission– 
During the initial phase of the application of the UNCSS, since Russia has vetoed the 
deployment of peacekeeping forces or the revived ‘United Nations Forces’, the first and 
third suggestions of this chapter will lose their practical significance. Nevertheless, 
under the invitation of the government of Ukraine, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations can still instantly send the guarding forces of the United Nations to Crimea, as 
this matter is at his personal discretion. No matter what kind of tactics will be applied 
by the international community thereafter, the armed forces stationed in Crimea under 
the name of the United Nations could always buy some time/acquire a better situation 
for Ukraine. Meanwhile, even if the amount of the emergency funds may limit the length 
of the deployment of the guarding forces of the United Nations, it is still better than the 
complete absence of the UNCSS in a ‘standard’ territorial dispute. 
During the intermediate phase of the application of the UNCSS, if Russia has not 
blocked the local traffic system, then the guarding forces of the United Nations could 
be sent to the Kerch Strait. Thereby, the potential road of the coming main forces of 
Russia will be closed. Otherwise, if Russia has blocked the local traffic system, then the 
guarding forces of the United Nations could be deployed in the Perekop Isthmus and 
the remaining Ukrainian settlements. Thereby, the tragedy of the total expulsion of the 
influence of Ukraine from Crimea might be avoided. In view of the narrow terrain of 
these two places, a few thousand personnel under the name of the United Nations should 
be more than enough. Furthermore, concerning the fact that Russia only dared to use 
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the ‘little green men’ against its weak neighbor in real history, it is predictable that the 
intervention of the guarding forces of the United Nations can hardly be publicly opposed 
by Russia.816 
During the finishing phase of the application of the UNCSS, since Russia has been 
trapped in Crimea, it is highly possible that there will be no uprising in the region of 
Donbass then. In addition, thanks to the grace period and buffer zone obtained by the 
guarding forces of the United Nations, the relevant parties should not need to worry 
about the ‘fait accompli’ created by Russia in the subsequent negotiations. Finally, as 
there are three parties stationed in Crimea, namely Russia, Ukraine and the United 
Nations, the author believes that the final result of this dispute may be similar to the 
mode of Cyprus.817 If so, then the guarding forces of the United Nations definitely can 
protect the ‘Buffer Zone’ for a short period of time under the command of the 
supervisory department, until the UNPKO and the peacekeeping forces have arrived at 
Crimea.  
4. Summary. 
In summary, according to the scope of research given by the author, the Crimea crisis 
in 2014 is a ‘standard’ territorial dispute that is rarely seen in the 21st century. 
Unfortunately, due to the numerous disadvantages and general rules summarized by 
previous sections and chapters, the UNCSS has failed to exert its potential influence on 
this case. If the reform plan proposed in this chapter can be adopted, however, it is quite 
clear that there is an enormous space for the improvement of the performance of the 
UNCSS. Meanwhile, it also can be said that the suggestions listed by the previous 
section could fit the corresponding situation. Therefore, the author is optimistic about 
                                                        
816 Otherwise, a large-scale armed conflict between the United Nations and one of the P5 will 
certainly signal the end of the current international system and all the credits of the United Na
tions, and this worst situation is certainly beyond the scope of the present thesis-we need gene
rals, rather than lawyers at that moment. See Lucy Ash, ‘How Russia Outfoxes Its Enemies’ 
(BBC, 29 January 2015) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-31020283> accessed 1 November
 2018. 
817 With regard to the issue of Cyprus which also has three direct parties, see Alex J. Bellamy,
 Paul D. Williams & Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (2nd edn, Polity 2010) 183-86. 
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his thoughts and personal proposal on the reform of the UNCSS, and also about the 





Writing-up to the present stage, this thesis has finally reached the moment of ultimately 
summarizing its context. As outlined in the introduction, the author will use two sub-
sections to concisely summarize the above five main chapters. These are his existing 
research findings on the basis of the research questions, and eventually the general 
summary. 
7.1 The research findings of the thesis 
Recalling the introduction, the author has set several research questions for the entire 
thesis, which surround the core theme of ‘the application of the UNCSS in territorial 
disputes’. Based on these above-mentioned questions, the findings of the thesis can be 
summarized as follows: 
Firstly, why the settlement of territorial disputes should be resorted to the UNCSS? 
Territorial disputes are one of the important international disputes that are both 
commonly seen and highly likely to trigger international armed conflicts since the 
signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The dangerous nature of them can easily 
result in the intervention of various international security mechanisms and peaceful 
measures. More importantly, although territorial disputes are widely distributed in the 
land territories of the member states of the United Nations, but their objects are both 
exceptionally valuable and crucial for a political entity to be qualified as a state. Thus, 
the related parties can hardly make any substantial compromise in respect to disputed 
territories. Besides, the subjects of territorial disputes usually just refer to sovereign 
states, especially the member states of the United Nations in the context of this thesis. 
The significance/value of territories to states and the inherent overall strength/ 
coordinated will/endurance of states have increased the difficulty and uncertainty of the 
settlement of territorial disputes.  
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In contrast to the complex characters of territorial disputes, as the primary solution to 
modern international disputes which are recommended by the international community, 
the various peaceful measures actually cannot guarantee their effectiveness, nor can 
they always ensure ‘international peace and security’. Specifically speaking, despite the 
different individual problems of these peaceful measures, the activation, operation and 
success of them are all relying on the will of the relevant parties, so that they cannot 
surely control the extreme desire or behaviour of definite states. Undoubtedly, this is an 
enormous misfortune in the process of settling territorial disputes. Given this unpleasant 
situation, as the only non-temporary measure through which states can legally, actively 
and collectively resort to armed forces, the UNCSS would naturally be regarded as a 
realistic choice for suppressing any unjustifiable private desire of the relevant parties. 
Secondly, what are the general rules governing the application of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes settlement? 
The routine operation of the UNCSS, when dealing with territorial disputes, is primarily 
through the UNSC, invoking the provisions of chapters 6 and 7 of the UN Charter. 
Between them, chapter 6 is the starting point, whilst chapter 7 is the core statute, but 
the emergence of new measures has made it impossible for these two chapters to 
completely reflect the operating mechanism of the UNCSS. Additionally, as the 
supplementary regulatory authorities, the UNGA, the ICJ and the United Nations 
Secretariat can also provide necessary assistance with due diligence, or even take over 
the overall management of this mechanism. However, from their theoretical roles and 
practical records, it can be seen that these three institutions could not completely replace 
the UNSC. Lastly, when acting as an assistant or substitute, the detailed purpose of the 
UNCSS in territorial disputes is to sanction any party which has refused the peaceful 
approach by violating international peace and security, so as to create a favourable 
environment for the subsequent processes. In other words, the UNCSS itself is not in 
charge of the eventual settlement of territorial disputes in the legal sense. 
265 
 
In terms of the surrounding issues of the UNCSS, in the process of directing the 
settlement of territorial disputes, the UNCSS may also intersect with three other 
supplementary manners. These are the peaceful measures for settling international 
disputes, the right of self-defence of states and the collective security functions of the 
regional organisations. Firstly, the intersection between the peaceful measures for 
settling international disputes and the UNCSS in territorial disputes is shown as the 
quasi-judicial power of the UNSC and the right of the parallel application of various 
peaceful measures. Meanwhile, the United Nations territorial administration system 
also has the potentiality to be involved in this field. Secondly, the right of self-defence 
of states is initially an independent route in the process of settling territorial disputes, 
and then it would be suspended or absorbed by the UNCSS after the activation of the 
latter. Thirdly, the collective security functions of the regional organisations might 
either assist or undermine the effect of the UNCSS in the process of settling territorial 
disputes. In short, the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes is not an isolated 
issue, but these surrounding mechanisms have placed them in a relatively subordinate 
supporting role in regard to the main topic of this thesis. 
Thirdly, how is the specific performance of the application of the UNCSS in 
territorial dispute settlement? 
The history of international relations since 1945 confirms that both the forcible 
measures and the non-forcible measures of the UNCSS have frequently engaged with 
territorial disputes. Nevertheless, the detailed effect and limitations of these two sets of 
measures are usually not the same. Firstly, the United Nations authorized diplomatic 
sanctions are basically supplementary measures in the process of settling territorial 
disputes, they cannot independently ‘maintain or restore international peace and 
security’. Secondly, the United Nations authorized economic sanctions can easily hurt 
the innocent third parties, and this character has negatively influenced the frequency of 
the application of this measure. Meanwhile, economic sanctions normally cannot 
achieve the pre-determined purpose of the UNCSS by themselves as well. Thirdly, the 
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United Nations authorized military enforcement actions are the ones which can exert 
the most positive practical effect on territorial disputes. However, due to its strict pre-
conditions, high costs and remaining hidden troubles, this measure has not been broadly 
applied in the field of territorial disputes. Fourthly, the substance of the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations is constantly changing, so that the accomplishments of this 
measure in the process of settling territorial disputes have changed a lot as well. Even 
so, with the increase of their mandatory power from traditional peacekeeping to 
coercive peacekeeping, the ability of achieving the predetermined purposes of the 
UNCSS of these operations is becoming better and better. 
Besides, it should be noted that as different measures of the UNCSS may partly 
compensate each other’s shortages, it is the shared weaknesses of all the forcible/non-
forcible measures which could severely affect the performance of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes. From the Ethiopia-Eritrea case, it can be seen that the non-forcible 
measures have rather moderate intensity of punishment and slow speed in terms of 
taking effect, plus the execution of them is overly relying on the co-operation of the 
member states of the United Nations. From the Iraq-Kuwait case, it can be seen that the 
forcible measures have a comparatively ambiguous legal basis and a tough operating 
environment, plus the background of their decision-making process is relatively 
imbalanced. Hence, the four sets of sanctionative measures of the UNCSS have had 
some successful experiences, but there is still some room for their further improvement. 
Fourthly, what can be improved for the future application of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes settlement? 
Concerning the fact that the UNCSS is still not perfect, it should be acknowledged that 
its future is depending on the design and implementation of the related reform plan. 
Fortunately, speaking from the perspective of realism, the problems of this mechanism 
are explainable, and the relevant researchers could accordingly find out the 
corresponding thoughts for reform. In fact, to such a security mechanism within the 
modern international legal system, the influence of power and interests upon the rational 
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and anarchic international community is still everywhere. On this basis, the author has 
proposed five applicable suggestions for the reform of the UNCSS vis-à-vis territorial 
disputes. Afterwards, with the help of the Crimea case, the author has proved that even 
without touching upon the veto power, his reform plan also can provide crucial 
assistance to the improvement of the performance of the UNCSS in territorial disputes. 
In total, it can be said that the prospect of the application of the UNCSS in territorial 
disputes settlement is worthy to be highly expected by the international community. 
7.2 General summary 
In general summary, on the basis of the perspective of realism, this thesis has thoroughly 
and critically assessed the international legal topic of the application of the UNCSS in 
territorial disputes. Firstly, from the discussion of the initial two chapters, it can be learnt 
that territorial disputes and the UNCSS are mutually important to each other. Meanwhile, 
as the corresponding background, there is a lack of relevant legal studies on the present 
research topic. Secondly, from the discussion of the middle two chapters, it can be learnt 
that both territorial disputes and the UNCSS have their specific nature and characters. 
As the result, it also can be recognized that although the general environment of the 
international community is pursuing peace and security, but the engagement between 
territorial dispute and the UNCSS is still inevitable. Thirdly, from the discussion of the 
final two chapters, it can be learnt that due to their diversified advantages and shortages, 
the various measures of the UNCSS can exert different effect on territorial disputes. 
Nevertheless, there are well-directed ways for the reform of the UNCSS in this field, 
and thereupon an applicable reform scheme can be drafted. 
Finally, as the author has mentioned in advance in the introduction, he does not 
extravagantly expect that this thesis is flawless in examining every aspect of its research 
topic. However, he sincerely hopes that his work could ‘creatively and profoundly 
reflect the unique features of the application of the UNCSS in territorial disputes’, so as 
to effectively fill a noticeable gap in the research projects of the international legal 
academia. Reviewing his academic work of over 90,000 words, the author hopes that 
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this purpose has been realized, and he also wishes that this thesis can offer valuable 
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